Has COVID-19 Infected the China-Russia Relationship?

There’s an old saying that China-Russia relations are “hot in politics” and “cold in economics,” meaning that official enthusiasm for the partnership isn’t backed up by yuan or rubles. Beneath that, there’s a deeper truth: While the top leadership in both countries sees immense strategic value in the relationship, the Chinese and Russian peoples, as a whole, don’t have the same fondness for each other. Many Chinese, especially on the more nationalist end of the spectrum, still view Russia as an imperialist power that wrested away territory in unequal treaties during the 19th century. And there’s an undeniable undercurrent of racism in the Russian popular attitude toward China, mixed with frustrations about Russia’s increasingly junior status in the relationship.

In times of stress – say, a global pandemic – those tensions become even harder to contain.

In the early days of China’s COVID-19 outbreak, before the new coronavirus even had a name, Russia had acted to ban Chinese nationals from entering the country. Land border crossing points were closed, train service was suspended, and most flight were cancelled.

Meanwhile, there were some reports that authorities were aggressively targeting presumed Chinese nationals for a round-up. In mid-February, the Associated Press reported that Mosgortrans, Moscow’s state-owned public transportation company, had told bus drivers to report any Chinese passengers who got on board – although drivers were confused about the directions. “How do I figure out if they’re Chinese? Should I ask them?” one driver wondered.

The public transit notice was part of a broader strategy to track down Chinese nationals in the Russian capital, including “raids” on hotels and stopping suspected Chinese in the streets. Moscow’s mayor said the crackdown was an “unpleasant task” but “necessary.”

In response, the Chinese embassy in Moscow urged Russian authorities not to discriminate against Chinese people. “We hope the measures will be in line with the friendship and high-level relationship between China and Russia,” the embassy said. But even that mild protest was withdrawn a few days later, with the embassy noting that “After verification, we found that the speculation was not true… Those who were taken away by police had violated Russia’s quarantine rules, and in addition to Chinese nationals, Russian[s] and other foreigners are also in the quarantine centers.”

That denial was likely an attempt to divert angry nationalist sentiment online away from Russia. If so, the effort was too little, too late – many Chinese social media users rejected the explanation, pointing to anecdotal evidence of anti-Chinese racism in Russia.

The official response to Russia’s actions is especially telling when compared to the scolding China gave to the United States for similar travel restrictions – without the alleged “raids.” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying registered China’s “strong objections” to countries imposing travel restrictions on China. “Their actions, which sowed panic among the public, will not help prevent and control the epidemic,” Hua said. “They have gravely disrupted normal personnel exchanges, international cooperation, and order of the international market for air transportation.”

It was clear, however, that those remarks were aimed mostly at the United States, though – for Russia and its restrictions, China reacted with a rhetorical shrug. Global Times called the restrictions “regrettable but understandable” and the Chinese embassy in Russia emphasized that the “decision taken by the Russian government is temporary, so we hope it will have very limited impact.”

Two months later, and the situation had been reversed. By April, China’s draconian measures had mostly stemmed the tide of COVID-19 infections. Meanwhile, Russia’s case count was starting to spike. Now it was China worrying about imported cases from Russia, with northern China emerging as the new epicenter for COVID-19. For example, all of China had 98 new imported cases on April 12. Of those, 49 were in Heilongjiang and 34 in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, both bordering Russia. All the cases in those two provinces had come from Russia (though those travellers were mostly Chinese nationals, as foreigners are largely banned from entering China). Even farther afield, COVID-19 cases from Russia were adding up. On April 11, Shanghai reported 52 imported cases – 51 of which were Chinese nationals coming from Russia.

Suifenhe had been the only operational land border crossing between Russia and China before being sealed on April 7. The city in Heilongjiang province now threatens to become a new epicenter for COVID-19 in China. Suifenhe became the site of China’s first makeshift COVID-19 hospital outside of Wuhan, and went into lockdown even as the rest of the country was emerging.  

Eurasianet neatly captured the severity of the situation:

In the almost three months following China’s first admission of coronavirus infections in Wuhan, Suifenhe had not officially registered a COVID-19 case.

But everything changed quickly in early April: Over the first seven days of the month, local officials reported 84 confirmed COVID-19 cases in Suifenhe. All the infected were Chinese citizens who had been working in and around Moscow.

Other cities, including Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang and home to 10 million people, soon followed with their own lockdowns as the number of imported COVID-19 cases continued to climb.

But from the official rhetoric being deployed, you would never know that Russia-China relations had a coronavirus problem. In a press conference on April 14, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian had nothing but praise for the partnership: “At our most trying times fighting COVID-19, Russia offered us strong support and assistance… We will further enhance cooperation with the Russian side to jointly tackle this challenges posed by the pandemic.” 

When China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin had a phone call on April 16, their second in less than a month, COVID-19 was likewise seen only as an opportunity for cooperation. “China will never forget Russia's strong support during the gravest moment in its fight against the disease,” the readout from China’s Foreign Ministry proclaimed, adding that “China will continue to extend firm support to Russia.”

“China and Russia will withstand the test of COVID-19, and their strategic coordination will grow more resilient and robust and the friendship between the two peoples will become even stronger,” the statement continued.

The Kremlin’s own readout, though slightly less effusive, noted that “mutual support in countering this global threat is further evidence of the special nature of the Russian-Chinese comprehensive strategic partnership.” Putin both “praised” China for its assistance in fighting COVID-19 and dismissed as “counterproductive” accusations that China initially covered up the new virus. 

The trouble for China-Russia relations is that the Xi-Putin bromance has not been replicated at the grassroots level. The steady rise in COVID-19 cases coming into China from Russia gave rise to social media postings speculating that Russia was covering up the extent of the outbreak – doubly ironic, given China’s record on that front. And when Chinese authorities proudly proclaimed they had sent a medical team to Russia to assist with its outbreak, netizens responded with angry reminders about Russia’s treatment of Chinese nationals in the early days of the pandemic.

This disconnect between official pronouncements and public sentiment is not unique to China-Russia relations. April also brought an ugly outpouring of racism against Africans for supposedly importing COVID-19 into China – even while China’s Foreign Ministry publicly praised the “unbreakable friendship” between China and Africa. Chinese nationalists outright rejected that notion, with a stunning number of them flatly posting “Yes, I’m a racist” along with hate speech in comments replying to the official line. Meanwhile, those comments were widely spread back to Africa by outraged social media users. As that episode proved, even in a tightly controlled society like China’s, public attitudes can do severe damage to top-level ties.

While Xi and Putin are determined to build the China-Russia relationship up even further, the foundation – people-to-people ties – is shaky. One day, with different leaders, the whole edifice might come tumbling down.