Time for the US to Step Up Its Courtship of Taiwan

Taiwan is no stranger to lobbying in the United States. Its marginalization from the international stage as a result of the deliberate ambiguity of the One China policy has made it imperative for Taipei to have its voice heard in Washington, strengthen relations with the United States as a matter of security and economic priority, and ensure that its global foothold remains secure. In recent years, however, the asymmetry in relations between Washington and Taipei has shifted considerably, with the United States increasingly needing Taiwan for its own economic and political security. 

Certainly, protecting Taiwan’s democracy and economic resilience has taken on a new sense of urgency under the Biden administration. In their first overseas visits since taking office, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made their first stop in Tokyo, followed by in-person meetings with their South Korean, Indian (for Austin), and Chinese (for Blinken) counterparts, making clear the U.S. commitment to the region goes beyond simply rhetoric. Moreover, unlike the official statement released after the Quad summit the previous week, which eschewed challenging China by name, the United States did not hesitate to call out Chinese aggressions explicitly in its joint declarations with Japan. In addition, at a joint press conference between Blinken and Austin with their Japanese counterparts Motegi Toshimitsu and Kishi Nobuo, there was affirmation of the need for the U.S.-Japan security alliance not only to protect Japanese territory, but also to ensure stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

Reaffirmation of both Washington and Tokyo’s commitment to protect Taiwan certainly resonates in a region facing ever-growing threats from China. As Blinken noted, “China uses coercion and aggression to systematically erode autonomy in Hong Kong, undercut democracy in Taiwan, abuse human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet, and assert maritime claims in the South China Sea that violate international law.”

The Biden cabinet members’ visit to the region is without doubt a much-needed manifestation of U.S. re-engagement in Asia. It has also demonstrated a far more measured approach to diplomacy in general, ensuring that there will be fewer surprises coming from the Biden administration, including on Taiwan policy. In the last days of the Trump administration, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that all guidelines restricting meetings with Taiwanese officials to be “null and void.”  

Although the Biden administration became the first to invite a current U.S. Taiwanese government representative to a presidential inauguration in January, it is clear that the White House is not going to make any sudden changes in its so-called robust unofficial relationship with Taipei, which is based on the 1979 U.S.-PRC joint communique acknowledging that there is but one China. Nonetheless, calls for greater clarity rather than strategic ambiguity when it comes to defining relations with Taiwan are on the rise inside the Beltway. 

In the joint statement between the United States and Japan, there was acknowledgement that “[t]he Ministers underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait." By acknowledging escalating tensions in the East as well as South China Seas as a result of Chinese actions, the Biden administration has been able to give credibility to its rhetoric of working together with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. Yet the limits on just how much Taiwan can contribute on the security front remains bound by the unique status of the government in Taipei.

But the pandemic has made clear that Taiwan is a critical partner in ensuring economic security not just in the Indo-Pacific, but in the United States too. Unlike in the defense realm, where regional stability remains very much dependent on the continued U.S. presence, when it comes to economic security the United States clearly needs Taiwan as much as Taipei needs Washington’s support. As the Biden administration reviews its critical supply chains and bolsters domestic economic resilience, it is clear that Washington will have to lean much more on Taiwan, and not less. 

Wooing the world’s biggest semiconductor manufacturer, Taiwan’s TSMC, has certainly been a priority for the United States, and ensuring that the Taiwanese government would approve the contract to move forward with a plan to develop a new $12 billion plant in Arizona this year has been critical as part of U.S. efforts to bolster its own supply chain resiliency. Meanwhile, TSMC’s announcement this earlier this year that it would build a $178 million material research center in Japan was much ballyhooed as a win for Tokyo, indicating that the global race to court TSMC has only just begun. 

The fact that Taiwan’s economy not only expanded in 2020 at a time when much of the rest of the world was struggling to stay afloat during the global pandemic was remarkable enough, but the fact that its GDP growth rate actually outpaced the growth rate of mainland China last year is striking. Taiwan was able to meet the global demand for IT goods and semiconductors manufactured by TSMC in particular, as well as Hon Hai Precision Industry and MediaTek. All three companies reported record levels of revenue. 

From telecommunications to data management to automobiles, semiconductors are a critical component of industrial growth. As a result, Taiwan is now punching far above its weight when it comes to defining the future of the global supply chain. Given that the Taiwanese economic ministry must authorize all major investments overseas by Taiwanese companies, it also means that Taipei will have far greater leverage when it comes to defining relations with their foreign counterparts in the future, including the United States. While Taipei will continue to lobby Washington for furthering bilateral relations, the United States too will need to bolster its own efforts to woo Taiwan too.