Can the China Consensus Hold?

It has taken nothing short of a perceived systemic threat from Beijing for Washington to step up efforts to invest in U.S. competitiveness in technology, which the United States until recently had taken more or less for granted. With no thaw in sight between the world’s two largest economies, the prospect of a prolonged strategic competition between Washington and Beijing is also leading other democracies to reassess their own perspectives and strategies vis-a-vis China. That has been heralded by the Biden administration as a sign not just of renewed U.S. commitment to work together with like-minded countries, but also a sign of renewed confidence in U.S. leadership for a global order in flux. Yet for all the demonstration of solidarity against the China threat at the latest G-7 summit meeting, the strength of unity among democracies and concerted resolve to challenge Beijing’s long game remains to be seen.

Efforts to take action against Chinese competition both within the United States and together with like-minded countries have intensified under the Biden administration, which carried over the hawkish stance against Beijing which emerged under President Trump. Certainly, U.S. legislators would not have been able to put forward as massive an industrial bill as the Innovation and Competition Act without a bipartisan consensus that, without some kind of direct public intervention, the United States would not be able to match the highly centralized Chinese industrial strategy moving forward. 

The exact future of the $200 billion bill aimed at bolstering U.S. technology investments in critical industries, including artificial intelligence and robotics, is still not known since it has yet to get the green light from the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the bill’s smooth sailing in the Senate undoubtedly indicates just how seriously members of the upper chamber see the rivalry with China impacting U.S. longer-term growth. Hopes for Beijing to change course and embrace the U.S.-led liberal order and the status quo have long passed.

In its early months, the Biden administration has also succeeded in garnering support for its position on China from American allies. From his first foreign leader meeting, with Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, to the G-7 Cornwall summit meeting in June, Biden’s views on the China threat have been reflected in joint communiques and statements, and have spearheaded unity among countries all grappling with the challenge China poses to the established global order. In the latest G-7 communique, for instance, the group stated that “with regard to China, and competition in the global economy, we will continue to consult on collective approaches to challenging non-market policies and practices which undermine the fair and transparent operation of the global economy.” At the same time, the world’s richest nations also made a case for their own commitment to shared values and democracy in particular by “calling on China to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially in relation to Xinjiang and those rights, freedoms and high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong.”

Even though Japan remains the sole Asian member of the G-7, the fact that Australia, India, and South Korea were included in the latest summit as observers not only highlights the fact that the Indo-Pacific is of ever greater interest to the group, but it also underscores the need for the world’s richest countries to demonstrate a united front in providing an alternative to the regional vision that is being steadily promoted by Beijing. It is no coincidence that China hosted an in-person meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Chongqing the same week as the G-7 summit and offered to provide much-needed financial aid and support to Southeast Asian nations grappling to recover from the disruptions caused by the COVID pandemic.

In the race to secure partners, however, it appears that the United States is winning for now. Not only was the G-7 summit a public demonstration of unity among the leaders, but the subsequent NATO summit meeting in Brussels made clear that allies were united also on the security front when assessing the China threat. Indeed, the fact that NATO, which has traditionally focused on threats from Eastern Europe and Russia in particular, is now addressing the challenges posed by Beijing indicates the growing concern of tensions in the Indo-Pacific spilling over well beyond the region. 

Yet the real question is whether investments and partnerships based on fear can be strong enough to withstand the long game being played out by Beijing. The Biden administration has undoubtedly made a remarkable comeback from a United States that until a few months ago was seen as a major cause of global disunity, emerging instead as a leader of a concerted effort of pushing back against China. In recasting the U.S. image, both the G-7 and NATO summits have been a success for the Biden administration. Nevertheless, the real test will be whether Washington can actually follow through on its initiatives to invest in longer-term competitiveness, promote democratic values without irony, and ensure commitment to collective security without wavering to its own domestic political winds.