The US-Korea Partnership Needs to Go Back to the Future

Regardless of whether Donald Trump or Joe Biden wins the U.S. presidential election on November 3, the next administration needs to refocus the U.S.-South Korea relationship on the future rather than the past.

For the last four years, rather undertaking efforts to modernize the alliance, the relationship has been mired in U.S. efforts to re-litigate old understandings in order to extract increasing concessions from South Korea on issues from trade to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea.

The focus on renegotiating the past began shortly after South Korean President Moon Jae-in was elected. At the press conference for their first summit meeting, President Trump announced that the United States and South Korea would be renegotiating the KORUS FTA despite the fact that there was no agreement to do so. After Trump threatened to withdraw from the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to renegotiate the terms.  

The United States and South Korea have also engaged in two tense sets of negotiations on new Special Measures Agreements (SMA). The Trump administration has sought to significantly increase the amount that South Korea and other allies contribute to the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. When talks began on a new agreement in 2018 this led to a standoff that was only resolved with the Hanoi Summit serving as forcing event.

The 2019 SMA saw South Korea agree to an 8.2 percent increase in its contribution for a one year deal, but the negotiations over a new agreement quickly grew contentious amid reported U.S. initial demands that South Korea’s contribution rise from a little less than $1 billion to $5 billion. Those talks remain unresolved 10 months after the 2019 agreement has expired. 

Despite this focus on the past, the four years of the Trump administration have also been a time of significant changes that are reshaping the challenges and opportunities available to the alliance. While the two allies have revisited issues related to trade and defense cost sharing, Trump’s decision to negotiate directly with Kim Jong Un has changed the dynamics in relations with North Korea. Those talks have created a new path to direct discussion with Kim, but also left North Korea with a growing and more dangerous arsenal. 

On the domestic front South Korea is beginning to feel the effects of demographic change. The total fertility rate dropped below the replacement level in the early 1980s and now the population is beginning a period of rapid aging and decline. The working age population (those aged 15-64) began declining in 2016 and the overall population is expected to begin declining this year. This will have long-term implications for South Korean budgetary expenditures and its conscription based military.

At the same time, the world is undergoing a geostrategic transition with China’s continued rise as a world power, as well as a technological transition to 5G and the increasing use of artificial intelligence. These two issues have become intertwined in the form of the U.S.-China tech war. The United States has particularly highlighted the national security implications of 5G with its efforts to convince countries not to use equipment from Huawei. These trends have implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance. 

The Immediate Focus for the Alliance

When either Trump or Biden is sworn in as president on January 20, 2021, South Korean President Moon will have a little less than 16 months left in office himself. That leaves a relatively short window to make substantive progress on key issues in the alliance prior to the next political transition in South Korea. 

An immediate priority should be the conclusion of a new multiyear SMA. The current dispute over levels of funding is a distraction from deeper discussions about the future needs and shape of the alliance. 

Over the next two decades demographic shifts will make South Korea’s current force levels unsustainable under its current conscription model. This will push South Korea to increasingly look for technological solutions to its impending manpower shortage, including solutions related to the integration of artificial intelligence into military applications. South Korea recently took part in a U.S. sponsored discussion on the ethical use of artificial intelligence, but the allies will need to engage in deeper conversations about how these shifts impact and address the security needs on the Korean Peninsula.

The allies will also need to focus on North Korea. Improving relations with Pyongyang has been a priority of the Moon administration and, despite the setback at the Hanoi Summit, might be one area where progress can be made. Talks have been stalled since a working level meeting in Stockholm, but the U.S. elections and COVID-19 have also slowed the possibility for progress post-Hanoi. 

While North Korea has been reluctant to accept outside assistance with COVID-19, the allies should discuss how to ensure that Pyongyang has access to the medical supplies it needs to deal with the pandemic should that change. Both sides also need to discuss how to make progress with North Korea before Moon leaves office; otherwise North Korea policy could become an area of tension in the alliance.  

Opportunities for the Alliance 

In parallel with discussions on a new SMA and how to restart talks with Pyongyang, the allies need to look for new areas of opportunity for cooperation. Technology could be a promising area.

The South Korean military’s need to integrate artificial intelligence could serve as one opportunity. In addition, the United States has also placed an emphasis on the deployment of 5G equipment by trusted partners. Much of the focus has been on excluding Huawei from 5G networks and promoting Nokia, Ericsson, or O-RAN as alternatives, but Samsung could play an important role as well. 

While not a major player in the network equipment market overall, Samsung has been much more competitive in the area of 5G. According to data from the Dell’Oro Group Samsung has the fourth largest market share of 5G network equipment with a little less than 15 percent of the market. It is also viewed as a more trusted partner than Nokia or Ericsson in Southeast Asia, according to a survey by the ASEAN Studies Center at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

With the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) now able to fund loans for the deployment of 5G by non-U.S. companies and proposals in Congress to provide direct funding, Samsung could be an important partner. Cooperation, however, will need to be done in a diplomatic manner to avoid pushback from China where Samsung Electronics earned 17 percent of its revenue last year. 

However, because of the South Korean government’s reluctance to require LG Plus to remove Huawei equipment from its 5G network, 5G could also be an area of tension in the alliance.

Potential Areas of Friction in the Alliance 

Similar to the sensitivities that Samsung may face in cooperating with the United States on the deployment of 5G, the United States’ tech and geostrategic competition with China could be a source of friction in the alliance. Like many nations in Asia, South Korea will be reluctant to choose between its most important economic and security partners.  

In 2019, South Korea exported $136 billion in goods to China, by far its largest export destination. These economic ties mean that South Korea will be reluctant to take on China as directly as the United States has under the Trump administration. From a security perspective, China’s influence over North Korea and the prospect for progress on the nuclear issue will also likely constrain South Korea. 

On the geostrategic level the United States has been working to build up cooperation in the Quad, which also includes Japan, India, and Australia, as a means to deal with the challenges presented by China. But while not foreclosing the idea of joining, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha recently noted that “We (South Korea) don't think anything that automatically shuts out, and is exclusive of, the interests of others is a good idea.”    

The reluctance of South Korea to join the Quad could be a source of tension in relations, but the competition with China will also be much different than the Cold War. The United States will need to learn to operate in a competitive environment that is much less bipolar and more complex. If it is unable to manage the constraints of countries such as South Korea that are hesitant to engage in an explicitly anti-China alliance, the United States risks lessening the cooperation it has had from other states similarly conflicted by China’s actions. 

Another source of tension, including in relation to the Quad, will be ties with Japan. Historical issues continue to create tensions between South Korea and Japan. Relations hit a new low in response to the South Korean Supreme Court decision to allow victims of forced labor from World War II to sue Japanese companies for compensation and Japan’s decision to place trade restrictions on key tech exports to South Korea.

Greater cooperation on tech and security issues in the Indo-Pacific will require deeper cooperation between South Korea and Japan, but unless Washington is able to ease tensions behind the scenes the continued row could cause friction in the United States relationship with both Seoul and Tokyo.

Looking to the Future

In the not too distant past, both the Bush and Obama administrations worked to upgrade the U.S.-Korea partnership to reshape the military alliance and upgrade the economic relationship and the level of cooperation in international organizations. While those changes were necessary, shifts in demographics, technology, relations with North Korea, and China’s role as an international actor necessitate that the United States and South Korea explore new ways to cooperate in the 2020s.