Myanmar’s Peace Process: The China Factor

After multiple rounds of postponement, Myanmar finally held the Fourth Union Peace Conference (UPC) from August 19 to 21. More than two years had passed since the Third UPC, despite the National League for Democracy (NLD) government’s original plan to convene the UPC every six months. Despite the low expectations for concrete progress and deliverables from the Fourth UPC, the conference arguably provided much-needed direction for the future of the peace process beyond the general elections this November.

The Fourth UPC was also notable for the absence of several ethinc groups that had previously been nudged to attend by China. Beijing has been an indispensable and significant player in Myanmar’s peace process. However, during this election year, the civil-military dynamics in Myanmar, developments in Rakhine state, and great power competition are all complicating China’s role in the peace process at this juncture. 

China and the Fourth Union Peace Conference 

Despite rounds of delays, the Fourth UPC was attended by representatives of the NLD government, the military, ethnic parliaments, political parties, and 10 signatory groups of the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord. In terms of substantive deliverables, the conference passed the Third Part of the Union Accord, affirmed the principle agreement on a true “democratic federal union,” and passed a peace work plan for after 2020.

Because few had high expectations of the Fourth UPC, the lack of both a substantive agreement and the inclusive participation of all ethnic armed groups (EAOs) was well-anticipated. The Burmese government and pro-government media have tried to cast a positive light over the achievements of the UPC, selectively emphasizing the deliverables that were passed. It is arguably true that the key utility of the Fourth UPC lies in setting the future direction of the peace process after the 2020 elections. Although the development will inevitably be subject to change beyond the control of the Burmese government, an effort to roughly sketch the direction is still important.

The biggest weakness of the Fourth UPC is the absence of the six EAOs from northern Myanmar who had received the invitation from the Burmese government. The six groups, along with the Arakan Army (AA), had formed their political alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), in 2017. Although the EAOs attributed their absence to the logistical difficulty posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the failure of the Burmese authorities to meet the “inclusiveness” criteria for the peace conference is the essential reason for their refusal to participate. Both the civilian government and the military designated AA a terrorist organization and excluded it from the peace process; FPNCC perceives this as deliberate set-up by the NLD government, part of a conspiracy to “divide and conquer.”

One of the most important roles that China played in the Union Peace Conferences of the past was ensuring the participation of the EAOs from northern Myanmar, especially the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Army. However, this time around, it does not appear that China exerted pressure for them to attend the UPC. One reason could be that the Myanmar government did not make that specific request. If Myanmar did not even ask, China certainly would not feel the need to offer. While COVID-19 and the low expectations for the UPC did make it easier for Beijing not to force the hands of the EAOs, China has been supportive of the “all inclusive” principle of the peace process. In this sense, tacit disapproval of the exclusion of the AA is evident in the Chinese narratives.

China and Myanmar’s Peace Process

China is undeniably a major stakeholder in Myanmar’s peace process. Key EAOs in FPNCC-held territory along or close to the 2,000-kilometer border that Myanmar shares with China, as well as armed conflict along the border, pose a direct threat to China’s national security. That reality has justified China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace process despite its “non-interference” principle and moved Beijing into a direct mediation role in the ethnic reconciliation of the country. However, China has consciously limited its role to that of a convener and a logistical facilitator rather than an agenda-setter, a broker, or an external guarantor of the negotiated result. Its role is so far characterized by a limited bottom line focused on a military ceasefire, rather than a political agreement about the peace mechanism and power distribution between the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities. In the Chinese view, such substantive issues should and could only be discussed by the Burmese actors themselves.

China’s official intervention or mediation in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts began in early 2013, when the escalation of conflict in Kachin state threatened China’s border security. Consequently, the Chinese government appointed its first special envoy for Asian affairs, Wang Yingfan, to intervene by facilitating dialogue in Yunnan province between the Kachin Independence Organization and the Myanmar central government and military. China’s intervention peaked after the Kokang crisis of February 2015, when amid heavy fighting the Tatmadaw shelled Chinese territory, resulting in the deaths of Chinese civilians. This greatly aggravated China’s threat perception and even prompted a military response; in June 2015 China resorted to live-fire drills on the border to pressure both sides of the conflict into a ceasefire.

In 2015, Wang was replaced by Ambassador Sun Guoxiang, opening a new era in China’s role and approach to Myanmar’s peace process. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Sun adopted a patient and hands-on approach in mediating the conflict between the EAOs and the Myanmar government and military. But Sun’s approach has also at times upset the ethnic armed groups – most notably when China put pressure on the EAOs to participate in the previous UPCs in accordance with requests from State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. China adopted a heavy-handed approach when it called the EAOs’ representatives to Yunnan and flew them down to Naypyidaw to attend the Second UPC in May 2017. That intervention came in response to Aung San Suu Kyi’s formal appeal for assistance to Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Belt and Road Forum that month.

