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Can Indian Diplomacy Recover From 2020?
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Can Indian Diplomacy Recover From 2020?

In 2020, Indian diplomacy suffered one of its most difficult years. 

By Mohamed Zeeshan

2020 will go down as among the most difficult years for Indian diplomacy – not because of COVID-19, but because of other problems. The past year was marred by a series of confrontations with allies, partners, and even international institutions, as Hindu nationalist political priorities at home caused myriad dilemmas for Indian policy abroad.

Early in the year, India began grappling with the fallout from the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the protests and riots that gripped Delhi in the aftermath of its passage. Meanwhile, Kashmir remained under an extensive lockdown, with several prominent local politicians in detention following the revocation of the state’s autonomy.

All of this led to trouble and tension extending from Europe to North America to Australia. In the European parliament, political groups of nearly 600 lawmakers laid out a series of draft resolutions condemning the CAA. In the United States, Democratic leaders – ranging from Bernie Sanders to Vice President-elect Kamala Harris – voiced solidarity with protesters in India. In Australia, a Lowy Institute poll published in June showed a significant drop in India’s popularity among the public: While 59 percent of Australians expressed trust in 2018 that India would be a responsible power, that number dropped to 45 percent two years later.

Perhaps most distressingly for New Delhi, India’s diaspora appeared to be significantly polarized. For much of his term in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had made outreach to the diaspora a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy, in recognition of the diaspora’s political influence in their home countries. Yet, in the aftermath of controversial policies back home, some Indians overseas took to protesting in front of Indian diplomatic missions, even as Indian-origin politicians lent them support.

These challenges have only gotten harder with the enactment of some politically difficult farm reforms in India. As farmer groups – predominantly Sikhs from Punjab – began protesting near and around New Delhi, supporters of the Modi government began casting them as “Khalistani secessionists.” That rhetoric attracted vocal support for the farmers from Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, whose government depends on a powerful Sikh constituency. And New Delhi’s caustic response to his criticism turned Canada into a diplomatic rival overnight.

Neighborhood relations have also been severely impacted by India’s domestic political churn. The CAA was seen by pro-India leaders in both Afghanistan and Bangladesh as an express message from New Delhi that their countries are failed states. Meanwhile, a long-forgotten border dispute with Nepal exploded unexpectedly, as the Indian army chief accused that country of acting at the behest of China – a comment that many believed was meant to appeal primarily to jingoists back home.

India has also had unusual trouble at the United Nations, where New Delhi’s soft power has traditionally delivered rich dividends and influence. In 2017, for instance, India won a historic election over the United Kingdom for a seat in the International Court of Justice. But as the international media began casting the spotlight on communal tensions in India this year, various U.N. agencies and functionaries joined in.

Indian diplomats have responded to these comments with uncharacteristically aggressive language. In October, India accused a U.N. Special Rapporteur from the Maldives of “bias” toward “one community” – ostensibly Muslims – after the diplomat called out New Delhi on the CAA riots and the police brutality that followed. That same month, the U.N. human rights chief, Michelle Bachelet, criticized the Modi government for cracking down on NGOs. India responded by saying that it expected Bachelet to have a “more informed view.”

India’s series of confrontations with the West and others could not have come at a worse time for New Delhi. Owing to troubles with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), New Delhi is desperately in need of goodwill and support across the West, in order to push back against Beijing. Instead, the fragmentation of the Indian diaspora and the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from New Delhi against foreign critics has left India’s political capital decidedly depleted.

The irony of India’s diplomatic messaging crisis is that it has come under a seasoned ex-diplomat who rose to become foreign minister. But External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has found his diplomat and politician personas increasingly in conflict with each other, as he juggles the government’s aggressive domestic imperatives against diplomatic deftness abroad. Last year, Jaishankar sparked a tiff with senior Democratic leaders in the United States after refusing to meet with Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal because of her comments on Kashmir.

Jaishankar’s challenges are set to continue well into 2021, as Hindu nationalist rhetoric gets more shrill at home – and the biggest problem for Indian foreign policy in the new year will be in trying to minimize the diplomatic fallout arising from India’s domestic politics. The rise of a Democrat to the White House will not help matters and will likely exacerbate the glare of the international media on India’s problems. As former Indian diplomat Vivek Katju pointed out recently, Jaishankar will now have to “meet the very U.S. political figures he has shunned till now.”

In order to revive India’s diplomatic capital over the new year, Jaishankar must rethink New Delhi’s aggressive rhetoric toward critics overseas – and establish dialogue with them, including on difficult human rights issues. Rebuffing or attacking critics will only make the diplomatic impact of their criticism all the more difficult to deal with.

A harder challenge will be at home: The foreign minister needs to ensure that India’s comments on external affairs are not hijacked by his political colleagues. In February last year, a senior functionary from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the state of Karnataka threatened Bernie Sanders by saying that India would “play a role” in the U.S. presidential elections (he later deleted the tweet). Jaishankar needs to find a way to work with BJP functionaries to prevent such comments in the future.

India’s global influence will suffer in 2021 if its foreign policy continues to play to the gallery back home. The foreign minister needs to rethink his ways.

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The Authors

Mohamed Zeeshan is a writer for The Diplomat’s South Asia section.

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