Kazakhstan on the Edge

When Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan for almost three decades, announced his resignation on March 19, 2019, Kazakhstanis had no way to expect what would happen next. After all, most people had assumed Nazarbayev would be president for life. While politics in Kazakhstan had always been centered around his persona, the big question of who would come next was also always hanging in the air.

There Nazarbayev was, on March 19, announcing that very moment – the end of his formal rule. He started his resignation speech without delay, saying he had decided to step down as president. On that day, I was home and heard some people celebrating from their balconies. On social media, many people were expressing their disbelief and some were very upset.

After that night things escalated quickly.

The next day, March 20, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was sworn in as Kazakhstan’s acting president. Tokayev had been speaker of the Senate and second in line for the presidency according to the Kazakh Constitution. That same day he managed to do two things: He nominated Dariga Nazarbayeva, the daughter of the first president, to replace him as Senate speaker and suggested that the capital be renamed from Astana to Nur-Sultan to cement Nazarbayev’s legacy.

March 20 shocked many with the speed of decisions made that would affect the whole country.

“March 20 was like a slap in the face,” Assem Zhapisheva, a journalist and a leader of the youth opposition movement Oyan, Qazaqstan, recalled. “Because it was a peculiar sign for society, for us, that nothing has changed.”

But some things have changed since last year. Kazakhstan had its first presidential election without Nazarbayev on the ballot; the country has also faced multiple crises, numerous nationwide protests, the redistribution of power, the dismissal of Dariga Nazarbayeva from her top position, and a “transition of consciousness.”

The process kicked off by Nazarbayev’s March 19, 2019 resignation is still ongoing and it is hard to predict what will happen next. Currently, the country is facing an unknown future fueled by many factors, including the pandemic crisis and the continuing redistribution and restructuring of power dynamics among the country’s political elite.

Kazakhstan’s First Non-Nazarbayev Presidential Election

Less than a month after Nazarbayev’s resignation, on April 9, Tokayev called for an early presidential election to be held on June 9, 2019. While Tokayev could have served out the remainder of Nazarbayev’s term, he said it was necessary to have the election early to avoid any “uncertainty.” But uncertainty continued, with many Kazakhstanis wondering whether Tokayev himself would participate in the election or whether Dariga Nazarbayeva would get the chance to try her luck. The answer became clear only on April 23, when Nazarbayev, the lifelong chair of the ruling Nur Otan party, suggested that the party nominate Tokayev to run for president.

Other little-known, pro-government parties also chose their own nominees but most Kazakhstanis heard little about those candidates. Among the most notable, there was the country’s first female presidential nominee, Daniya Yespayeva, and the first opposition candidate since 2005, Amirzhan Kosanov. Overall, seven candidates were registered to run for Nazarbayev’s vacant presidential seat.

Most experts agree that Kosanov was needed to lend some legitimacy to the election and bring more Kazakhstanis to the polling stations last June. There were heated debates among Kazakhstanis over whether one should participate in the “staged” election at all. Some critics boycotted the election, others became independent observers; the rest voted for the other candidates or Kosanov to demonstrate the level of political anger in the country.

In the election, almost 71 percent of votes were given in favor of Tokayev, Kosanov received around 16 percent, and Daniya Yespayeva came away with 5 percent. The election period was marked by nationwide protests in which some 4,000 people were detained and hundreds were jailed for at least a few days. Human rights groups expressed concern over arbitrary detentions and “excessive violence against the protesters.” Many were tried at night with no access to lawyers, food, or water, while others were taken to detention facilities in different cities and relatives were not able to locate them easily.

The protests were driven by several factors. Apart from the obvious lack of choice in the election, there was also utter disappointment in the opposition candidate, Kosanov. Some believe he betrayed his supporters by simply congratulating and praising Tokayev after his win, without calling for an investigation into what many independent observers called a fraudulent vote.

