European Navies Up their South China Sea Footprint

“We cannot allow countries to unilaterally undermine international law and maritime security in the South China Sea, thereby representing a serious threat to the peaceful development of the region,” EU High Representative Josep Borrell emphasized at the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Conference in September 2020. This statement aligns with the European Union’s consistently held position on the disputed waters, calling for a peaceful resolution, and voicing criticism of (presumably Chinese) actions and claims that run counter to international law.

The EU, though a geographically distant voice on these issues, certainly has real interests in keeping the South China Sea crisis and conflict free. An estimated 40 percent of the EU’s external trade travels through the region, making free and safe sea lines of communication indispensable economically. But beyond material concerns, the upholding of international law and the maintenance of a rules-based system are fundamental pillars not only for the EU’s own governance but also for the frame and shape of its external engagement.

Despite the regularity with which EU officials articulate the need to respect statutes governing international waters, the EU response by design is somewhat fragmented, with the bulk of foreign and security policy decision-making lying with individual member states. Still, 2021 may usher in a shift, with leading European powers signalling a willingness to boost freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. Although only one tool among several at the disposal of non-claimant parties to the disputed waters, these operations send a message, symbolically elevating the presence of European naval vessels in Asia to affirm the rights of states in passages designated as international waters. While FONOPs in the South China Sea have been regularly utilized by the United States, European countries have sparsely employed the operations to date.

France has led the way for Europe on the South China Sea. The country identifies itself as a “resident power” in Asia thanks to its overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and military facilities on French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Reunion Island. Accordingly, Paris has notably called out the potentially dangerous impact of Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and beyond, including waters in the Arctic and Mediterranean. This year, in February, France sent a nuclear attack submarine and naval support ship through the South China Sea and is slated to conduct another transit with an amphibious assault ship and frigate as part of its annual Jeanne d’Arc mission, during which it will conduct joint exercises with Japan and the United States. (The French navy also conducted an unprecedented FONOP in April 2019 in the Taiwan Strait.) French Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly tweeted that the submarine made its voyage to “enrich our knowledge of this area and affirm that international law is the only rule that is valid, regardless of the sea where we sail.”

Separately, the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy is expected to send its state-of-the-art aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, which entered service last year, to the Pacific in May. The battleship will reportedly pass through the South China Sea.

More recently, Germany, the EU’s largest economy, announced it would send a frigate to Asia in August, making it the first German warship to sail through the South China Sea in nearly two decades. The move was praised by officials in Washington and represents a change in Berlin’s disposition on the disputed waters, especially for an EU member state whose navy has traditionally been more focused on the more immediate neighborhood.

FONOPs alone have by and large proven to be insufficient in thwarting bold and at times aggressive behavior from Chinese vessels in the South China Sea. As Meia Nouwens, senior fellow for Chinese defense policy and military modernization at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) notes, there have already been more than 44 Chinese incursions in the region in the first few months of 2021.

In addition to more frequent and visible FONOPs, some EU member states have gone further and formulated policies dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region. Though these guidelines appear to echo objectives from the United States’ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, the models set forth first by France (May 2018), then Germany (September 2020), and the Netherlands (November 2020) also suggest the potential for a more unified European stance toward the region. The Dutch policy itself calls for a greater role for the EU to cooperate with others to maintain free passage and maritime safety in the region, adding that “the EU must express itself more often and more strongly on developments in the South China Sea that violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”      

Brussels has also sought to enhance its diplomatic links to the region as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum since its signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012. It has developed security dialogues and capacity-building trainings targeting issues related to fishing, environmental preservation, joint resource development, as well as maritime best practices and law enforcement. Still, its checkered participation at other regional security fora has at times raised questions about its capacity to play a larger role in the region’s security, noted Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, senior research fellow at the Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris, France in a previous analysis for The Diplomat.

In a collective diplomatic move, France, Germany, and the U.K. submitted a note verbale (a diplomatic correspondence) to the United Nations in September 2020 in which they emphasized that “historic rights” over the waters of the South China Sea do not comply with international law and provisions of the U.N. Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As du Rocher wrote “This note verbale set a precedent: For the first time, three major European states voiced the European position at the level of the United Nations. If there is nothing new about the substance – respect for international law and the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles and rules of UNCLOS are the bedrock of European policy – the very fact they questioned the validity of the Chinese narrative at the U.N. is the message.”

Beijing’s latest response vis-a-vis a greater European push into the South China Sea has remained even-tempered. Officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs have repeatedly said that “there is no problem with freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.” And yet, while stating China’s respect for freedom of navigation in accordance with international law, spokespeople are equally quick to voice opposition for any move that might attempt to “undermine China’s sovereignty and security and disrupt regional peace and tranquility.”

Commentary published in the Global Times, however, tends to reveal stronger, more nationalistic positions. In March, the Global Times wrote “By sending warships to the South China Sea, the U.K., France, and Germany have posed themselves as the protectors of international rules on the one hand and demonstrated their intention to become participants of the major-country competition on the other.”

“They want to impose clout on China not only through economic and diplomatic means but also with something ‘visible’, such as warships, to remind Beijing that ‘we are able to exert security influence around you,’” said China Institute of International Studies director Cui Hongjian.

The EU-China relationship has grown more nuanced in recent years, particularly as Brussels identified Beijing as a “systemic rival, promoting alternative models of governance” in its March 2019 report “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook.” Concern over peace and stability in the South China Sea is now one among a number of growing sources of tension. Still, the 27-member EU bloc is China’s largest trade partner with two-way trade in goods totaling $710 billion in 2020. China also surpassed the United States as the EU’s most important trade partner in goods last year. Beijing and Brussels finished 2020 by concluding the negotiations of an investment pact that would further deepen their economic relationship.

The increased presence of European partners into the South China Sea may engender risks for miscalculation, especially in waters that can be heavily congested. Moreover, a fresh focus on the Indo-Pacific among European partners does not always mean the alignment of priorities, particularly between EU leading member states such as France and Germany. “These divergences will need to be reduced or circumvented in order to formulate an effective EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific,” wrote Mathieu Duchâtel, director of the Asia program at the Institut Montaigne and Garima Mohan, a fellow at the German Marshall Fund. They argue that a broad agenda, concentrating on issues beyond security and integrating open shipping routes with open markets and free trade, digital and infrastructure connectivity, and climate change emphasizes Europe’s strengths and could “prove to be an asset for European engagement with the region.”