Boris Johnson’s Shifting Stance on China

The past year has been a turbulent one in China-U.K. relations and U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson appears to be increasingly at the heart of a new “tough on China” position. In July, U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab announced the extension of the U.K. arms embargo to China, as well as changes to the country’s extradition treaty with Hong Kong amid concerns about Beijing’s implementation and enactment of a new national security law in the Chinese special administrative region. Johnson, who has been prime minister since July 2019, stated that the new national security legislation was a “clear and serious” violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, signed in 1984 and which came into force in 1997, to hand Hong Kong back to China. The U.K. government, in its revision of the British National Overseas (BNO) passports and visa policies, offered a potential pathway to citizenship for more than 3 million Hong Kong residents.

Hong Kong developments have not been the sole source of tension between London and Beijing. After initially allowing equipment from China telecom giant Huawei to be used to develop part of the United Kingdom’s 5G network in January, U.K. officials announced in July that Huawei gear would no longer be used and any that was already installed would be removed by 2027. Officials explained that the decision was forced by U.S. sanctions against the Chinese firm. 

Separately, the U.K. government accused China of “gross and egregious” human rights abuses against the Uyghur population, primarily located in Xinjiang. Raab suggested that the imposition of sanctions against those responsible for such policies could not be ruled out. These developments have unfolded amid the world’s patchwork response to the global coronavirus pandemic.

“Tough on China” is a somewhat new look for the United Kingdom. Historically, the U.K. was among the first Western countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China as the government of China in 1950; however, mutual recognition from Beijing, allowing for the formal exchange of ambassadors, only came in 1972. More recently, the U.K. made waves by breaking ranks with U.S. opposition to the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and becoming a founding member of the institution. London’s backing led a swath of other Western countries to join, including France, Germany, and Italy. 

Boris Johnson himself is a self-described Sinophile. As mayor of London (2008-2016), and the host of the 2012 Summer Olympics, he traveled to Beijing to attend the closing ceremony of the 2008 games. Johnson also attended a number of events on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s busy multi-day state visit in October 2015. In a joint press conference at the time, Xi and then-Prime Minister David Cameron committed to “open up a golden era of an enduring inclusive win-win China-U.K. relationship, and jointly create an even brighter future for our relations.” The visit also resulted in deals worth more than 30 billion British pounds. While much of Johnson’s time as foreign secretary (from 2016 to 2018) was dominated by navigating the fallout of Brexit negotiations, he also made clear his intent to foster positive ties with Beijing.

Even in the early days of his tenure as prime minister, Johnson signaled a seemingly pro-China stance, with a willingness to carry on the “golden-era” of U.K.-China relations. Johnson reportedly exclaimed “I love China” in a call with Xi in February 2020. He has voiced enthusiasm for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and committed to keep the U.K. “the most open economy” in Europe for Chinese investment. He has also acknowledged the contributions of China and its people to not only the U.K. economy but society as well, praising the inclusion of so many Chinese students within British universities. London also remains the largest clearing house of Chinese renminbi outside of China. 

But now the tide toward China is shifting, with Johnson’s government standing up to Beijing’s increasing bluster.

What explains this revision in Johnson’s position vis-à-vis China? Likely a confluence of factors is at work. For one, Xi’s China has grown more ambitious in its international conduct, demanding a greater voice in decisionmaking and the carrying out of global governance, as well as doubling down on state-centric multilateralism. 

The United States has also exerted its own diplomatic pressure on its ally across the Atlantic. After the U.K. reversed its decision on Huawei, U.S. President Donald Trump took credit for the change in policy. New U.S. sanctions against the Chinese company added restrictions that affected trade policies in third-party countries. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has also traveled to London, meeting with Conservative MPs who share similar national security concerns about the extent of China’s economic presence in the American and U.K. markets.

Finally, Johnson faces significant pressure domestically to revisit U.K.-China relations. Much of the charge has been led by fellow backbench members of Johnson’s Conservative Party, including Tobias Ellwood, the current chair of the defense committee of the House of Commons.

“This is a pivotal moment — a moment that is overdue — for us to recalibrate our stance, our geostrategic position with China,” Ellwood told POLITICO. “We are heading into a Cold War,” he added. Iain Duncan Smith, an MP and former Conservative leader has said, “[China] is not a country that is in any way managing itself to be a good and decent partner in anything at the moment.” 

These calls for more action against China have also been echoed by members of parliament from different political parties, including Liberal Democrat MP Alistair Carmichael, as well as Labor leader Keir Starmer, who urged the U.K. government not to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses in China. The U.K. public, too, has not been silent. A petition calling for invoking “Magnitsky law” sanctions over China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims garnered more than 100,000 signatures, forcing a debate on the matter in parliament.

Alone, these separate components may not have been sufficient to so disrupt the expanding ties between London and Beijing, but combined they have been enough to push Johnson and his government to recalibrate the relationship’s direction. 

Johnson will seek to strike a balance between being tough on China and appearing overly compliant with the world’s second largest economy. He stated he would not be “pushed into a position of becoming a knee-jerk Sinophobe on every issue, somebody who is automatically anti-China.”

“What we won’t do, as I say, is completely abandon our policy of engagement with China,” Johnson said.

How much of the bridge will be burned remains to be seen as further friction between London and Beijing could lead to a more turbulent global economy and harden one of Beijing’s stronger advocates in the West.