The Costs of Australia’s Climate Politics

At the beginning of 2020, Australia’s catastrophic bushfires were making international headlines. The scale and devastation of the fires is difficult to exaggerate. By the time the worst had passed, some 30 people had lost their lives directly, with hundreds more killed in the smoke haze that blanketed some of the country’s largest cities. Millions of hectares of bush and forest had been burnt, over 1 billion animals had perished, and the recovery bill was into the billions. Australia called up its armed forces, states of disaster were declared, and the federal government announced a royal commission into the effectiveness of preparation and response.

Amidst stories of tragedy and heroism, a range of accounts emphasized the important role of climate change. Among other effects, climate change causes an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, including bushfires. In the case of a country like Australia, higher temperatures associated with climate change serve to increase the number of “high risk” fire days over the course of a year. It also increases the volume of dry soil and fuel, while limiting the time window for carrying out fuel reduction burning to minimize the threat. Analysts noting the climate link were quick to point out that climate change had arrived in Australia, with the country experiencing its hottest year on record in 2019 at more than 1.5 degrees Celsius above Australia’s long-term average.

On the back of long-term drought and natural disasters, it is perhaps unsurprising that the scale of the threat posed by climate change seems to be one recognized by the Australian public. Surveys such as the Lowy Institute Poll have indicated growing concern about the implications of climate change, with climate change topping their 2019 survey on key threats to Australia’s national interest. Even since the coronavirus pandemic commenced, appearing to draw attention away from the challenge of climate change, an October 2020 Australia Institute poll indicated that 80 percent of Australians thought we were already experiencing problems caused by climate change, while 83 percent supported closing coal-fired power stations. 

Yet despite the reality of the threat posed and the growth of public concern about it, Australia is at best a laggard on global climate action, and at worst a pariah. The current national government heavily subsidizes the fossil fuel industry domestically, while aggressively promoting fossil fuel exports internationally. Canberra’s Paris Agreement commitments of a 26-28 percent reduction in emissions by 2030 are comparatively unambitious, and even then will only be realized with a generous (and controversial) use of carry-over “credits” from the Kyoto Protocol. Australia is also part of a rapidly shrinking minority of major economies (and emitters) refusing to commit to achieving net zero emissions by the middle of the century. Australia, it would seem, is both near the “front line” of climate change and a significant part of the failure to adequately address it.

While the domestic forces impacting Australia’s climate policy are clearly worth examining, the international context – both international influences on Australian climate policy and the impact of climate policy on Australian foreign policy – are also important subjects for analysis. Here, it appears clear that Australia’s climate policy is increasingly undermining stated foreign policy objectives. This particularly applies to increasing regional engagement in the Pacific and being seen to play a constructive role in the management of transnational challenges. And while in the past Australian climate policy appeared to be shaped significantly by immediate national economic considerations influenced by international demand (as applied to coal exports, in particular), the evolving international political and economic context suggests that market forces may ultimately serve to undermine rather than endorse Australia’s embrace of the fossil fuel sector. Changing international winds risk severely isolating Australia and challenging the very rationale for Australian climate policy. 

Climate Change and Foreign Policy: The Regional Context

By any account, Australia’s immediate region is among the most vulnerable in the world to the effects of climate change. Rising sea levels, an increase in natural disasters, and ocean acidification pose immediate and fundamental challenges to the island states of the Pacific. Some of these are direct threats. Rising sea levels threaten state territory itself in countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati; natural disasters pose immediate threats in terms of loss of life and community infrastructure; ocean acidification directly threatens the marine ecosystems of the region. But the flow-on or secondary effects of such manifestations of climate change are also telling. These range from population displacement to physical health effects, loss of livelihoods, and even challenges to regional culture and identity.

The vulnerability of the states of the Pacific is born of a combination of their exposure to these manifestations and their reduced capacity to insulate themselves from – or respond to – these manifestations. On the former, the low-lying nature of island states exposes them immediately to the effects of sea level rises. One 2012 analysis by the Asian Development Bank suggested that the Asia-Pacific is home to 70 percent of the world’s countries most vulnerable to natural disasters, with over 40 million people displaced in 2010-11 alone. On the latter, the relative underdevelopment of Pacific Island states militates against significant local investment in the development of adaptive capacity to manage these effects. And the minimal contribution of Pacific Island states to the problem of climate change itself also equates to reduced capacity to address the problem at its source even with ambitious and sweeping mitigation action. 

Given this vulnerability, it is hardly surprising that climate change is at the forefront of Pacific Island states’ concerns. The 2018 Boe Declaration, agreed at the Pacific Islands Forum in Nauru and endorsed by the leaders of Pacific Island states, affirmed that “climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific.” Given their ultimate reliance on the actions of other states to minimize the effects of climate change (through mitigation action) and help facilitate the transfer of resources to enable adaptive projects, it is hardly surprising that climate change has featured prominently in the diplomatic efforts of Pacific Island states. Many of these efforts – and much of this pressure – have been directed at a regional power and climate recalcitrant: Australia.

For Australia, the current Morrison government has emphasized the importance of engagement with the Pacific. The so-called “Pacific Step-up” builds on former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s 2016 call for a “step change” in relations with the region, an ambition endorsed in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. In simple terms, it recognizes the importance of significantly strengthening Australia’s relations with the region and acknowledges Australia’s “special responsibilities” to the states of the Pacific. This strategy has seen an increase in diplomatic visits to the region, the expansion of Australia’s Pacific labor scheme, and the announcement of a A$2 billion infrastructure financing initiative. And while Australia’s aid budget has shrunk to historically low levels (as a percentage of Australia’s gross national income), the Pacific has largely been spared the decline experienced by Australia’s other aid recipients. In short, the ‘“step-up,” arguably driven significantly by Australian concerns about increasing Chinese involvement in the region, constitutes a core foreign policy priority for the Australian government.

