Repositioning the US Vision of Democracy
Focusing on democracy as the impetus for unity will likely alienate more countries than bringing them together.
Insurgents taking over Capitol Hill, if only for a few hours, sounded a tumultuous beginning to a new year that has already been bogged down with the ongoing pandemic. Yet the resulting impeachment of then-President Donald Trump for the second time has actually restored some confidence in democracy and the ability for the United States to self-correct. Within hours of taking office, new President Joe Biden signed 17 executive orders to reverse many of his predecessor’s signature policies, including on climate change and immigration. But as the Biden White House looks to promote democratic governance as part of his administration’s recommitment to the international liberal order and as a rallying point to unite Asian nations in particular, the new administration will still have to tread carefully.
Working to restore solid ground with long-established U.S. allies, and to strengthen new partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, will be critical for Washington to amplify its voice, especially amid an ever-increasing Chinese presence across the region over the last four years. With Biden surrounded by advisors who played a major role in developing the Obama administration’s policy to rebalance toward Asia, including former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who is now coordinator for the National Security Council’s newly created Indo-Pacific affairs portfolio, the White House’s renewed commitment to the region is clear. The will to complete the rebalance and restore the United States as a fully present Pacific power is palpable, and the foreign policy team is clearly aware of the strategic need to do so in light of the rapidly shifting balance of power in Asia in particular.
The question, though, is whether the appetite among Asian nations to follow Washington can be as strong as it was four years ago. The Biden White House’s focus on restoring public confidence in government and investing in its own domestic growth is in itself a welcome one across the Indo-Pacific, given the need for the United States to be stable and economically competitive if it is to return as a strong regional leader. As such, the new administration’s focus on the domestic economy will be seen as inevitable and even welcomed so long as there is continued commitment to engage with the region beyond rhetoric.
But the urge to promote values as a means to unite like-minded nations may backfire. Throughout his campaign, Biden has repeated the need for the United States to work closely with its allies and promote democracy. Indeed, he proposed convening a Summit of Democracies to further that objective, aiming to bring together countries that shared a commitment to good governance. The idea is not new, with U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposing the idea of a D10 summit of democracies last summer, which would bring together the G-7 countries together with South Korea, India, and Australia to cooperate on tackling the pandemic and other cross-border issues. A coordinated effort to deal with the continued spread of COVID-19 and the distribution of vaccines has been sorely lacking, and is certainly much needed.
What has also been missing over the past four years has been a multilateral approach to strengthen the rules-based order, and a global commitment to call out China on its violation of international rules and norms. Washington has a key role to play to hold Beijing accountable for its transgressions. Yet focusing on democracy as the impetus for unity will likely alienate more countries than bringing them together, for three reasons in particular.
First, although Washington continues to see the growing geopolitical divide as a clash between authoritarian rule and democracy, democratic governments in Asia are increasingly wary of the differences in focusing on collective interest compared to individual interest. For Tokyo and Seoul in particular, the different approaches in dealing with the pandemic are reflective of the divide in what democracy means on either side of the Pacific. The fact that East Asia in 2020 was far more successful than the United States or Europe in keeping the pandemic at bay has certainly given the region greater confidence about its government systems, while increasing wariness about the democratic values in the West, which put individual rights above collective interest. A communitarian approach to dealing with COVID-19 by establishing ground rules for individual conduct as well as a more comprehensive approach to contact tracing have been seen as key to prevent the pandemic from spreading exponentially. In contrast, the U.S. focus on individualism in favor of collective protection has been seen to backfire in dealing with a health crisis that requires unity based on consensus to adhere to stringent, unpopular rules.
As a result, there is more of a need to reassess how good governance is defined, rather than simply promoting democracy as an unshakeable tenant for equitable growth. In short, there is growing concern that democracy taken to its extreme can lead to individualism run amok, ultimately leading to a fracturing of society and national identity. In order to maintain the allure of democracy, there needs to be a reassessment of how individual rights can be protected while fulfilling the the social compact to meet the needs of the national population at large. The United States must certainly be willing to listen and learn from the best practices of other countries, especially in Asia, as it promotes its commitment to democratic values.
Finally, if Washington is to expand its network of countries to cooperate on cross-border issues, focusing too heavily on democracy as an end in itself can alienate potential partners from the get-go. Enhanced trade relations in the Indo-Pacific without the United States is a case in point. Since 2017, the region has succeeded in concluding two major multilateral trade deals, bringing together nations with disparate governance systems, from democracies such as Japan to one-party nations such as Vietnam. The strength of both the CPTPP and RCEP is in part their ability to unite countries regardless of their politics and commit them to greater economic integration, which in turn is expected to lead to further cooperation on issues of mutual concern beyond trade. As Washington looks to expand its network of countries to push back against Chinese economic coercion, territorial claims in the South China Sea, and human rights violations within and outside of its own borders, the United States will need to reclaim its credibility not only as a Pacific power, but as an attractive model for growth and governance.
The Biden administration’s focus on restoring order at home is only to be expected. What it will also need to bear in mind is that the allure of a U.S.-led order and the U.S. vision of democracy will only be as strong as the stability and equity that it can nurture within its own borders.
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Shihoko Goto is the deputy director for geoeconomics and the senior Northeast Asia associate at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program. She is a leading expert on economics and politics in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as U.S. policy in the region.