China-India Disengagement in Ladakh: Grounds for Cautious Optimism

After nearly 10 months of false starts, premature jubilation, and umpteen rounds of political and military talks, the China-India standoff in eastern Ladakh may be reaching its end. With military disengagement complete at one the key friction points, Pangong Lake, military commander talks are now focusing on other areas. However, the leap from narrow military disengagement to a real reduction in tensions along the undefined 3,488-kilometer Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China (mostly, the Tibetan Autonomous Region) is still quite far.

Starting in April 2020, if not earlier, Chinese forces crossed over into Indian territory across a wide front in Ladakh, following which they blocked the Indian Army from patrolling in these areas or, in the case of the north bank of Pangong Lake, undertook construction work that would have shifted the LAC in China’s favor. The incursions first became visible, so to speak, to the public in early May 2020 after melees between Chinese and Indian troops, including one on the north bank of Pangong Lake. It soon became clear that other than the area in the vicinity of the lake, Chinese forces had obstructed Indian patrolling in the strategically vital Depsang area, Gogra, Galwan, Hot Springs, and Demchok. 

However, it was the north bank of Pangong Lake that soon emerged as a crucial challenge. The area is marked with so-called “fingers,” mountainous features protruding into the lake. While both China and India have different perceptions of where the LAC in the area actually lies – the two sides have not exchanged maps of the LAC in the Ladakh sector in general – China’s construction of a blacktopped road to Finger 4 would have obstructed Indian patrolling beyond that point, and rendered its claim that the LAC runs through Finger 8 moot.

But beyond construction activity and obstructing patrols, both sides deployed several divisions worth of troops in Ladakh along with commensurate armor, air assets, missiles, and other weapons and platforms in the rear. Should shooting erupt at one of the friction points – where both sides had deployed troops at close proximity – a larger conflagration would be a real possibility. 

And both sides did indeed come close to war at least once. 

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, Indian special forces embarked on an audacious military operation to seize several unoccupied peaks in the Kailash range – in the Chushul sector near the south bank of Pangong Lake – in order to, simultaneously, regain tactical advantage as well as secure a bargaining chip for future negotiations. In a media interview following the announcement that both sides were disengaging in the Pangong Lake area, Indian Army’s Northern Command chief Lieutenant General Y.K. Joshi noted how close China and India were in going to war end of August. 

“We were on the edge, we were absolutely on the brink,” Joshi said. 

In any event, India’s gambit in the Kailash range seems to have paid off. Following corps commander talks in late January, Chinese and Indian forces have agreed to a buffer zone – with no patrolling by either side – in the north bank of Pangong Lake, whereby Indian forces position themselves near Finger 3 and Chinese troops retreat beyond Finger 8. Simultaneously, both armies have vacated peaks that they occupied in the Chushul sector and have also pulled back mechanized forces in the area – one of the few places in Ladakh that renders itself suitable for armored war given the relatively flat terrain. 

While the plan to establish buffer zones along the LAC is not new, its February instantiation in the fingers area marks one of the very few times a fait accompli has been reversed, contrary to scholarly expectations. But whether disengagement on the two banks of Pangong Lake can indeed be replicated in other sectors of contention remains unknown.

On February 20, corps commanders from both sides held a 10th round of talks to discuss disengagement in Hot Springs, Gogra, Demchok, and Depsang. Media reports following the meeting suggested that while both forces agreed to disengage in Gogra and Hot Springs during the talks, Demchok and Depsang continue to remain contentious. Even if they were also to be resolved in a narrow, “technical” way through a pullback of troops and/or the creation of more buffer zones, the larger question of deescalation along the Ladakh LAC – which would involve considerable thinning of forces along the LAC – remains open. It is plausible that further de-escalatory steps would require political intervention and commitment at the highest levels of government, both in New Delhi and Beijing.

And for that to happen, two additional steps have to be taken. First, a new set of confidence-building measures (the existing five, carefully crafted and upheld over decades, are now in tatters following the standoff) have to be developed – a task easier set than concluded. Second, the larger China-India relationship would need a hard, honest look in both countries, beyond hypernationalist posturing and needless inflammation. Both countries now need to decisively push for resolving boundary as well as territorial disputes across the entire LAC, and not just in Ladakh. 

For now, however, small steps.