Has COVID Re-Militarized Indonesia?

The Indonesian archipelago has been slammed by the coronavirus. On July 27, the country crested 100,000 confirmed cases and had suffered 4,838 deaths. In the days ahead of publication, Indonesia was averaging 1,500 new cases per day. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia has the highest number of cases, followed by the Philippines and Singapore. There are reports that the situation could be worse than the numbers show: Testing rates are low and there is a stigma attached to being COVID-19 positive. Indonesia’s health sector, already under strain – with four doctors and 12 hospital beds for every 10,000 people, and only three intensive care beds per 100,000 people – is breaking. In mid July, Indonesia’s top medical bodies announced that 61 doctors had died of COVID-19, 14 doctors that week alone. Meanwhile, 167 nurses had succumbed to the virus. 

As Indonesia’s government struggles to contain the pandemic, it has harnessed all state assets including one of the country’s oldest and most trusted institutions: the military. 

The conspicuous role of the Indonesian armed forces has drawn attention from commentators and analysts who have questioned whether the country’s response has been overly militarized. Such concerns are raised as part of a broader discussion about democratic decline not just in Indonesia but across Southeast Asia. That said, such generalizations reveal little about how the military is being used in overcoming the current public health crisis in the short to medium term or how this will impact civil-military relations in the long term. 

Is the coronavirus actually leading to a military comeback, or is this business as usual?

A Prominent Role in Fighting COVID-19 

There is no doubt that the Indonesian military, as well as the police, has had a prominent and wide-reaching role in combatting the coronavirus. The military has been visible from the national level, including figures around President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, all the way down to uniformed personnel providing assistance at the village level. Key military figures include the controversial health minister, retired Army General Terawan Agus Putranto, known for attributing Indonesia’s low infection rates at the beginning of the pandemic to God, and head of the National Agency for Disaster Prevention (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB), Lieutenant General Doni Monardo, who is also chief of Indonesia’s Coronavirus Disease Response Acceleration Task Force.

At the working level, the military has fallen into a familiar pattern by virtue of its constant deployment against Indonesia’s frequent and intense natural disasters and emergencies. The military’s long-standing experience and high readiness have seen Indonesian Air Force assets used to evacuate citizens out of China’s Wuhan province, where COVID-19 originated, in January and to retrieve medical equipment donated by China. The military has also acted as administrators of COVID-19 emergency hospitals in Kemayoran, Jakarta, and Galang Island. In the early weeks of the government’s response, a 140-member military medical team of general practitioners, specialists, nurses, and pharmacists was deployed to the athletes village built for the 2018 Asian Games but converted into the capital’s emergency hospital, headed by the Jakarta military commander. The Indonesian military was also directed to construct makeshift regional hospitals in preparation for an influx of what might have been thousands of infected citizens as well as hand out protective equipment. The military focused on distributing personal protective equipment (PPE) to provinces with poor connectivity or bordering neighboring countries.

As the virus spread, the role of security forces intensified. 

In late May, when Indonesia had around 23,000 confirmed coronavirus infections and 1,391 deaths, 340,000 troops and police officers were deployed to enforce a government decree restricting travel during the month of Ramadan, as well as rules on wearing face masks and physical distancing. With Indonesia easing its restrictions in June and July and headed into a phase dubbed the “new normal,” the military chief told reporters that security personnel would be deployed to four provinces – Jakarta, West Java, West Sumatra, and Gorontalo – “in public places where people converge, including shopping malls, markets and tourist resorts.” 

Is COVID-19 a Chance for a Military Comeback?

Despite the extensive role of the military, there are few reasons to believe it signifies a degrading of civil-military relations. For one, the use of the military to help combat the pandemic is not unique to Indonesia. Other Southeast Asian countries, like the Philippines and Singapore, as well as regional neighbors like Australia, have engaged military personnel to enforce lockdowns or to monitor border checkpoints. New Zealand recently appointed its assistant chief of defense to monitor quarantines and oversee isolation facilities. Neither is it unusual for the military to be used during crises; the Indonesian military’s logistics chain and reach have been frequently relied upon in natural disasters, particularly to reach remote parts of the sprawling archipelago. Nevertheless, some analysts have argued this stepped-up military presence is an opportunity for the military to take over or a sign of eroded democratic norms.

