Revisiting China’s Anti-Secession Law

China’s Anti-Secession Law was adopted 15 years ago this month. The short, 10-article piece of legislation reshaped the cross-strait relationship between mainland China and the island of Taiwan by emphasizing Beijing’s commitment to “reunification” and thwarting Taiwanese secession. China-Taiwan unification has been a top policy priority for all Chinese leaders since 1949 and Xi Jinping’s priorities appear no different. If anything, under Xi’s leadership, Beijing’s tough stance toward Taipei continues to deepen. There may also be signs that Beijing’s tolerance for protest and opposition in Hong Kong is on the decline.

The 2005 Anti-Secession Law proved controversial primarily because of a provision reserving the right to use nonpeaceful means to ensure Beijing’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Anti-Secession Law has been viewed by some as seeking to highlight avenues for the development of peaceful ties between the mainland and the island, and yet, it also undoubtedly codified a military threat. The move to “legalize” Beijing’s redline casts a long shadow over not only cross-strait relations but also Beijing’s ties to Hong Kong, which have grown increasingly tense.

The Anti-Secession Law includes a series of provisions that delineates Taiwan’s place within Beijing’s conceptualization, namely that there is “one China,” that “the state shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means,” and that Beijing’s objective is peaceful reunification. The latter half of the legislation’s provisions lay out a roadmap to build cross-strait stability and to maintain peace, such as building mutual trust; deepening economic ties; pursuing cultural, educational, health, science, and technological exchanges; as well as handling issues requiring negotiations, such as the political status of Taiwanese authorities and the island’s international presence.

Political transitions and other events, including elections, are often inflection points in cross-strait relations. This trend has been particularly acute since Taiwan’s democratic transition in the 1990s. The Anti-Secession Law came into force a year after Taiwan’s 2004 general elections, in which Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) narrowly won re-election for a second presidential term. In 2000, Chen became the first DPP member to be elected president, representing a political party first formed in the late 1980s associated with human rights advocacy, anti-communist stances, and a distinct Taiwanese identity. The 2004 presidential election also coincided with a controversial nationwide consultative referendum posing voters two questions pertaining to ties with the mainland (the first asked whether Beijing should renounce the use of force and withdraw Chinese missiles aimed at the island, and whether Taipei should strengthen its self-defense capabilities; the second asked if voters agreed that Taipei should negotiate with Beijing under the auspices of a “peace and stability” framework). Ultimately, the referendum’s results were invalid, failing to reach sufficient voter turnout.

The subsequent Taiwanese presidential election in 2008 ushered in an eight year period of cross-strait rapprochement under Ma Ying-jeou’s Kuomintang government, during which Beijing and Taipei signed numerous deals to remove barriers to trade and further economic exchange. However, by 2016, political tides had shifted again in Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP won in the 2016 general elections, paving the way for a progressive government with its first-ever legislative majority (Although the DPP has held the presidency under Chen in the 2000s, Taiwan’s legislative body had been dominated by a more conservative coalition).

Taiwan’s evolving political dynamics reflect a clear shift in how Taiwanese perceive their identity. In a 2019 poll conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 58.5 percent of respondents identified as Taiwanese, compared to 34.7 percent identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and a mere 3.5 percent as Chinese. These polls have been conducted since 1992 when mixed Taiwanese and Chinese identity was more salient. Interestingly, 2005, the year the PRC Anti-Secession Law came into effect, marked the first year in which exclusively Taiwanese identity was more salient than a mixed identity.