China’s Influence Operations in India: Evidence of Absence or Absence of Evidence?

As reports of China’s influence and interference operations around the world continue to make headlines, and its relations with India are at a breaking point over a military crisis in eastern Ladakh, it is pertinent to ask whether and how Beijing may have sought to further its interests in India through surreptitious, indirect ways. To begin, there is very little firm and verifiable evidence that it has done so. Recent analyses of China’s influence operations do not mention India.

But much like the dog that didn’t bark in “Silver Blaze,” a Sherlock Holmes story, the very absence of visible indicators on how China may or may not have interfered in India – a major power increasingly at loggerheads with Beijing – is noteworthy. This is even more curious since evidence emerged on September 14 that a Chinese firm with links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had engaged in extensive digital surveillance of over 10,000 Indians, possibly with influence operations in mind. Given that the Zhenhua database covers a wide spectrum of individuals and voices – ranging from ruling to opposition party leaders, China hawks as well as doves, even cricketers and one lone self-styled godwoman – it is difficult to use it as a starting point in understanding who China might have specifically sought to target to shape Indian narratives or directly meddle in Indian politics.

That said, we do know of three broad nongovernmental India-China channels that had been quite active until the recent developments in eastern Ladakh: civil society interactions, often under the banner of people-to-people exchanges within the BRICS; study fellowships for Indians in China; as well as commercial relations between Indian and Chinese businesses. This is not to suggest that such channels have been, with certainty, used for anti-India campaigns. But understanding how they have worked in the past may hold the key to understanding possible Chinese approaches.

While the two countries have had an active track II diplomacy circuit for some time now and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has sent its representatives to China in the past as part of “non-official diplomacy,” China’s outreach to certain sections of Indian civil society, such as think tanks, acquired a fevered pitch around 2016 as Beijing tried to convince New Delhi to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Several Chinese “think tanks” – both well-known and relatively obscure – reached out to understand India’s position.

While India decisively closed the door when it came to participating in the BRI in May 2017 citing sovereignty concerns, among others, an Indian think tank – the Observer Research Foundation in Mumbai –  hosted a conference around the BRI a month earlier. Liu Jinsong, then deputy chief of mission at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, presented an extensive BRI pitch at the event, giving the event the color of a lobbying effort as opposed to a neutral academic discussion. Sudheendra Kulkarni, the think tank’s head, also attended the inaugural Belt and Road Forum in May that year in Beijing, going against a stringent advisory by the Indian government to Indian civil society to boycott the forum and landing Beijing a propaganda victory of sorts. That said, Kulkarni is far from being the lone voice in championing Indian membership in the BRI.

While the BRI thrust was transient, China has organized trips to the country for scholars from the five BRICS nations – India included – along with hosting academic BRICS conferences; the former often has had the characteristic of a junket, with ample sightseeing opportunities thrown in. Several Indian universities have also signed “memorandum of agreements” with Chinese universities. While these arrangements did not attract particular attention from the Indian government until last October, China’s special programs for international journalists have raised complicated questions about its possible role in influence operations as well as media ethics.

A November 2018 Indian news report notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China Public Diplomacy Association-managed China South Asia Press Centers have seen participation of Indian journalists, including from leading outlets. It also notes that journalists participating in such programs are often allowed privileges not normally accorded to foreign correspondents in China and are also afforded the opportunity to write for Chinese state-run media.

While unrelated, the arrest of a veteran Indian journalist – and regular contributor to the CCP-affiliated tabloid Global Times  – on September 14 in New Delhi on charges of espionage committed on behalf of Beijing is likely to lead to greater scrutiny of civil society members who have participated in Chinese programs, often under generous terms, by the Indian security services. Recall that in 2016, India refused to extend the visas of three Xinhua journalists, after the country’s intelligence services raised concerns about their activities.

Commercial ties between India and China, at least before the recent Indian push against it, have also afforded businesspeople from both sides the ability to develop much closer relationships. In fact, it is likely that China finds India’s commercial capital Mumbai – as well as technology centers such as Bangalore – much more receptive to its positions than New Delhi’s political and strategic circles. (Note that the Kulkarni-organized BRI event in April 2017 was held in Mumbai and not, for example, New Delhi – a city that typically hosts major international foreign policy events.) After the deadly June 15 clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh, the opposition Congress Party alleged that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state of Gujarat was the “epicenter of Chinese investment in India”; while somewhat hyperbolic, there is no denying that Gujarat over the years has developed close economic ties with China.

India’s domestic politics have certainly shaped how China has sought to make inroads into the country. While China established a consulate in Kolkata, the capital of the eastern state of West Bengal – ruled by Mamata Banerjee, politically orthogonal to Modi – in 2008, it rebuffed her request to meet a member of China’s senior political leadership during a planned 2018 trip, following which the trip was cancelled. Whether this was due to Beijing’s apprehensions over offending Modi is not known. That said, in the past opposition Congress Party leaders have been considerably optimistic about India-China relations.

While track II diplomacy, study exchanges, and commercial ties provide potential opportunities for China to talent-spot and target specific individuals for influence operations – just like they do for other countries – it is very hard to identify specific past instances. And public pronouncements by Indian civil society members – whether in defense of China, or BRI, or any other issue, for that matter – can hardly be used to point fingers. After all, Indian society, especially its upper English-speaking echelons, has a long tradition of contrarian thinking. Successive governments over the past two decades, including Modi’s in his first term, have encouraged closer relations with China, including the deepening of people-to-people ties.

At the same time, the Indian government has been – to a certain extent – quite cautious when it comes to potential Chinese influence or interference operations. For example, foreign participants in Indian conferences are vetted by the security establishment for issuance of visas; it is likely that such vetting is especially stringent when it comes to Chinese nationals. India is also reviewing the activities of Confucius Institutes in the country, with a particular focus on two, in Mumbai and Kolkata. The U.S. designated these Institutes as part of China’s “foreign missions” in August 2020.

The extent to which China has already sought to use deep existing, legitimate channels of nongovernmental exchanges for various covert purposes remains unknown. However, it is extremely unlikely that it has not done so at all.

Disclosure: The author participated in two events in China, in 2016 and 2017, one an India-China track II dialogue and the other a BRICS conference, as a guest of China Foreign Affairs University and Fudan University, respectively.