North Korea Without Nukes: How Does It Measure Up?

For many, North Korea (or the DPRK) has become inextricably entangled with the topic of its nuclear weapons program. Nukes, and the strategic rocket forces responsible for delivering them, have dominated headlines associated with the country for decades. 

Conventional military abilities, however, are a topic most are happy to avoid, and for good reason. Not only is North Korea notoriously secretive about any and all matters related to its military, it is peculiarly insistent on producing practically all of its equipment indigenously as part of its ideology of “juche,” or self reliance. This often makes assessing its equipment holdings and capabilities challenging, if not downright impossible. Furthermore, in an implicit acknowledgement of its inability to match its foes in expenditures or technological sophistication, the DPRK employs a number of unorthodox strategies to keep its military in a fighting condition, and relies heavily on asymmetric warfare to skew the balance of power during hostilities. These factors throw up still more uncertainty to which the large number of conflicting reports about the Korean People’s Army (KPA)’s operational status indubitably owe their origin.

Nevertheless, the advent of new means of communication in the modern era has facilitated a much greater flow of information out of the reclusive nation, through both propaganda and more subversive means. The picture that is formed through analysis of this information is complex, and significantly more nuanced than what could ever be contained in a single column. Instead, we can attempt a more modest review of North Korea’s armed forces, and ask ourselves: “How would events unfold, if the DPRK managed to initiate a non-nuclear conflict today?”

The question alone presumes a certain amount of divergence from current reality. First off, a full-scale mobilization of the KPA is unlikely to go unnoticed, meaning the opposing side could begin dismantling North Korean attacking columns even before they have finished forming. But perhaps more importantly, an unprovoked invasion of the South may well provoke a nuclear attack from the United States – which reserves the right to perform a first strike against nuclear weapons states. Still, the very event of a conflict itself implies the unexpected has happened, and those that neglect the possibility of a conventional war on the peninsula may end up on the wrong side of history when the unthinkable becomes reality.

Although much of the KPA is permanently forward deployed, with an estimated 70 percent of ground forces stationed below the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, the first strike would not be delivered through these means. The opening moments of a theoretical war are absolutely crucial to the North Korean attack, and their fate is increasingly decided by long-ranged artillery systems. In the past this would have referred to the impressive 170 mm Koksan artillery guns and a variety of 240 mm multiple rocket launch systems (MRLs) that would have pounded targets from up to 60 kilometers away. Nowadays, however, a new threat has arisen that has the potential to do far greater damage. Not only have increasingly accurate ballistic missiles entered service in large numbers, an entirely new class of oversized multiple rocket systems now threatens much of the South. Straddling the line between ballistic missiles and MRLs, precision guided armament like this, fired en masse, is employed to destroy fortified positions, military bases, naval bases, air defense sites, and perhaps most importantly, enemy aircraft and runways. 

Anything that can be targeted in advance risks destruction in this stage, with a variety of different systems designed for different types of targets at different ranges. Using air defense systems to shoot down these projectiles may prove difficult due to their high speed, maneuverability, and their utilization of depressed flight trajectories. However, these systems often rely on GPS for precise accuracy and are therefore potentially vulnerable to jamming.

In our hypothetical conflict, a more conventional artillery barrage of ferocious intensity simultaneously attempts to soften up the heavily fortified first line defenses of the South. The zone separating the two nations may be demilitarized, but it still contains one of the largest minefields in the world, despite some efforts to remove landmines during the 2018 rapprochement. Beyond the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the road to the first and foremost objective of Seoul is lined with both U.S. and South Korean defenses and military. 

The DPRK unexpectedly boasts perhaps the single largest artillery forces on the globe, with over 14,000 artillery pieces of various sizes in its service, including 5,500 MRLs. As with much of its military, the quality of this equipment is extremely inconsistent, with some weapons dating back to before the Korean War and others surprisingly modern. The sheer volume of firepower concentrated along the border, however, may be sufficient to completely saturate crucial areas and force a breakthrough, with military engineering vehicles and quite possibly tunnels running underneath the minefields aiding in crossing the DMZ.

As this front is unfolding, North Korean doctrine calls for the opening of a second front behind enemy lines to expedite the destruction of enemy opposition. To this end it upholds the largest special operations branch of any military in the world. These forces, numbering close to 200,000, should not be thought of in the same sense as other special forces, with roughly 120,000 expected to fight alongside regular divisions as light infantry. Nevertheless, the special operations force’s main purpose is to drop into the South via air and sea, impeding operations and taking objectives so as to achieve a second front. Their success nowadays is heavily dependent on the ability of the initial strikes to soften up defenses, since their transports are highly vulnerable to modern air defenses and other dedicated weaponry. Still, this invasion force alone is impressive, boasting some 300 An-2 light aircraft, 150 helicopters, and up to 200 large hovercraft. All are of considerable age, but it deserves mentioning that no other nation in the world operates such numbers of large combat-capable hovercraft. Meanwhile, dedicated teams of highly trained operatives search out and kill or kidnap high-ranking officials, as well as sabotaging or destroying other objectives. It is doubtful whether the KPA actually manages to pull off these feats and establish a second front in today’s climate of advanced missile defenses, but if timed correctly the vast numbers of forces involved will surely add to the chaos, possibly catching defenders off guard.

