The Diplomat
Overview
What Can Japan Learn From Its COVID-19 Missteps?
Eugene Hoshiko, Associated Press
Northeast Asia

What Can Japan Learn From Its COVID-19 Missteps?

Japan has ended its state of emergency. But instead of simply declaring victory, politicians should take heed of the lessons learned.

By Yuki Tatsumi

On May 25, the Japanese government canceled the state of emergency it had declared on Tokyo and its neighboring prefectures. This officially ended the state of emergency for all parts of Japan a week ahead of schedule. Beyond this point, the Japanese government will have to forge its way toward a post-COVID-19 stage. That requires the government to strike a delicate balance between pushing forward to reopen its economy while continuing to heed public health concerns. With estimates that Japan’s economy will contract by as much as 20 percent, it will not be an easy path for the government to navigate. 

One thing that is remarkable, however, is how Japan, despite its initial missteps and setbacks in containing the virus between late March and early May, has come out of what hopefully is the worst of its COVID-19 wave relatively unscathed. As of May 25, the total death toll in Japan from COVID-19 was approximately 850, with the number of confirmed cases approximately 16,500. Even with the possibility that there are unreported cases, the number of deaths Japan suffered from COVID-19 is extremely low for a country that has a population of approximately 126 million people. In other words, by any international standards, Japan is undoubtedly among the “success stories” in the fight against COVID-19.

How Japan came out of the worst (so far, anyway) of its COVID-19 crisis is a big mystery. The government never imposed restrictions as severe as those seen throughout Europe, with the exception of Sweden. Although the central government had to declare a state of emergency, the duration was far shorter than in most industrialized countries. The initial period was 14 days, and although Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had to extend the state of emergency to the end of May, he ended up lifting it a week ahead of schedule anyway. There was never an “order” of any kind by the government that was imposed on its citizens — rather, the government, both central and local, repeatedly reinforced their “strong request” for cooperation on social distancing and other restrictions. 

It is easy for those in Japan to focus on the bottom line — the very low death rate — and tout the country’s success. Indeed, there have already been commentaries that discuss the success of the “Japanese style” response to the pandemic. That said, however, there is no doubt that Abe and his government came under fire from citizens for their inadequate response to COVID-19. The pandemic hit Abe politically — an opinion poll released by Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) on May 19 indicated that the support rate for Abe had fallen to 37 percent, with some newspaper polls showing the support rate ever lower, below 30 percent. 

What did the government get wrong? 

First and foremost, the government’s response always seems to have been chasing after the situation on the ground. Despite having ample time to learn from the examples of other governments — everything from Taiwan’s success in containing the virus, to South Korea’s quick adaptation to the evolving situation on the ground, to the explosion of COVID-19 in the United States, which most blame on the Trump administration’s lack of urgency in its response early on — the measures Japanese government rolled out were mostly in response to the changing situation, rather than anticipating the next steps. 

Second, the processes through which some of the critical decision were made were far from being transparent. Abe’s abrupt announcement shutting down schools for most of March came as a near complete surprise to all the school systems, leaving faculties as well as students and their parents scrambling for a solution. Similarly, the government’s “strong recommendation” for the private sector and other entities to allow their staff to telework came without giving due consideration to the reality of many workplaces across Japan — telework has really not taken root in Japanese business culture — which, in turn, left the private sector on its own to improvise. And as in many other countries, the contraction of social activities as a result of the pandemic has driven countless small business owners and those who are self-employed into economic hardship. 

Finally, the pandemic exposed a critical weakness in the capacity of Japanese political leaders: an inability to communicate effectively with the public in a way that resonates with their concerns. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that the ability of political leaders to effectively convey accurate information, as well as the government’s goals and challenges, to the general public is critical. Communication from the government’s top leadership is not only essential in maintaining transparency but also a critical tool in preventing the spread of disinformation, panic among the public, and other negative impacts on a society in crisis. Indeed, from a pandemic to a natural disaster to an imminent armed conflict, the ability for a country’s leadership to be able to effectively communicate with the public is indispensable in any type of national crisis. 

Unfortunately, it is in this area that the Japanese government failed its public. The last two months suggested that even the most skillful and politically-savvy leader, such as Abe, is often not an effective communicator with the public. One might argue that the lack of such a capacity is partly structural. Under a parliamentary democracy, politicians hone their skills to work with fellow politicians, and to effectively mobilize resources within government agencies to get things done. But the ability to articulate their intentions, the goals they are trying to reach, the challenges they foresee in the process and so much more, is usually not a part of the requirements to become effective politicians in Japan. If anything, those who have oratory skills can become the subject of satire or mockery (for example, former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, one of Japan’s most articulate politicians and well-known to the Washington, D.C. policy community, has often been ridiculed in Japan with the nickname “Iu dake bancho” -- Mr. Words Without Implementation). However, when you look at the leaders in other parliamentary democracies such as New Zealand, where steady communication by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has been effective, one cannot blame the government structure alone for the lack of communication ability on the part of Japanese politicians. 

Given their seeming success in containing the spread of COVID-19, it will be much easier for Japanese leaders to give themselves a pat on the back and move their focus to restoring the economy. However, there were missteps made by the government that resulted in the rapidly falling support rate of Prime Minister Abe. Strategic communication (or lack thereof) during the crisis was only one of the “lessons learned” that leaders need to reflect on in the coming days and months. 

Want to read more?
Subscribe for full access.

Subscribe
Already a subscriber?

The Authors

Yuki Tatsumi is a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program and director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center.

Northeast Asia
South Korea-China Relations Amid the Pandemic
Northeast Asia
The Rise of Japan’s Governors: Central-Local Relations During a Pandemic
;