D.S. Hooda

The China-India standoff in eastern Ladakh shows signs of ending after almost 10 months. Arguably the most serious in over half a century, the standoff – involving multiple points of Chinese incursions across a large frontage – at times threatened to erupt into war. Beyond a mid-June clash between Chinese and Indian forces in the Galwan Valley, an Indian military operation at the end of August to seize unoccupied peaks in the Kailash range saw the country deploy the secretive Special Frontier Force. Both sides used firearms ostensibly to warn each other and signal resolve. 

The standoff also saw China and India field an unprecedented number of soldiers (about five divisions each, according to media reports) as well as armored columns, missiles, air assets, and other weapons and platforms along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, dramatically raising the risk of escalation. However, since February 10 both Chinese and Indian forces have disengaged at two of the critical friction points around the scenic Pangong Lake, and both countries have committed to working to resolve the crisis elsewhere. 

Retired Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda is no stranger to the LAC, having headed the Indian Army’s Northern Command (responsible for the Ladakh sector, among other, contiguous, areas of responsibility) between 2014 and 2016. Since retiring from the military in November 2016, Hooda has been involved in a range of think tank and advisory activities around Indian strategic affairs. In an interview with The Diplomat, Hooda distills the key lessons he has drawn from the Ladakh standoff and how he sees the future unfolding as India renews focus on its northern boundary.

The Indian government had maintained, first, that it wasn’t sure why the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) did what it did, and then, that the explanations provided by Beijing for its actions were not “credible.” In your personal assessment, what could have been China’s motivations behind the standoff? To what extent are hypotheses that it was the result of India’s August 2019 Jammu and Kashmir decisions, or its push toward improving infrastructure along the LAC, credible?

China's military actions indeed came as a matter of great surprise to India. In attempting to analyse China's motivations, two things are clear. First, there was no immediate provocation that could have served as a trigger for the Chinese intrusion. Second, the Chinese plan was at least a few months in the making as the first reports of a major military exercise in Tibet had come out in January 2020. Soldiers from that exercise were diverted for the transgressions in May. Therefore, we could assume that it was a series of events from the August 2019 decision and subsequent comments made regarding Aksai Chin, India's opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative, and the growing closeness in U.S.-India ties, that possibly prompted the Chinese leadership to attempt military coercion of India. I also think that China seriously underestimated Indian resolve not to buckle under their threat.  

Do you envision a scenario where the Ladakh standoff could have erupted into a limited shooting war? Now that both India and China have announced their plans to disengage in both the north and south banks of the Pangong Lake, has the probability of a kinetic conflict erupting from the standoff decreased?

When thousands of soldiers are facing off in a tense situation where lives have already been lost, there is always the possibility of a shooting war, even though both sides may not want it. Surely, neither country wished the June 15 Galwan incident [when 20 Indian soldiers along with four PLA troops, the Chinese confirmed only recently, died as a result of a clash] to happen, but it is almost impossible to control local happenings when tensions are running high.

The disengagement from the north and south banks of Pangong Lake is a positive step because it separates the two forces and paves the way for further disengagement from other areas along the LAC in Ladakh. Obviously, the deep feeling of mistrust will take much more time to overcome, but the two countries can ill afford a conflict breaking out in what is perhaps the most forbidding terrain in the world.

If the standoff was – as many have claimed – ultimately about a larger China-India geostrategic contest and not fundamentally about a limited push-and-pull along the LAC, how do you see it playing out? Is the “LOC-fication” of the LAC – making the de facto Sino-Indian border as heavily militarized as the Line of Control between India- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir – inevitable?

The standoff, in my view, was ultimately about a larger geostrategic contest in Asia. We must look at it with this perspective and not only in military terms. It would be tempting to do a LOC-fication of the LAC, but we must be very selective in how it is done. Merely deploying more soldiers in attempting to defend every meter of a 3,500 km border from PLA transgressions would be a very costly strategy, aside from being entirely defensive. We must have a much more nuanced strategy of deterrence that combines diplomatic and economic pressure with potential use of military force. 

In a January 30 article, you wrote: “It would be strategically prudent for the Indian Army to prepare for a contingency in which the PLA attempts to move into more disputed areas along the LAC, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh.” How do you assess the Indian Army’s capabilities in deterring or – if deterrence fails – repelling Chinese forces across multiple sectors of the LAC?

If you look at the PLA transgressions in Ladakh, it is mainly in those areas where there is a differing perception of the LAC and which could be considered disputed. This provides some moral justification for PLA actions. That is why I wrote that our focus should be on the disputed areas in other sectors. As far as the Indian Army's capabilities are concerned, I think we only have to look at the strong response to PLA’s transgressions in Ladakh. Today the PLA is stepping back from Finger 4 in the north bank of Pangong [Lake] that China’s ambassador to India had declared as the “traditional customary boundary line." For the last ten years, there has been significant military focus toward the northern borders, which began with the raising of two divisions in 2010, followed by the raising of a Mountain Strike Corps for the China front. The Indian Army is fairly well placed to deal with a limited conventional threat from China.  

What do you assess to be the key vulnerabilities of the PLA Ground Forces?

It is generally considered a fatal error to underestimate the enemy. We must start with the assumption that the PLA Army is a professional and well-equipped force. I think the major difficulty they will face is in overcoming the challenges associated with mounting an attack across the Himalayan watershed. This will test the limits of human endurance that even the best of weapon systems cannot compensate. There could also be a question mark on the battle-performance of conscripts, who constitute about one-third of the total manpower in the PLA and serve two-year terms. A short training period and unfamiliarity with the terrain and operating conditions among the conscripts could be a restricting factor in their employment.

In the long run, do you envision fundamental shifts in Indian defense policy following the Ladakh standoff? In your mind, what does a robust counter-China military posture look like?

Although the military has always been cognizant of China's military threat, there appeared to be a feeling in the political establishment that the China challenge could be handled through a combination of political, diplomatic, and economic engagement. The Ladakh standoff will undoubtedly trigger a shift in India's defense policy with greater attention to the northern border. A robust counter-China military posture will demand rapid infrastructure development along the LAC and building up capabilities to neutralize the PLA’s advantage in cyber, space, electronic warfare, and missile technology. The Indian Navy must be further strengthened to exploit its geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean that remains a vulnerability for China. I am aware that given the limitations of the Indian defense budget, all this will not come easy. Therefore, the three services must come out with a joint plan on the priority military capabilities required to be built up to deal with a potential threat from China.