As infantry and mechanized divisions begin to pour across the border in an attack mainly concentrated near Seoul and the coasts, the North’s air force takes to the skies to aid the advance. Rather than attempting to head off the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) directly (an attempt which would be futile), it relies on ballistic missiles and long-ranged artillery units to destroy their winged opponents on the ground, with preciously few airframes dedicated to air-to-air engagements. If this proves unsuccessful, there is little chance of North Korean air defenses and limited numbers of aircraft that aren’t entirely obsolete achieving this objective instead.

The North Korean air defense network is vast, and utilizes a number of relatively modern elements including a copy of the Russian S-300PMU(-1) and other indigenous designs slowly entering service. It has very limited capabilities on the offensive, however, and mainly serves to slow the inevitable assault on targets in the North when control of the air is lost. Perhaps its most effective fighter aircraft are 40-odd upgraded MiG-23MLs, whose design dates back to the late 1970s. Although a dozen-plus similarly upgraded MiG-29s offer superior capabilities, their number is too small to make a significant impact, and they are still no match for modern combat aircraft like the ROKAF’s KF-16C/D, F-15K, and F-35A. Over 200 MiG-21s of various types will incidentally meet older ROKAF airframes in the sky (if they are not shot down beforehand), but their lack of modern air-to-air weaponry means they can do little more than distract them from missions. 

Instead, most aircraft have been refitted to increase their effectiveness as ground attack aircraft, including vast numbers of MiG-19s, MiG-17s, and even Korean War vintage MiG-15s. The most modern planes the North’s air force has on offer in this department is the venerable Su-25, of which a little under two score are in service. In recent years the introduction of glide bombs and air-launched guided weaponry has increased effectiveness across all airframes, however, meaning the DPRK essentially brings to bear almost a thousand light aircraft capable of supporting operations in this conflict.

On the ground, advances through urban areas may present some of the most bloody and difficult fighting seen in recent history. North Korea has 10 infantry corps it can mobilize for such fighting, though in order to preserve momentum the main fights occur as the bulk of the invasion moves around Seoul, sequestering opposing units in the city for a prolonged battle while its mechanized forces advance. A push for mechanization that originated in the 1970s but is still ongoing has meant that the KPA now operates over 2,500 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, with trucks and other transports facilitating movement further in the rear. Around 4,300 main battle tanks (MBTs) and light tanks form the bulk of its armor, ranging from obsolete types such as the Soviet T-55 to a host of indigenous designs that are much more of a wildcard. The emphasis lies on flexibility and high mobility in most North Korean armored vehicles, with many designs amphibious or capable of autonomous river-crossing one way or another. While certainly the older types in its inventory stand to lose an engagement with modern South Korean armor, the 2020 nocturnal parade in Pyongyang showcased a stunning number of new designs that are distinctly modern. Their actual performance, let alone the size of their production run before conflict erupts, is unknown. Nevertheless, recent introductions like these necessitate a greater level of caution during combat than would formerly have been required. 

For the average soldier, recent developments have slowly begun to accumulate into concrete equipment changes. A variety of new small arms (some now sporting picatinny-type rails for attachments), new uniforms, and even the introduction of body armor and night vision devices all serve to increase combat efficacy. This is just the most visible aspect of a military-wide push for modern equipment even in those areas that serve little propaganda value. As a result, large numbers of new trucks, of both foreign and indigenous manufacture, have entered service in the past decade, complementing less glamorous materiel such as combat engineering vehicles and river-crossing equipment. Other obscure systems that serve a less direct combat role are electronics; the DPRK produces a large array of jammers and radars, as well as equipment related to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

The impact of such developments on this hypothetical war is difficult to assess beyond stating that they serve to maintain the KPA’s operational status in the modern age. A branch in which recent innovations have had a similar effect is the navy, which after the start of the conflict will mainly engage in operations meant to keep foreign navies and landing craft away from the DPRK’s shores. Perhaps the most powerful weapon it can deploy to achieve this is the submarine: operating over two dozen antiquated Romeo-class attack submarines and scores of smaller ones of indigenous design, these vessels can effectively deny opposing navies safe use of large swaths of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Though much investment has gone into producing vessels capable of regular operations, which has coincided with the introduction of a number of modern anti-ship missiles, the navy deploys a large number of highly unconventional craft. This has included a catamaran frigate, surface effect ships, very slender vessels, semi-submersibles, and even the world’s only non-nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The philosophy behind this is sensible: Since it is impossible to match the enemy ton for ton, the navy is forced to place faith in the ability of asymmetric warfare to produce results.

None of these vessels can prevent the inevitable, however: At a certain point the extensive network of bases the United States has in the region will begin unloading its forces onto the Korean Peninsula. This is the point where our hypothetical war ceases to be – for to consider this aspect is to consider the prospect of escalation. The DPRK’s only effective weapon against these bases is a pre-emptive strike with weapons of mass destruction, be it chemical, biological, or nuclear. We have explicitly precluded their use here, yet the North Korean regime will unfortunately not comply if it deems it necessary for its survival. Our survey of the KPA’s conventional strengths thus ends where news headlines have incessantly told us it would: the fires of a nuclear war.