According to a recent study titled “Civic activism and digital technologies in Kazakhstan” by researchers Serik Beyssembayev, Anna Gusarova, and Karlygash Kabatova, the “disappointment in Kosanov has increased the level of distrust to politics and civil activists” among the general population. Some activists, interviewed for the study, witnessed strong skepticism toward political activity when approaching new people with their political activism. People asked activists why they should trust them and how they could guarantee they will not be “fooled” again.

But the election had a positive side, too. It brought Kazakhstanis and civil society together in exercising their rights as voters and independent observers.

“We all felt responsibility,” Zhapisheva from Oyan, Qazaqstan said. Before, she said, “we all had a sense that we cannot influence anything,” but after elections people “have felt their citizenship in full.”

Tokayev’s Promises: Reform and Change

Analyst and researcher Daniyar Kosnazarov said the decision to nominate Tokayev to the presidency was driven by his “rich international experience.” Former director-general of the UN office in Geneva, Tokayev has basically “laid the foundation of multivector policy” in Kazakhstan, Kosnazarov said. This, together with the fact that “he is not an oligarch and a vulgar person” were the key factors behind the choice of Tokayev as the next president, he added.

After Tokayev took up the position of president, he demonstrated his multivector vision in a number of interviews for international media.

In an interview with Deutsche Welle late last year, Tokayev made two controversial statements related to Kazakhstan’s powerful neighbors – Russia and China. “We do not call it annexation,” Tokayev said with regards to Crimea. Russia approved, but Kyiv expressed “deep concern” regarding this statement. As for the situation regarding ethnic Kazakhs in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, Tokayev said most of the reports from human rights organizations “are untrue” and that there was a “deliberate escalation” of the topic in the media. The statement sparked controversy, but Beijing was likely pleased.

Tokayev also used various interviews to put forth a reform narrative. In a late June 2019 Bloomberg interview, Tokayev promised “political transformation of society” and a “dialogue with the people.”

The “dialogue with the people” was created partially through the National Council of Public Trust (NCPT), which political analyst Dossym Satpayev calls an “advertisement” rather than “the real mechanism for society to influence [the decisions of the] authorities.”

There are certain “new trends” that the government is trying to engage with or react to, Iskander Akylbayev, executive director of Kazakhstan Council on International Relations (KCIR), said.

“How well prepared the government is, is still a question but at least they are trying to form a new narrative,” Akylbayev told The Diplomat.

It was via the platform of the NCPT that Tokayev announced upcoming legislative amendments regarding freedom of assembly, political parties, and libel decriminalization in late 2019. All the amendments have gone through Parliament, and the legislation on libel decriminalization was sent to the Senate at the beginning of May.

The legislation on freedom of assembly was heavily criticized by human rights organizations. It was returned from the Senate to the Parliament’s lower house, the Mazhilis. Civil society and rights activists had noted that the modified version was even more restrictive. On May 25, Tokayev signed the new legislation on demonstrations into law. Satpayev thinks that Tokayev’s attempts in this area resemble “a political game rather than a genuine desire to conduct structural political reforms.”

Serik Beyssembayev, a sociologist and co-author of the study on civic activism in Kazakhstan mentioned above, also points to the fact that society’s calls for political reform has remained “untapped.”

“Judging by how the law on peaceful assembly is being adopted, there is no talk about liberalization,” only “the preservation of the [current] political system,” Beyssembayev told The Diplomat.

He warns that the “desire of a certain part of the elite to maintain the status quo” may result in “serious consequences for the country.”

“Because, after dissatisfaction with the current socio-economic situation there comes the dissatisfaction with the political system,” he added.

Public Discontent During the Transit of Power

The aforementioned study on civic activism marks 2019 as an important year in terms of the development of civic activism in Kazakhstan. “Previously thought [of] as apolitical, Kazakhstani society had showed itself from a completely different perspective,” the authors of the study note. “During this year [2019] there was a revolution in the minds of people, especially young people,” the study suggested.

Analyst Satpayev calls it a “transition of consciousness.”

“It is these scandalous presidential elections that gave a very powerful surge of protest, especially among youth, which for a long time was apolitical,” Satpayev told The Diplomat.

Yevgeny Zhovtis, a leading human rights defender in Kazakhstan, thinks that the transition of power itself “stimulated, intensified, or escalated certain processes” both in society and in the political elite.

