US-Iran Tensions: Lessons for Japan

The past several months have been quite a turbulent time for U.S.-Iran relations. Although U.S. President Donald Trump has not ruled out his own summit diplomacy with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to reduce the tensions, Washington continues to urge its allies to take a tough stance vis-à-vis Tehran and participate in patrol activities in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, a quick rise in tensions between Washington and Tehran, triggered by the United States killing General Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, resulted in a few days where the world watched nervously as the U.S. and Iran exchanged sharp rhetoric, raising worries about whether a military conflict might break out between the two.  

Even though a head-on conflict between the United States and Iran was averted, the standoff between Washington and Tehran should give Japan much to think about. 

When Iran shot down a U.S. military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in June 2019, Trump decided not to retaliate with military measures because there were no deaths on the U.S. side. He applied the same principle and decided not to respond with military force when Iran, retaliating for the U.S. killing of Soleimani, launched missile strikes against Iraqi bases in Erbil and Asad, where U.S. troops were stationed, in January 2020. What emerges from these two incidents is Trump’s “red line” for the use of force: whether hostile military actions cause U.S. deaths. This logic, while it may not be the most thoughtful or strategic, easily resonates with the general public. 

What does that mean for Japan?

Take the case of North Korea, for example. What if a North Korean missile hits Japan, but no American is harmed? Of course, if the missile is targeted at any populated area, it is highly unlikely that this would happen, given how many U.S. citizens live in Japan. But what if a North Korean missile hits one of Japan’s many unpopulated islands or a radar site? Technically, that would be an armed attack against Japan that triggers U.S. military support for Japan’s response. But can a U.S. president make the decision to support Japan militarily in counterstrikes when there is no American casualty? Can the White House make such a case to the U.S. public? 

How about an even more complicated case, such as a Chinese attempt to take the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) away from Japan’s administrative control? Again, technically, the United States is committed to support Japan in its defense of the Senkakus. Trump, his Cabinet members, and their predecessors all reconfirmed the U.S. commitment to do so. But the escalation of tensions between Japan and China over the Senkakus is highly unlikely to start by Beijing deploying the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to that area. A more likely scenario would be that tension escalates between the two countries’ coast guards as Chinese “civilians” attempt to land on one of the Senkaku Islands (or, having already landed, refuse to leave). At what point in the escalation of tensions between Tokyo and Beijing does a U.S. president decides to commit U.S. forces in support of Japan? What kind of case is made  to the U.S. public to justify that decision? 

The recent Washington-Tehran standoff also raises other issues for Japan. The showdown following Soleimani’s death demonstrated how quickly tensions can escalate. Can Japan respond quickly enough to evacuate Japanese citizens in an area where tension is quickly escalating, especially when Japan has minimal ability to control the pace of escalation? It will be hard enough for Japan to cope with a flashpoint situation unfolding in Japan’s neighborhood, such as U.S.-China tension over Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula. Does Japan have measures in place to protect Japanese nationals in more distant places, such as the Middle East or Africa?  

Based on the lessons learned from the January 2013 hostage crisis in Algeria, which resulted in the deaths of 10 Japanese citizens, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) now has legal authorization to be mobilized to conduct hostage rescues or evacuations of Japanese citizens overseas. But when the time comes, can Japanese political leaders make a decision quickly enough, and does Japan’s national security establishment have the capacity to make it happen? 

Indeed, the most recent U.S.-Iran standoff gives Japan a lot to think – or even be concerned – about.