Australia and Japan Agree in Principle to Reciprocal Troop Access

The ever-increasing closeness of Australia and Japan was reinforced in mid-November with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s trip to Tokyo. Most notable was the agreement in principle for a reciprocal access agreement (RAA) between the two countries. This latest area of cooperation would allow Japanese and Australian troops to conduct training and joint operations on each other’s soil and allow for greater interoperability between the Australian Defense Force (ADF) and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The RAA is expected to be signed by Morrison and his Japanese counterpart, Suga Yoshihide, in the new year.

The RAA is both highly symbolic and significant because it is Japan’s first instance of allowing a foreign military presence on Japanese territory since the agreement signed with the United States in 1960, which has allowed for the United States to base warships, aircraft, and troops in Japan. It is a sign of just how close Tokyo and Canberra have become, seeing each other as their most important security partner outside of their respective alliances with the U.S., and due to Washington’s current internal political difficulties, most likely each other’s most reliable partner.

The symbolism of the in-principle agreement was compounded by Morrison becoming the first foreign leader to visit Japan since Suga took office. Indeed, after Suga became prime minister in September his first phone call to a foreign leader was not to the U.S president, as would be the norm, but to Morrison. It’s a sign that he is keen to maintain the trajectory toward an ever-closer bond between the two countries that escalated under his predecessor, Abe Shinzo.

The double impact of China’s increasing regional assertiveness and the presidency of Donald Trump has had a profound psychological impact on both Japan and Australia. The certainties that both countries could firmly hold to in the second half of the 20th century and into the opening decade and a half of the 21st have been significantly eroded. Japan and Australia both now have China as their largest trading partner, a revisionist power increasingly hostile to global norms; under Trump, Japan and Australia have seen their primary ally led by an administration suspicious of alliances and free trade, fond of authoritarians, and displaying a distaste for multilateralism.

The election of Joe Biden may significantly ease the psychological insecurity that both countries have felt over the past four years, but the fear will likely remain that Washington’s approach to the world might have been permanently altered under Trump. Both Canberra and Tokyo will need each other to act as an insurance policy should this be the case. While both may lack the raw power of either the U.S. or China, both countries have important roles to play in maintaining regional stability and security.

Japan has been inching toward playing a more active role in Indo-Pacific security. Although Tokyo has maintained its adherence to self-defense and eschewing a first strike capability, under Abe it enhanced its defence capabilities and pushed the boundaries of its pacifist constitution. This included lifting its ban on arms exports. Although Australia has not explicitly commented on this trend, Canberra has clearly welcomed these developments, placing trust in Japan to use its capabilities in a way that would also benefit Australia.

This confidence in Canberra stems from the shared strategic vision that the two countries have. Both are wary of China’s growing regional might, and both are keen to maintain a system of open trade throughout the Indo-Pacific. While the RAA does not contain security assurances between the two countries, it provides for a greater ability for the two countries to cooperate with these mutual interests in mind. This moves Tokyo and Canberra further toward seeing each other as security partners in their own right, rather than separate components of Washington’s hub and spoke approach to Asian security.

The election of Biden as the next U.S president will ease concerns in Canberra and Tokyo that they need to hedge against the U.S. becoming more unreliable. Yet Trump’s presidency demonstrated to both countries that the certainties they had come to rely on in their respective relationships with the U.S. may not be permanent. Trump’s presidency demonstrated that there is a radical sentiment within the Republican Party distrustful of allies and that may remain strong even after Biden takes office.

The other side of the equation for Australia and Japan is that no one country will be able to balance against China’s assertiveness. The region’s middle powers are going to have to act in a more coordinated manner in order to guard against Beijing’s revisionist tendencies. The RAA is a significant step toward Australia and Japan enhancing their security cooperation, but also opens the door for other countries to forge similar agreements with Tokyo.