“The process [of changes in society] itself has accelerated because there was an illusion of opening up the political space.”

“There was an illusion that something will change, there were hopes,” Zhovtis said. This in turn, according to Zhovtis, sparked more public discontent.

It is unclear whether any of those hopes were met.

As political analyst and regional director for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Tolganay Umbetaliyeva, put it, “he [Tokayev] tries to build trust, build a bridge between him and the society. And there is a certain reaction [from society].”

Given the fairly more open attitude of Tokayev to public criticism, it is important that “such attempts to fix [things] in line with public opinion would solidify, particularly in the political sphere,” she added.

She noticed, however, that the changes that happened over the last year “are [on the] surface and do not have any solid footing,” as they are more “of informational character without any systematic changes.”

What Has Changed?

Although most experts interviewed by The Diplomat note that the changes which happened in Kazakhstan over the last year were not structural, some were nevertheless significant.

For example, the representation of women in politics and managerial positions has increased. Tokayev appointed the first female minister of sports and culture, Aktoty Raiymkulova; the first female minister of information and communication, Aida Balayeva; and the first female governor of Kyzylorda region, Gulshara Abdykalykova. Tokayev also put Kazakhstan’s chief epidemiologist, Aizhan Yesmagambetova, in charge of country’s coronavirus response. The Mazhilis passed a 30 percent quota requirement for women and young people in parties’ election lists. Three hundred young people, who have passed through various tests, have been selected for the presidential reserve. These are broadly seen as positive steps, although it is still unclear as to what happens next and how individuals can make a real impact.

Tokayev did not just appoint more women to positions of power, however; he also dismissed a woman seen by many as one of the most influential in the country: Dariga Nazarbayeva. It is still unclear why she was dismissed from her post as Senate speaker in May as no official explanation has been provided. As of writing, Nazarbayeva still has not received any new position. Many experts have connected her dismissal with a loss of influence and power.

“It is obvious that this is the most important recent event” since Nazarbayev stepped down, political analyst Satpayev said. “It was important simply because the very existence of [Dariga] Nazarbayeva as a Senate speaker constantly raised the questions about [another] transit of power in Kazakhstan.”

According to Satpayev, her dismissal means that “even President Nazarbayev himself decided not to bet on her.”

There have been some theories about intra-elite struggles for power, too, with some suggesting that Nazarbayeva was dismissed because she was too active, contradicted main official messaging, and overstepped official and nonofficial norms.

What is clear, however, is that the decision could not have happened without approval from her father, Nazarbayev himself.

Tokayev suggested technocrat and Nazarbayev loyalist Maulen Ashimbayev to replace Nazarbayeva as Senate speaker. When suggesting Ashimbayev during his speech in the Senate, Tokayev said that the “coordinated actions of all branches of the government are needed” and the Senate has “a special role in implementing the most important reforms” that, in turn, will “secure stability and order.” Nazarbayeva as Senate speaker may have had another view of the Senate’s role, which did not give way for certain reforms.

Nazarbayeva is gone for now and this raises the question: Is this the beginning of the post-Nazarbayev era in Kazakhstan? It may well be.

Kosnazarov noted that people are gradually getting used to the idea of living in a post-Nazarbayev era. “I think psychologically and mentally it is a big thing.”

Satpayev thinks that the “Nazarbayev era is ending,” and therefore, some rules of the game are also changing. “Tokayev understands well that in the future fight for power, which will happen sooner or later after Nazarbayev [is gone], he needs to get the support from the [regular] people,” Satpayev said.

Such a transition cannot happen fast, political scientist Umbetaliyeva adds, “and the feeling of the [finished] transition will not be registered immediately.”

Although the emerging of a post-Nazarbayev era is undeniably in progress, some aspects of life remain unchanged. In terms of human rights, there are almost no changes, according to Zhovtis, who serves as the director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law.

“People are still being imprisoned for their views or expression of their opinions... the political opposition is being pressured the same way, [the] same surveillance takes place. Nothing has changed, neither from the legislative point of view nor from practice,” Zhovtis concluded. “A year has passed – apart from declarations, statements, promises – nothing in principle has changed.”

