What Will China’s New Drones Bring to the Battlefield?

China’s ongoing military modernization has manifested in several advanced unmanned systems, three of which were revealed to the outside world at the October 1, 2019, military parade to commemorate China’s 70th National Day. Three systems in particular – the GJ-11, WZ-8, and HSU-001 – represent potentially major advances in the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to fight and sustain a modern war in the western Pacific. While these systems were revealed publicly, little authoritative information exists about how they might actually find themselves integrated into PLA warfighting concepts. The three systems mentioned above, however, potentially bring much to the table.

The Gongji-11 (GJ-11)/Sharp Sword: Deep Strike

At the October parade, the PLA unveiled the GJ-11 (Sharp Sword) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), which appeared to be an aerodynamically refined, stealthy design, reminiscent of the U.S. X-47B UCAV or certain renderings of the unarmed Northrop Grumman RQ-180. There is limited value in analyzing the object that was shown during the parade because it was a representational mockup, but the demonstrated model – which was photographed by foreign journalists in high resolution – offers important hints as to its role and capability.

First, the fact that the UCAV made an appearance at the parade suggests that it has entered into service. As for the system’s actual capability, the GJ-11 is slated to serve as a long-endurance, deep-strike stealth platform, capable of holding at risk targets in areas where the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) may lack aerial superiority. The efficacy of the GJ-11’s stealth is unknown, but it is likely to pose a challenge to many of the air defense radars operated by Southeast Asian countries.

Importantly, contrary to some published analyses of this system, there is nothing to suggest that the GJ-11 will be a carrier-borne system, despite its aesthetic similarities to the carrier-based X-47B. The parade model did not have important features suggesting a carrier-based role, including a tailhook for arrested recovery aboard a carrier flight deck, for instance.

The GJ-11 is likely to feature AI-enabled software and avionics for sustained combat operations, even in environments where communication with human operators might be severed or denied. The system’s onboard software may also allow for coordinated manned-unmanned teaming with normal PLAAF fighters under some circumstances. The GJ-11 is known to have been in testing since at least November 2013, according to the U.S. intelligence community.

The WZ-8: AI and Strategic Reconnaissance

Alongside the GJ-11, a strange looking system made its public debut at the October 1, 2019, parade: the WZ-8. The WZ-8’s role is, at first glance, not obvious. The two objects seen at the parade appeared as sleek, black, triangular UAVs – similar in appearance to some mockups seen of hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. They appeared too small to carry any ordnance, ruling out a “kamikaze” drone role, but the system’s airframe suggested that it had been designed for speed.

The WZ-8 relies on powered thrusters for flight and the parade units did not feature a forward inlet that might have suggested an air-breathing ramjet or scramjet design. The WZ-8 most probably has a singular role on the modern battlefield and fills a gap that is important to Chinese planners: strategic reconnaissance in ISR-denied environments. In other words, the WZ-8 is intended to be used well into a crisis or a war, when China may have lost otherwise operational ISR assets, including space-, land-, and sea-based sensors.

H-6 bombers carrying the WZ-8 could also release the drone to potentially cue the terminal guidance of China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile – particularly if the DF-21D were operating with a conventional payload, where precision requirements are less forgiving. The WZ-8 may also play a role in cueing terminal guidance for the upcoming Chinese air-launched ballistic missile (known to the U.S. intelligence community as the CH-AS-X-13), which is thought to be derived from the DF-21D.

The WZ-8, in many ways, is China’s take on the now-abandoned U.S. D-21 drone, a supersonic ramjet reconnaissance drone that was designed for a similar role. (The D-21 was built by Lockheed Martin’s infamous “Skunk Works” secret research and development effort.) Unlike the air-breathing D-21, the WZ-8 could potentially pull aerodynamic skip maneuvers at high altitudes.

The vehicle’s speed may reach as high as Mach 4.5 – near the hypersonic threshold of Mach 5. Another application for the WZ-8 – one that will benefit from the application of AI technologies – is battle damage assessment. Well into a China-U.S. conflict, the PLA may lack a capability for real-time damage assessment after standoff strikes on U.S. assets and facilities in East Asia; the WZ-8, with its supersonic flight speeds and low observability, could enter a potentially dangerous environment to autonomously assess conditions and relay information back to PLA planners, either via remote communication or by flying back while evading interception.

The precise array of sensors that may be compatible with the WZ-8 remains unknown. Curiously, the WZ-8 objects at the parade did not appear to be mockups, but real units that had seen use; high resolution imagery showed visible signs of aging on the airframe (each carried a serial number: 21311 and 21312).

Two lugs atop the unit suggested that the WZ-8 could be mounted on the bottom of China’s H-6 strategic bombers for release. The WZ-8 is rumored to be in service with the 10th Bomber Division of the PLAAF, which is in service in eastern China; these UAVs would thus play a role in Japan and Taiwan Strait contingencies, particularly in ISR-denied environments. The WZ-8, though impressive in theory, can likely be countered by advanced American and allied air defense systems, including existing Aegis destroyers.

The HSU-001: Autonomous Underwater Sensing

One of the most intriguing autonomous systems to make its debut at China’s October 1, 2019, military parade was a new type of large-displacement unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV). Likely designated the HSU-001 internally (due to a visible marking on the parade vessel), the LDUUV appears to clearly be designed for an undersea long-endurance persistent ISR mission.

The HSU-001 features a twin-screw propulsion arrangement, and at least two large sensor masts were extended during the parade. It’s unclear how stealthy the HSU-001 might be in practice. Chinese naval engineering has faced difficulties in developing especially silent submarines and smaller propellers of the type seen on the HSU-001 are particularly difficult to silence. In terms of analogs, the HSU-001 bears similarities to the U.S. Orca XLUUV, but this comparison is imprecise given the vast size difference between the two systems.

The American “extra-large” (XL) UUV is akin to many smaller manned submarines. In terms of mission objectives, the Orca XLUUV and the HSU-001 may be siblings; each appears to aim toward high-endurance autonomous underwater sensing missions. The HSU-001 is likely already deployed in the waters of the South and East China Seas for ISR missions; its targets are likely to be other UUVs and human-crewed submarines, which are a major source of concern for the Chinese military.

It is likely to be followed by several successor UUVs with similar missions. Autonomous, unmanned underwater vehicles are set to become a major feature of the naval forces of technologically advanced countries. These systems obviate the need for undersea surveillance and attack missions being limited by the endurance of human sailors (even nuclear-propelled submarines have limited crew endurance). With a theoretical ability for unlimited duration undersea persistent surveillance, investments in UUVs like the HSU-001 are set to continue.

An Increasingly Autonomous PLA

Understanding the capabilities and limitations of these systems will be important for how the United States and allies plan for high-intensity conflict in East Asia in the coming years. American defense planners have already recognized the value of sustaining an innovative edge in defense, but China has made it clear that it intends to compete at the higher-end of autonomous capabilities for surveillance, deep strike, and sensing alike. These systems are likely to also yield benefits in peacetime as well as in conflict. China’s competitors would underestimate these capabilities to their own detriment.