The US Afghanistan Withdrawal: The View From China

As the United States prepares for its August 31 withdrawal from Afghanistan, ending what has been two decades of conflict, China’s influence in the country is poised to increase – for better or for worse. Afghanistan presents ample opportunity for Chinese firms to invest in the country’s reconstruction, development, and abundant mineral resources, but ongoing instability and violence have thwarted or stalled the two neighbors from deepening their ties so far. The Afghanistan-China relationship is illustrative of the tension between Beijing’s enduring need for stability, internally and along its borders, and the country’s economic imperatives.

In light of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan, China is of two minds. First, it has been critical of the pace and timeline of the U.S. exit, calling it “hasty” and “abrupt” and placing blame on Washington for escalating tensions and conflict in Afghanistan. Second, Beijing is also seizing the moment to emphasize that Afghanistan now has “a new opportunity to take the destiny of their country and their people into their own hands.” While calling for peace, reconciliation, and an inclusive Afghan political structure, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged the Taliban to cut ties with terrorist groups and “return to the political mainstream.”

So far, Afghanistan’s security challenges have prevented a more robust Beijing-Kabul partnership from becoming a reality. Despite the fact that Chinese firms around the world tend to be more risk-acceptant or risk-tolerant, the dynamics in Afghanistan are cause for concern.  Moving forward however, pragmatism may win out in China’s calculus vis-a-vis Afghanistan, even with the Taliban resurgent.

In the lead up to the U.S. withdrawal over the summer, the Taliban have been gaining ground from the Afghan government, finding their way deeper into parts of the mountainous northeastern Badakhshan province near Afghanistan’s border with China’s Xinjiang. While the area’s high altitude and terrain make cross-border road connections extremely difficult, the short 76 kilometer border between Afghanistan and China is also abutted by Tajikistan, whose more porous borders provide access between Xinjiang and Afghanistan’s Wakhan district.

Qian Feng, head of research at the National Strategy Institute of Beijing’s Tsinghua University, told the Wall Street Journal that “the Taliban want to show China good will.” For their part, the Taliban have called China a “welcome friend” in Afghanistan, suggesting that they would support Beijing playing a greater role in the country’s future. Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen told the South China Morning Post that the group would not allow Chinese investors to come to harm, saying, “[I]f they have investments of course we ensure their safety. Their safety is very important for us.”

Separately, the Taliban also said in July that while the group cares about the oppression of Muslims, “we are not going to interfere in China’s internal affairs,” alluding to China’s policing policies toward its Uyghur population.

Still, at first blush, the Taliban and China make for unlikely partners. The Chinese government has long tightly overseen the lives of its Muslim Uyghyr population in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, which shares a border with Afghanistan. Under China’s Xi Jinping, central leadership mounted a repressive crackdown on Uyghurs, detaining and imposing harsh measures on large swaths of the population under the guise of counterterrorism operations.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, an Islamist movement and military organization, has links to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and its successor, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). According to a 2020 United Nations Security Council report, an estimated 500 ETIM members remain in Afghanistan, though other affiliated militants have migrated to Syria in recent years. After the September 11 attacks in the United States and given its connections to other terrorist groups, ETIM has been formally designated as a terrorist organization by numerous countries (though the group’s coherence has always been questioned, and the Trump administration removed it from the U.S. terror list in 2020).

Despite these concerns, Chinese inroads into Afghanistan are critical for Beijing’s long-term development goals for its neighborhood and the broader region to its southwest. As such, Chinese leadership seems willing to make use of a variety of diplomatic tools to facilitate a smooth path forward.

Shortly after the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan in 2001 and the establishment of a new government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai, China reopened its embassy in Kabul and provided foreign assistance and investment. Over the past two decades, China has become an important source of foreign investment for Afghanistan. Chinese leaders have spearheaded a trilateral dialogue between counterparts in China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In September 2019, Afghan, Chinese, and Pakistani foreign ministers agreed to the proposed extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan. A highway connection between Pakistan’s Peshawar and the Afghan capital Kabul was put forth as an initial project.

The flow of Chinese investment to Afghanistan will not be a new phenomenon, but the link to CPEC may infuse investment partnerships with renewed energy. A $3 billion contract for the Mes Aynak copper mine in May 2008 was awarded to two Chinese state-owned enterprises (the China Metallurgical Group Corporation and the Jiangxi Copper Company Limited) that formed a consortium to run the project. Although the mine is said to include the second largest copper ore deposit in the world, extraction has yet to begin and parties have tried to renegotiate contract terms. Not coincidentally, the mine is also located in Logar province, where the Taliban and other insurgent groups are active. Other projects include the opening of a freight rail link between Urumqi and Kabul in September 2019.

In another move to mitigate its anxieties over Afghanistan’s, China – though opposed to sending its own troops abroad – has trained Afghan soldiers and police on Chinese soil, as well as providing small arms and equipment support. There have also been additional reports of China building a base in Badakhshan.

Meanwhile, despite prior links between Uyghurs and the Taliban, Beijing has not shied away from maintaining ties and reaching out to the militant group. Communication between Beijing and the Taliban also appears to be growing in recent years. Chinese leaders hosted a Taliban delegation in Beijing in 2019 to discuss peace talks and Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. As the Taliban grow stronger in Afghanistan, Beijing is likely trying to get ahead of events to come in the near term.   

And yet, as uncertainty lingers surrounding the security situation in Afghanistan post-U.S. withdrawal, China reportedly evacuated several hundred of its nationals from the country, according to state media, though few details were offered. China’s Foreign Ministry and its embassy in Kabul also urged its citizens to leave. More recently, at the July 2021 foreign ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s Wang Yi offered proposals for the Afghan situation.The first two points highlight China’s priorities: to prevent the United States from shirking responsibility in supporting peace and reconstruction after its withdrawal and to prevent the resurgence of terrorist forces.

Although the payoff of a stable Afghanistan is high for China, its ongoing efforts leave some doubts as to the degree to which China is willing to take on responsibility for its desired future for the region. Once the United States has fully left, Afghanistan and China’s neighbors may naturally look to Beijing to help realize the promise of peace. “None expect China to replace the United States in military terms, but Central Asia may hope Beijing will play a more forward and substantial role in Afghanistan – a role that actually helps stabilize and calm the situation – rather than hedge and watch while it collapses in on itself,” Niva Yao and Raffaello Pantucci wrote recently in The Diplomat.