Australia’s position on climate change has significantly undermined this ambition, however. Pacific leaders have been particularly critical of Australia’s minimal climate ambitions under the Paris Agreement, and the government’s continued commitment to the fossil fuel sector within Australia. The 2019 Pacific Islands Forum, in particular, saw Pacific leaders turning on Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and his climate policy, with significant criticism of Morrison’s attempts to water down the wording of the Pacific Island Communique’s commitment to action on climate change. While the government had announced that it would commit A$500 million over five years to climate change programs in the region on the eve of the meeting, Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga responded by suggesting that “No matter how much money you put on the table, it doesn't give you the excuse to not do the right thing [on climate change].” And with Australia apparently competing with China for regional influence, the latter’s commitment to net zero emissions by 2060 (announced in September 2020) appears to further challenge Australia’s legitimacy and standing in the region. Certainly, it points to the potential role of climate policy in undermining Australia’s foreign policy goals.

Climate Change and Foreign Policy: The International Context 

Australia’s regional engagement is clearly, therefore, compromised by its position on climate change. But the limited scale of Australia’s climate ambitions also challenges the extent to which Australia can reasonably claim to be playing a substantive role in addressing this transnational challenge – and thereby being a “good international citizen.” As noted, Australia’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the 2015 Paris Agreement is a 26-28 percent decrease in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels by 2030, with no update on this commitment announced so far in 2020. The Morrison government has also indicated its intention to use (controversial) “carry-over” credits from the Kyoto Protocol period (in which Australia was granted an increase in emissions) to meet these commitments, making it the only country to do so. Further, the government has refused to outline a timetable for achieving net zero emissions. 

These positions have been further exposed by increasing ambition from other states. Within a month of each other, China, South Korea, and Japan all committed to a goal of achieving net zero emissions – by 2060 in the case of China and 2050 in the case of South Korea and Japan. While these announcements expose Australia’s refusal to commit to a net zero emissions deadline, as key markets for Australian coal they also directly challenge the viability of Australian fossil fuel exports in the long term – a sector long subsidized by the government. And the European Union – which had committed to net zero emissions by 2050 in 2019 – announced an intention to increase its 2030 target to a 55 percent reduction in emissions from 1990 levels, up from its previous target of 40 percent.

The election of Joe Biden as U.S. president also, of course, serves to further isolate Australia internationally on this issue. While Australia could at least point to their continued engagement with the climate regime – in contrast to the United States under President Donald Trump – Biden’s ambitious target of net zero emissions by 2050 and a carbon-free energy sector by 2030 isolates Australia further. Indeed the incoming U.S. president’s position on climate ambitions could feasibly be viewed as something of a game changer for Australia, not least as Australia’s key ally and given Biden’s stated intention to pressure reluctant states to act on the issue. On the latter, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson – host of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26) meeting in Glasgow in 2021 – has already directly raised the issue of Australia’s minimal climate ambitions with the Australian prime minister. As COP26 looms, it’s reasonable to expect this type of pressure to increase, and not unreasonable to imagine Australia committing to more ambitious targets rather than being viewed – and cast – as a climate laggard. 

Is Change on the Horizon?

These regional and international political contexts are making Australia’s position on climate change increasingly difficult to sustain, at least while claiming a willingness to “do its part” in addressing the issue. And as noted in the context of the region in particular, at times Australia’s position on climate policy has actively undermined its stated foreign policy goals, especially in terms of the Pacific Step-up.

If these external political forces put pressure on Australia to increase its ambitions on climate change and commit to a transition away from fossil fuels, they reinforce and align with economic forces. Simply put, global market forces are pushing toward renewable energy and away from fossil fuels, with some countries and regional organizations (most notably the EU) announcing plans to build a post-COVID economic recovery on the back of significant investment in the renewable energy sector – in building a “green economy.” More directly, some states outlining ambitious plans for emissions reduction (China, Japan, and South Korea, in particular) are among Australia’s largest markets for coal exports, raising questions about the long-term viability of the industry. While the Morrison government continues to support the fossil fuel industry (politically and economically), even embracing gas as an alternative to coal should export markets for the latter decline, it’s harder to see this priority reflected in other countries or evident in market forces. In this sense, the market may serve as a compelling force for change, rather than a rationale for the commitment to fossil fuels in Australia.  

Then there’s the domestic context. Foreign policy (and by extension climate diplomacy) is a reflection of domestic political considerations, dynamics, and even values. As noted at the outset, the Australian public increasingly supports strong action on climate change, not least in the wake of natural disasters that point to the existential threat that manifestations of climate change pose. And in advance of a private member’s bill introduced to Australian Parliament on November 9, 2020 calling for a wholesale overhaul of Australian climate policy, over 100 businesses and organizations (from the Australian Medical Association to multinational companies such as Unilever) outlined their support for a net zero emissions target in Australia. This type of pressure, coupled with international dynamics, foreign policy interests, and market forces, might ultimately serve to compel the Australian government to increase its NDC ambitions, commit to a net zero emissions target, and revisit political and economic support for the fossil fuel industry to achieve these ends.

For Australia, the alternative to genuine policy action on climate change is the very real prospect that Australian taxpayers will continue to invest in and subsidize what may become stranded assets in the form of coal mines and associated fossil fuel infrastructure. Australia’s diplomatic goals will continue to be harmed by the collision course between the country’s continued role in contributing to climate change on one hand, and the real and immediate concerns of states (rightly) concerned about its effects, particularly in the region. Perhaps more fundamentally, continuing the same course on climate policy will almost certainly incur reputational damage for Australia, raising the prospect that Australia will occupy a position on climate change that can feasibly be characterized as that of a pariah state.