The claim of a military resurgence based on the presence of military personnel in traditionally civilian roles is also not strongly supported. A recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia found that, for now, the Indonesian military is acting like a supporting cast member, working in coordination with civilians, rather than taking the lead in ways that threaten civilian capacity. The authors found that there was only a “partial” militarization of public policy, that is, the degree to which military officers are in positions of influence with regard to both policy decision-making and implementation. Despite the presence of retired personnel in positions such as the health minister, the report found that the 21 or so retired or active duty military officers directly involved in the decision-making process related to COVID-19 mitigation at the national level did not take orders or work for the military leadership. At the local level, the report also found that, while hundreds of military officers are working as deputy chiefs in local COVID-19 task forces, they do not dominate them. Rather, local civilian leaders still control decision-making, with the military providing support in implementing mitigation efforts.

As Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a former presidential adviser on foreign affairs, stated, there do need to be clear guidelines about the military’s role for nonsecurity threats. Indonesian Law 34 of 2004 on the National Armed Forces (TNI) states that the military can act in operations other than war, including in times of natural disaster and to provide humanitarian aid, but the norm of military involvement in daily affairs has been long established by the country’s territorial system. Under this system, military personnel presence stretches from a major general commanding at the provincial level to an NCO at the village level. While Anwar is right – there needs to be clarity about the military’s role in nontraditional security matters – the challenge lies in the uniform and consistent application of these guidelines in a sprawling archipelago. 

Expectations that Indonesia’s civil-military relations will resemble those other democratic states do not adequately account for the country’s history since 1945, in which the military has played a significant role in politics, economics, business, diplomacy, education, and the media. Like the Singaporean military, the presence of the Indonesian military during the critical early stage of the pandemic not only signaled government action but provided an important morale boost. While the military has a dark past of human rights violations and is still in conflict with some armed groups today, it has continued to enjoy high levels of public trust. Despite an overall dip in trust in government institutions this year, one survey recorded the military as the most trusted institution in the country, with an approval rating of 85.5 percent.

COVID Also Hits the Military Hard

Claims of a mid-pandemic military takeover might be unfounded, but the virus is having other serious effects on the armed forces. 

A cluster of infections was discovered at the Army Officer Candidate School in West Java in July, leading to a government-imposed lockdown. At its height, 1,308 positive cases, comprising student officers, staff, and family members living on the grounds, were detected in the cluster, with 17 people requiring hospitalization. According to an update from the army chief on July 19, the number of active cases had dropped to 840. Out of 1,198 student officers, 991 were confirmed to have the virus.

While the original source of the cluster remains unknown, the case demonstrates the ease with which the virus can spread in close living and training quarters, even with health protocols in place. The candidates would ordinarily have graduated in July as second lieutenants and, given how close they were to completion, probably still will, despite one Indonesian report questioning whether their education was sufficiently complete. That said, if Indonesia’s coronavirus transmission cannot be managed, further adjustments will be needed to prevent serious disruptions to successive cohorts in military training and education institutions. The risk is not limited to the military, in April 300 of 1,550 cadets at the Police Officer Candidate School, also in West Java, tested positive for the virus.

The army cadet cluster could also have an impact on the military’s leadership. Writing for Asia Times, John McBeth suggested that these lapses could affect the appointment choices for the chief of military role, expected next year when the current chief retires. If he cannot manage the current cluster, the current favorite, Army Chief General Andika Perkasa, might be edged out in favor of Navy Chief Admiral Yugo Margono. If Andika is successful, then three out of the previous four military heads will have come from the army. While the rotational system between the services in appointing the chief is not set in stone, it encourages greater air force and navy influence in an otherwise army-dominant military. A navy military head dovetails well with Jokowi’s maritime ambitions. The presence of Chinese vessels, which obstinately sat in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone for weeks in December, was an indisputable reminder of the country’s maritime vulnerabilities. That said, given the current army chief’s father-in-law is former General A.M. Hendropriyono and a current adviser of the president, politics might win out over pragmatism, unless Andika’s coronavirus performance becomes a serious issue.

Another area under pressure due to the coronavirus is the defense budget. After an increase in last year’s state budget, the defense allocation has been cut twice this year, down to 117.9 trillion Indonesian rupiahs ($8.12 billion) in response to the pandemic. While the lion’s share is spent on personnel, this will not be affected. As the largest service, the army chief announced in early July that the 4 trillion rupiah reallocation of his service’s budget related only to defense equipment, not personnel salaries. A defense ministry spokesperson also said that capability purchases from local manufacturers would be prioritized. However, Indonesia’s indigenous defense industry does not produce all of the sorts of high-end equipment earmarked to modernize the forces. 

