Is the EU Souring on China?

May 2020 marked the 45th anniversary of China-European Union relations. Despite a history of warming ties, anchored by significant growth in trade relations, the past few years have exposed differences among EU member states in their approach to engaging with China. While much attention has been given to how China’s coronavirus response and subsequent diplomacy may be coloring and reshaping Beijing’s international relations, signs of a tougher EU position toward China were already afoot before COVID-19.

European publics increasingly view China as the world’s leading economy, although favorability marks have waned, according to 2019 polling by the Pew Research Center. Central and Eastern European states hold more mixed views of China, while the percentages of favorable views in France, Germany, and the U.K. hover in the mid to low 30s.

Two-way trade in goods between the EU bloc and China more than doubled in the last decade, growing from 260 billion euros in 2009 to more than 560 billion euros in 2019 with machinery dominating both exports and imports. And yet concerns over market access for European firms in China have stymied the conclusion of an investment treaty, and the absence of an EU-wide investment review process has led to a fragmented position on China’s expansion into technology and infrastructure in Europe, including on 5G and ports.

In a bid to foster a more unified front vis-a-vis foreign investment, the EU finalized a screening mechanism last spring with new rules to scrutinize deals in critical sectors, including communications, data, energy, finance, space, and transport infrastructure. Once the mechanism enters into force in late 2020, the European Commission will be able to request information and issue opinions on specific investment deals in an EU member state.

Changing perceptions are also reflected in a rhetorical shift from the European Union. In the past, EU officials and European leaders alike have had misgivings about pushing back too resolutely against Beijing’s influence. However, Brussels may be shedding this more demure and accommodating posture. A little over a year ago, outgoing High Representative Federica Mogherini described China-EU relations as both “principled” and “pragmatic.” The EU then released a report identifying China as not only a cooperative and negotiating partner, but also an economic competitor and a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.”

Despite leadership changes in the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in December 2019, there was continuity in the tougher EU tone regarding China and that has carried through the pandemic response.

The EU has emphasized the existence of a battle in global narratives, both specifically in the context of the pandemic and more broadly. The European External Action Service issued a report in April 2020 highlighting Russian and Chinese efforts to “target conspiracy narratives and disinformation both at public audiences in the EU and the wider neighborhood.” Separately, Josep Borrell, European Union high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, told media that the EU had been “naive” in its relationship with China. More recently, in an op-ed published in European outlets, Borrell called for the future of EU-China relations to be grounded in “trust, transparency and reciprocity.” In early May, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, backed calls for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, though she also urged for China’s involvement in the process, framing it as one that would generate information as a public good rather than one in which China would be antagonized.

Nevertheless, while the EU has successfully obtained some compromises from China on the economic front, Brussels’ tougher tone has not been costless. Beijing has simultaneously moved to more actively exploit differences among EU member states and neighboring states, particularly in those who share a greater skepticism of Brussels. “The tougher EU line also allows weaker and more vulnerable member states to stay the course with China without facing retribution from Beijing,” write the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Erik Brattberg and Philippe Le Corre.

Bolder Chinese actions in European countries – in the form of propaganda, misinformation, or sensitive investments – may push European leaders to set aside some of their differences in how to reconcile national preferences versus European ones to craft a more unified China policy. This is certainly the hope of EU officials as articulated by Borrell: “It is up to us Europeans to maintain the necessary collective discipline. Unity is a pre-condition for influence.” EU officials are also likely to capitalize on an international moment void of U.S. leadership to carve out a larger role for the bloc on the global stage in advocating for greater cooperation and a multilateral approach to address common challenges.

Ultimately, the consequences will bear out in time. “In the short term, Beijing might be able to win some hearts and minds, especially among the more Eurosceptic members of our societies, who are more prone to accept alternatives to traditional alliances. However, in the longer term it will be more difficult for the Chinese government to convince large groups in [European] governments and societies of its innocence in this crisis and of the benevolence of its gestures,” writes Mercator Institute for China Studies’ Lucrezia Poggetti for ChinaFile.