The authors of the study referenced above found that one of the main restrictions on the development of civic activism has been the “authoritarian character of state institutions.”

“With the growth and development of civic activism, the reaction and response from the authorities increases accordingly,” the study found.

Beyssembayev recalls one phrase from an activist he interviewed: “Activism in Kazakhstan’s condition is not about helping the country to progress; it is, rather, stopping its fall into the abyss.”

The Coronavirus Crisis and Its Consequences in Kazakhstan

The coronavirus pandemic may very well contribute to Kazakhstan’s “fall into the abyss,” given the significant global changes that will affect the country’s economy. In order to prevent disaster, Tokayev announced an unprecedented coronavirus support package worth around $14 billion. The package included support for the economy, financial help for the unemployed as well as medical workers, additional funding for state programs, and support of the national healthcare system.

The novel coronavirus, and the deadly disease it causes, COVID-19, not only exposed long-standing problems in the country’s political space and economy, but also revealed how, and how well, the country was prepared to tackle something like COVID-19, Zhovtis said. “What is more important, coronavirus highlighted what the government can do really well – it can shut down, set rules, bring army and police to the streets, create roadblocks, thus, to control everything.”

Tokayev announced a state of emergency on March 16, which was extended twice and ended on May 11. In the first month, by April 16, there were more than 5,000 administrative charges for violation of quarantine rules and more than 1,600 people were jailed. Human Rights Watch expressed concern regarding jail terms during the pandemic in Kazakhstan.

Among the detained violators of quarantine were bloggers and activists who documented the work of military and police. As no protests are allowed during a state of emergency, some activists were detained for their active stances online. Alnur Ilyashev, a critic of the ruling Nur Otan party and the government, has been given a jail sentence until June 18 for “spreading false information during the state of emergency.” The details of his specific case are still unclear, as of writing.

On the exact same charges, authorities arrested a former member of Tokayev’s National Council of Public Trust, media manager Arman Shorayev. He was released shortly after a lawyer became involved and all charges were dropped. Again, no details were provided to the public about what inspired the original charge.

“It is a selectiveness of law,” Zhapisheva from Oyan, Qazaqstan said. “We see every day how such selectiveness works when some people are not touched by the law, while for others this law applies,” she told The Diplomat about Ilyashev’s case. “This is how they silence [people].”

Given the ongoing struggle for political reforms, the current crisis caused by the pandemic could be a trigger to restructure the economy. An unprecedented number of job cuts, particularly in the oil sector, could lead to the authorities making certain political decisions about the economy. But change will not be easy.

“In this new challenging time, with coronavirus and low oil prices, the Kazakh government sees that it cannot operate in an old-fashioned way. We see that they’re trying to make some changes but it’s not easy because old habits die hard,” analyst Iskander Akylbayev said. “To reform the economy, I think, is even more challenging than to reform [the] political aspect,” he added.

Satpayev thinks that Kazakhstan will be hit harder that other Central Asian economies because of its dependency on the oil market. Amid the public health crisis, the demand for oil plummeted as countries around the world locked down and closed their borders.

“The sharp declines in oil prices have led to [a] budget deficit, which led to the fall of the national currency and its devaluation, which, in turn, led to high inflation and increased prices,” he added. “This is a chain reaction.”

A recent study done by KPMG, an international accounting organization, concluded that the economic fallout of the COVID-19 crisis in Kazakhstan will be one of the deepest after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Hundreds of people were seen attempting to cross “borders” into Kazakhstan’s big cities after the state of emergency was lifted, as they have no jobs and no money to support their families. Despite some financial help from the government for millions of people who have lost their jobs, almost the same number of people have had their applications for aid rejected. The dire economic situation, and its consequences, will become increasingly apparent as time goes on.

Sociologist Serik Beyssembayev said that there is already a trend of growing uncertainty and fear for the future among Kazakhstanis, especially with regards to the coronavirus and the “upcoming new economic crisis.”