China’s current mediation strategy is clear. It prioritizes the continuation of the peace talks between the FPNCC, led by the United Wa State Army, and the Burmese authorities. However, China put more emphasis on the process of the talks rather than its result. From the Chinese perspective, as long as the peace dialogue continues and major armed conflict is prevented on the Chinese border, China’s interests are protected. Under this framework, one of the top achievements for China before the end of 2018 was the “inclusiveness” of the peace process. The Myanmar authorities’ refusal to accept the involvement of three groups – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and the Arakan Army – had been an obstacle to the peace process in the sense that the FPNCC had regarded the inclusion of these groups as legitimate and their participation was a precondition for dialogue to move forward.

Inclusiveness was finally achieved on December 12, 2018, after a meeting China orchestrated in Kunming among the three groups, the FPNCC, and the Burmese military. In a statement that the MNDAA, the TNLA, and the AA released right after the meeting, they agreed to “firstly stop military actions and to create a good peace situation through political means beyond military means to achieve peace early.” However, this commitment to peace rapidly crumbled three weeks later, after the AA began to launch attacks in Rakhine and Chin states.

Key Issues in China’s Current Approach

As Myanmar prepares for the general elections in November, the country and its external partners have all entered “election mode” where key policy initiatives and actions are put on hold. China is no exception – in an election year, stabilization of relations is always the overwhelming priority. In the view of almost all observers, the domestic politics of Myanmar, especially the evolving civil-military relations between the NLD government and the Burmese military, have a critical impact over the ethnic conflict and the peace process. Most noticeably, the perception is that the Burmese military has an intrinsic interest in maintaining a hardline attitude and keeping tension high on the ethnic front in order to defend its legitimacy in domestic politics as the protector of the Burmese nation. If the Burmese military needs the ongoing conflict to validate its status in a power struggle vis-à-vis the civilian government and such tension pr pressure is particularly high during the election year, no country, China included, will treat this particular timing as the most appropriate opportunity to push on the peace process.

China has been somewhat singled out as a sore spot during this election year over the issue of the AA, especially in lieu of the Burmese military’s thinly-veiled criticism of China. During his July 2020 visit to Russia, Myanmar Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing accused “foreign forces” of supporting terrorist groups, namely the AA, in Myanmar, alluding to the role China has played in sustaining the survival of the ethnic armed group. While the Burmese government and military have both declared the AA a terrorist organization, China does not necessarily believe such a military and confrontational approach will help eliminate the problem, especially when the Burmese military has not been able to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. This is particularly true given the AA’s high popularity among the Rakhine population and its sustainable model of operations through various channels of revenues. 

Given the impasse between the Burmese military and the AA on the battlefield, the Rakhine conflict will continue well after the elections. Rakhine state is relatively far away from the Chinese border, but the state does host key infrastructure projects for China’s aspired access to the Indian Ocean, such as the Kyaukphyu deep sea port on the state’s west coast. A reluctance to rile the local public, which largely supports the AA, partially explains China’s support of including the group in the peace process.

The vigor and intensity of China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace process is also affected by the broader politics in the region. In 2020, we are observing less action from China on Myanmar’s peace process, but this is not only because navigating Myanmar’s general elections is China’s top priority. It is also because China’s policy attention and resources are significantly distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the escalation of tensions with the United States. Great power competition has emerged and gradually strengthened as the theme in U.S.-China interactions over Myanmar. To the Chinese, a late July article in the Irrawaddy by George N. Sibley, chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Myanmar, criticizing China’s role in the country and the region was tantamount to a declaration of war.

The tension between the United States and China and its manifestation in Myanmar has had a direct impact on China’s activities in the country. Most noticeably, China naturally feels the need to contract rather than expand its actions for the fear of a misstep, mislabeling, or any negative local reactions. To maintain the status quo is believed to be in China’s interests during the current period and drastic actions will be unlikely until the election is over and the dust more or less settles. China is unlikely to produce new proposals, much less to launch new actions on the peace process for the time being.

What Lies Ahead?

These are many voices holding China accountable for Myanmar’s stalled peace process. The theory appears plausible but lacks fundamental understanding about the origin of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict. The ethnic minority’s discontent and grievances toward the Bamar central government are not a Chinese creation, but the result of historical experiences, perceptions of political, social, and economic exploitation, as well as injustice against the ethnic minorities by the authorities. In this sense, China is an external factor that complicates the peace process, but not the origin of the problem. Removing China from the equation does not remove the political, security, and economic incompatibilities in Myanmar. To assume that peace will prevail if, and only if, China drops its relations with the EAOs is an unrealistic misperception.

This conclusion does not negate or deny the constructive and positive effect China could play to facilitate the peace process, with the Burmese actors taking the lead to resolve the political and economic incompatibilities between the central government and the EAOs. There are many things that China could provide, including but not limited to logistical support, political endorsement, economic incentives, and technical advice. But ultimately, the key to peace in Myanmar is in Burmese, not Chinese hands.