Where Do Cross-Strait Relations Go From Here?

On January 9, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo abruptly announced that he was lifting decades-old guidelines that restricted the extent and form of U.S. official interactions with Taiwan. The timing of the move – just 11 days before the Biden administration took office, putting Pompeo out of a job – sparked a wave of commentary about how Pompeo’s statement would impact new President Joe Biden’s Taiwan policy.

Less discussed, but equally important, is how a change in U.S. Taiwan policy could impact cross-strait relations.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said Pompeo’s announcement would be met with a “resolute response” from China. He did not elaborate. Generally, however, when China responds to advances in U.S.-Taiwan relations, it takes aim at Taipei, not Washington.

Sure enough, a few days later, Zhu Fenglin, the spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office under China’s State Council, blasted not only the U.S. but also Taiwan for Pompeo’s move. “The Democratic Progressive Party authorities are stubbornly ‘relying on the United States to plot for independence,’” Zhu said, referring to Taiwan’s ruling party. “Going further and further down the wrong path will certainly meet with severe punishment.”

China has put actions behind those words in the past, in a way it typically does not do for its threats toward the United States. For example, the Trump administration sent two high-ranking officials to Taiwan in 2020: Health Secretary Alex Azar in August, followed by Undersecretary of State Keith Krach in September. During Krach’s visit, China’s military sent 18 fighter jets and bombers into Taiwan’s airspace.

Senior Colonel Ren Guoqiang, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, linked the show of force to Beijing’s displeasure at the “collusion” between the United States and Taiwan. “Those who play with fire are bound to get burned,” he added. Left unspoken: Taiwan is the one facing the flames.

The September incident was not a one-off. By the end of 2020, Taiwan reported that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had made around 380 sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. That was the most since 1996, when Chinese military activity sparked a serious security crisis in the Taiwan Strait – precipitated, in part, by the U.S. decision to grant a visa to then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui.

China’s military planes and naval vessels have also crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait – the de facto maritime and air space border between China and Taiwan – over 40 times in 2020. Before 2019, no such incursions had been reported since 1999. The uptick in military activity near Taiwan had some analysts seriously worried that China might try to stage an actual invasion in the period between the U.S. presidential election in November and the inauguration in January.

While that didn’t play out, China has not stepped down its aggression, either. Rather, the increased military pressure appears to be a new normal. PLA military planes flying near Taiwan are now “almost a daily occurrence,” Voice of America reported in January.

It’s long been theorized that the Chinese Communist Party will seek to have control over Taiwan by 2049, a date that has assumed immense political significance as the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. But soon after taking power, Xi Jinping infamously commented that the cross-strait dilemma “must reach a final resolution” and “cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” That raised eyebrows, sparking theories that Xi will seek to oversee the unification of Taiwan even sooner – possibly by force.

But while military activities get the most headlines, they are only one aspect of China’s strategy for Taiwan. Beijing uses a combination of carrots and sticks, both punishing what it sees as bad behavior (including increased interactions with the United States) and rewarding good behavior on the part of those willing to toe the CCP line. Though direct contacts between the governments in Taipei and Beijing have been frozen since 2016, cross-strait interactions continue apace in some fields, even while military pressure increases. 

In fact, Beijing will be stepping up its exchanges with pro-China groups and individuals in Taiwan, as made clear by the January 2021 release of new regulations guiding “united front work,” CCP jargon for working with non-Communist Party forces at home and abroad to achieve party interests. In the case of Taiwan, specifically, Zhu Fenglin, the spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, explained that the goal of united front work is to “broadly unite Taiwan compatriots at home and abroad, jointly oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities, continue to advance the process of peaceful reunification of the motherland, and finally complete the great cause of national reunification.”

At the same press conference, Zhu spoke at length about the opportunities for Taiwanese businesspeople to engage with China’s economy. He promised that China will take further steps to “guarantee the well-being” and equal treatment of Taiwanese doing business in China. “The majority of Taiwanese compatriots and Taiwanese enterprises fully grasp the development trends and important opportunities in the mainland… and they will surely receive bigger and better growth [as a result],” Zhu said.

Critics in Taiwan, however, say efforts to offer special benefits to Taiwanese are an effort to hollow out Taiwan’s work force and accelerate “brain drain” from Taiwan.

It should always be kept in mind that everything Beijing does on Taiwan policy is aimed at one goal: bringing both sides of the Taiwan Strait under Chinese Communist Party control. China’s carrots and sticks alike are aimed at this end.

That helps explain why China has so far been unwilling to make moves that would directly impact the lives of Taiwanese people – such as ending the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, forged under the previous administration in Taiwan. The ECFA could have been allowed to lapse in 2020, but instead Beijing quietly chose to keep it in effect. CCP leaders likely realized the villainous picture it would paint if China threw Taiwan into further economic turmoil amid the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Meanwhile, military excursions near Taiwan help create an atmosphere of fear and foreboding, but don’t impact daily life for Taiwan’s people. Likewise, the severing of a diplomatic relationship helps isolate Taiwan internationally but isn’t going to directly affect most Taiwanese.

With all this in mind, it’s likely that continued advances in U.S.-Taiwan relations will lead to increased pressure on Tsai’s government, albeit in ways that will not directly impact Taiwan’s people (the way economic restrictions, for example, might). China continues to try, in its own way and subject to the inherent limitations of an authoritarian party-state, to “win the hearts and minds” of people in Taiwan. That makes a blockade, much less an outright invasion, unlikely – but not impossible.