US-Japan 2+2: Charting New Waters for Japan?

On March 16, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with their respective Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu and Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo, in Tokyo for a Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting. It was the first since the inauguration of the Biden administration in January 2021. Following the meeting, the four ministers issued a joint press statement.  

In the past, the SCC – more commonly known as the “2+2” – has been used to publicly lay out the vision and set the priorities for the U.S.-Japan alliance at important moments. For instance, past SCC joint statements have been used to provide the overall strategic contexts for the realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa and the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. As such, the contents of SCC joint statements, especially when the four ministers meet under new leadership in either country, have always attracted a great deal of attention.  

That said, last month’s 2+2 meeting attracted even more attention than usual. First, the meeting was the first foreign trip for both Blinken and Austin since assuming their respective positions.  When a U.S. administration comes into the office, the world watches (a) which foreign leader a new U.S. president welcomes to the White House first, and (b) where senior members of the new administration – namely the president, the vice president, and the secretaries of state and defense  – choose to visit on their first foreign trips. The mere fact that two top members of the new Biden administration not only chose Japan as their first foreign destination, but also were willing to coordinate their schedules so that they could hold a 2+2 with their Japanese counterparts while in Tokyo, speaks unambiguously to the importance that the Biden administration attaches to the U.S.-Japan alliance as the “cornerstone of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” 

Moreover, the 2+2 took place just days after U.S. President Joe Biden convened the first U.S.-Japan-Australia-India summit meeting. Policy consultation among these four countries, known collectively as the “Quad,” has been occurring since 2007, but was recently revitalized under the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept during the Trump administration. All four countries show increasing concern over China’s assertive behaviors in the region. Biden convening the virtual Quad summit attracted attention as a demonstration of the administration’s intention to attach significant strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region. Holding a U.S.-Japan 2+2 so soon after the Quad summit was yet another gesture by the Biden administration to demonstrate that the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of the main pillars for U.S. strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region. 

Second, this 2+2 meeting for the first time singled out China as a shared security concern for the United States and Japan. Indeed, the degree of specificity with which the joint statement lays out the two countries’ concerns vis-à-vis China is unprecedented. The joint statement identified Chinese behaviors that are inconsistent with existing international norms as “political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the Alliance and to the international community,” referring to everything from China’s newly-enacted Coast Guard Law to its “unlawful” maritime claims and activities in South China Sea. This went far beyond simply reiterating that the Senkaku Islands, administered by Tokyo but claimed by Beijing as the Diaoyu Islands, are covered under the U.S. commitment to defend Japan under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Furthermore, the joint statement also made a reference to Taiwan for the first time. When the United States and Japan revised the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation for the first time in 1997, there was acknowledgement that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan Strait was politically controversial in Japan. A reference to that topic could suggest Japan’s potential involvement in a U.S. effort to defend Taiwan. As a result, officials from the two governments had to invent the concept of a “situation in the areas surrounding Japan” to discuss U.S.-Japan security cooperation in East Asia beyond the defense of Japan itself. Even though the language in the most recent joint statement stopped at saying the two countries “underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” the mere inclusion of the reference to the Taiwan Strait illustrates how far the alliance cooperation has evolved since 1997. 

The outcome of the first 2+2 with the Biden administration must certainly be reassuring for Japan. Tokyo seems to have gained what it sought from Washington – reconfirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the “cornerstone of peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region”; reaffirmation that the Senkaku Islands are covered under the U.S. defense commitment to defend Japan under Article 5 of the security treaty; and a reference to Beijing’s new Coast Guard Law as one of the allies’ shared concern, to name a few points. If there was any concern in Tokyo that the Biden administration might begin to take an engagement-based stance vis-à-vis China, what the U.S. was willing to publicly articulate with Japan in the joint statement, including the reference to Taiwan, should dispel those worries.  

However, as the United States and Japan move ahead with many of the tasks that have been laid out in the joint statement, there is no doubt that Japan will have a lot of work to do. While the Biden administration emphasizes mending and restoring alliance relationships that might have suffered damage during the previous administration, it also seeks to “modernize” its alliance relationships. If the reference to the renewal negotiations of the Host Nation Support agreement in the joint statement is any guide, Washington will seek a “mutually beneficial” solution. In other words, even if the Biden administration’s approach to alliance consultations will be far less transactional and far more cooperative compared to the previous administration’s, it will still push its allies to do their fair share in keeping the alliances robust.  

For Japan, this means it will have to be able to present its own ideas of what a “modernized” and “mutually beneficial” alliance will look like. This is especially important in Tokyo’s discussions with Washington on enhancing deterrence capabilities for the alliance, including “cooperation across all domains” and “alliance roles, missions and capabilities.” As the consultation moves forward in these areas, Japan should prepare to propose specific areas in which it is willing to expand its roles.  

The March 2+2 meeting gave the reassurance that Japan needed. Now it is up to Japan to do its part to work with the United States to modernize the U.S.-Japan alliance into a more “mutually beneficial” alliance.