Given the vast expense of upgrading air force and naval platforms, budgetary adjustments and delayed purchases are likely to negatively impact the two services whose functions directly contribute to boosting Indonesia’s maritime capabilities. As highlighted by defense expert Marchio Irfan Gorbiano, the government’s military modernization plans will likely need to be reevaluated; purchases will either be axed or delayed. The Trade and Defense Ministries are currently collaborating to find countertrade options – paying with commodities such as palm oil, rubber, machinery, or coffee in exchange for defense equipment – to overcome budget shortfalls. Yet, the success of this plan and the medium-term impacts of these budgetary changes on capability remain to be seen. As Alban Sciascia and Anastasia Febiola Sumarauw  recently pointed out, a better idea might be to use the navy’s ships to develop hospital ship-like capacities, especially in an archipelago. This versatility could then leave the military with assets to deploy in diplomatic health initiatives in future.

Lastly, the virus has intensified the military’s fight against extremist groups in Indonesia. In early July, the government announced that joint police-military operations known as Operation Tinombala against the Islamic State-affiliate East Indonesian Mujahideen (MIT) would be extended until the end of September. As a report by the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict recently stated, a resurgence of violence in the eastern Indonesian city of Poso in the first half of this year is directly related to COVID-19; remaining MIT members have vowed to fight on, emboldened by the belief that the virus was the “army of Allah” and that new recruits would join them. While these operations are small in scale relative to the military’s overall pandemic response, nonetheless, the involvement of security forces in counterterrorism is critical in preventing attacks. Dealing with groups like MIT removes sources of potential recruitment, provided human rights violations have not occurred and the children of fighters likely to seek revenge are counselled. While the police lead counterterrorism operations, they are also stretched thin due to the health crisis. The Indonesian National Police recently deployed 77,897 personnel to ease the transition toward the so-called “new normal” across the nation. This ties up resources that could be directed to post-release monitoring of convicted terrorists. This is particularly important given the planned release of up to 50,000 inmates to alleviate risks of intra-prison transmission of COVID-19.

For Jokowi, It’s Butter Over Guns … for Now

For Jokowi, the military is playing an indispensable role alongside the Healthy Ministry, police, and other government institutions attempting to reduce the country’s alarming rates of infection. Given the normalization of the military’s role in a number of civilian areas, particularly in remote areas, in education, health, agriculture, religion, and private security, there are few reasons for the president to change the status quo in the short to medium term. Already serving his second term, Jokowi’s focus will be on the health of the economy. Released in May, Indonesia’s National Economic Recovery (NER) program is estimated to cost 641.17 trillion rupiahs ($43 billion) and includes tax breaks, subsidies for enterprises, and financial assistance for vulnerable households.

Such economic recovery will depend on foreign markets for Indonesian goods and foreign sources of investment, particularly from China. Indeed, China’s offer of medical equipment assistance to Indonesia in March was one example of Beijing making the most of health crisis diplomacy. However, with China’s threatening moves in Indonesia’s Natuna Seas in December and gradual ASEAN pushback on China’s claims in the South China Sea, Indonesia will be, as always, trying to keep stable relations with Beijing while standing up for its sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, with potential cuts or delays to military hardware, Indonesia’s medium- to long-term maritime defenses, and thus its ability to at least patrol and protect its EEZ, might be impacted. With the United States weighed down heavily by the virus, questions remain about the future of its strategic presence in the region. 

Conclusion

On a recent visit to East Java, the worst affected province, Jokowi was shocked to hear that roughly 70 percent of residents were not wearing masks. The figure allegedly came from an online survey from the end of May and is alarming given the high incidence of community transmission in the country’s second most populous province. In addition to travelers returning home after the end of Ramadan, experts claim that a lack of enforcement and sanctions for violators has been a factor in Indonesia’s high infection rates. The military’s focus thus will be to do what it can, alongside government bodies and the community, to prevent further spread among Indonesia’s 267 million inhabitants. While Indonesia’s civil-military balance is unique to the archipelago and continues to evolve, it won’t be COVID-19 that tips the scales.