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What Biden’s Foreign Policy Team Means for Japan
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What Biden’s Foreign Policy Team Means for Japan

Japan is pleased with Biden’s foreign policy picks, viewing them as boding well for the relationship.

By Yuki Tatsumi

On November 23, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden announced his top foreign policy advisers. Antony Blinken, a long-time foreign policy hand and Biden’s top foreign policy adviser during his 2020 presidential campaign, was tapped to lead the Department of State. Jake Sullivan, who was considered to be on the short list for national security advisor if Hillary Clinton had won in 2016, is slated to serve in that role for Biden. Avril Haines, a former deputy CIA director, has been picked to be the director of national intelligence. She would become the first woman to fill the position if confirmed. While Biden’s secretary of defense has not been named just yet, Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy during the Obama administration, is expected to be nominated to become the first women to lead the Pentagon.

The initial response from Japan to these picks has been very positive. Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu commented on the Blinken pick specifically, “I look forward to working with him to further develop a strong Japan-U.S. relationship.”

These foreign and national security policy picks bode very well for Japan. First of all, these choices reflect Biden’s commitment to restoring U.S. alliances, some of which have been damaged by President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to U.S. allies in the last four years. Although Japan currently faces some difficult issues in the relationship – Host Nation Support renewal negotiations, alternatives to the Aegis Ashore acquisition, and the determination of an international partner to develop its F-2 fighter follow-on, to name a few – having a team that appreciates the non-monetary value of the alliance will likely ease the pressure that Tokyo has often felt from the Trump administration. 

Second, Tokyo can count on the new administration’s foreign policy team to be familiar with Japan, the salient issues for the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the regional security environment. Secretary of State-designate Blinken, while he worked primarily in European and Middle Eastern affairs during the Clinton administration, became the key advocate pushing for better U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation as President Barack Obama’s deputy secretary of state. Sullivan, as Hilary Clinton’s director for policy planning when she was the secretary of state and then as Vice President Biden’s national security advisor, has been intimately involved with a wide range of foreign and security policy issues, including in East Asia. 

Finally, and probably most importantly, Japan can now count on a U.S. president with whom its own leader has a much better chance of building warm and yet also professional ties. Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide and President-elect Biden both come from humble beginnings, rising up the ranks through hard work. They are both veterans in politics and fully appreciate the complexities of policymaking. They also share similar – reasonable, measured, and pragmatic – approaches to policy. Furthermore, both leaders share a very similar view of governance: Biden proudly talks about the job of a president being a “duty to care.” Similarly, Suga emphasizes that his cabinet is one that “works for the people.” When the two leaders meet, they will find in each other a reliable counterpart that they can also relate with on a personal level.

If anything, it may be up to Japan to optimize the transition by finally growing out of its stereotypical view of U.S. presidents and administrations. Even since President Bill Clinton traveled to China in 1998, when he did not bother to make a stopover either before or after his trip to debrief his Japanese counterpart, Japan has not been able to shake off the view that Democratic administrations are inherently pro-China while Republican administrations support the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, if the four years of Trump’s presidency taught Japan anything, it is that such a stereotype is outdated. Even though many in Japan appreciated the hardline approach vis-à-vis China taken by the Trump administration, its transactional approach to other aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance has caused a great deal of anxiety in Tokyo. In fact, even if not overtly spoken, one of the criticisms toward former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was his approach to Trump – despite him bending over backwards to court Trump, it was always questionable at best whether Abe’s effort paid any dividend. Just as the United States is set to make a fresh start with a new leadership, it may also provide Japan an opportunity to finally break from its 20-year-old stereotypical view of U.S. administrations.

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The Authors

Yuki Tatsumi is a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program and director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center.

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