Richard Horsey

The Myanmar military’s seizure of power in February tipped the country into turmoil. Almost immediately, mass protests erupted and tens of thousands went on strike to oppose the new military junta led by Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing. Seven months on, the demonstrations have largely dissipated under the violent repression of the security forces, but armed resistance – in both urban and rural areas – has taken their place, holding out the prospect of a grinding political stalemate. Meanwhile, COVID-19 has surged into the vacuum of state capacity left by the coup, threatening to compound a generational political crisis with a public health emergency.

Richard Horsey, an independent political analyst and long-time adviser for the International Crisis Group, speaks with The Diplomat about the evolution of the popular resistance to the junta, how foreign governments can help alleviate the COVID-19 crisis, and whether the current tumult might give rise to a new and more inclusive political paradigm in Myanmar.

In the six months since the Tatmadaw’s seizure of power, how have the tactics of the anti-coup resistance evolved? What does this suggest to you about the future trajectory of the crisis?

The anti-coup resistance is diverse and determined. In the early days after the coup, their demand was the release of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint and a return to status quo ante. As the regime’s crackdown became increasingly violent, both the demands and the tactics of the resistance shifted. A return to the situation before the coup was no longer acceptable and the objective became the ouster of the regime, the replacement of the military with a new institution under civilian control, and the abrogation of the 2008 Constitution and its replacement with a more democratic and federal charter.

In terms of tactics, it quickly became clear that the regime would not back down in the face of mass street protests, and as the security forces began violent attacks and killings of demonstrators and communities, forms of violent resistance emerged. These include ambushes and attacks on military and police targets in rural areas, and assassinations and bombings in urban areas. The situation is becoming increasingly violent, including tit-for-tat killings within communities by resistance forces and conservative forces, both plainclothes members of the security forces and other anti-resistance community members, the so-called Pyusawhti.

There is a history of violent resistance in Myanmar, for example after the 1988 crackdown on demonstrations and the subsequent formation of a Student Army. But the mainstream opposition under Aung San Suu Kyi adopted an explicitly non-violent and political approach. The embrace of violent tactics by the resistance movement represents a decisive shift away from Aung San Suu Kyi’s approach, mainly because peaceful responses were seen as untenable given the level of violence unleashed by the regime.

The composition of the opposition National Unity Government formed in April suggests a conscious attempt by officials from the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government to reach out to ethnic armed organizations and parties in a bid to establish a united front against a common foe: the military. Yet historically the relationship between the two camps has been strained. In general, how have ethnic armed organizations responded to the crisis? Do you see any signs that new cross-ethnic political formations will emerge from the post-coup tumult?

The NUG has attempted to rally the ethnic armed organizations to its side, hoping that the combination of its political legitimacy and their military capacity could force the regime from power. This was always going to be a long shot. The armed groups have in many cases been fighting for decades for greater autonomy and rights, and feel they have faced the same intransigence and discrimination from both democratic and dictatorial governments – including the Aung San Suu Kyi administration. They were never likely to throw their lot in with the NUG, especially given the sober assessment of most of these groups that the NUG’s chances of forcing the regime from power were slim, and the likely military retribution on their communities would be severe.

This is not to say that the armed groups have no sympathy for the NUG and other resistance forces. They have watched the horror of the last months unfold with a grim familiarity, seeing the army act against demonstrators as they have always done against ethnic communities in conflict areas. They also know that the chances of any political solution to the conflicts have receded with the regime in power. Thus, many armed groups have sympathy for the NUG, understand that it has very strong popular support, and want to help resistance forces as much as they can.

But it is difficult to generalize across multiple armed groups with very different origins, objectives, and allegiances. The Arakan Army, a relatively new group that has been engaged in intense fighting with the military for the last few years, sees advantage in an accommodation with the regime and extending the current ceasefire, to enable it to regroup and consolidate control of its areas. The United Wa State Army, the largest and best equipped armed group with close ties to China, has remained aloof from the current crisis, which it does not see as threatening its interests. The Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Organization, both large and politically significant groups, have provided sanctuary and training to fleeing dissidents, but have to balance this support against the risk of major attacks by the regime.

But amidst all this maneuvering, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that a new political paradigm may be emerging in Myanmar. The NUG has included many ethnic minority leaders in its cabinet, and adopted much more forward-leaning policies on ethnic autonomy and rights, including as regards the Rohingya. The youth-led resistance has bridged ethnic divides in a way that appears genuinely new and important. It remains to be seen how much of this is tied to the political exigencies of the moment, and how much may be a lasting societal shift; but it feels new and significant.

While it is hard to know the reality, the military junta has so far shrugged off the impacts of the economic sanctions imposed by Western democracies. Given the generals’ cloistered worldview and proven ability to withstand long spells of international isolation, are there any ways that sympathetic outside governments can support a return to democratic government? If so, how?

The regime is highly resistant to outside pressure, and most countries have come to the conclusion that beyond largely symbolic gestures such as targeted sanctions, they have very little leverage. This is probably true when it comes to the endurance of the regime – there is no prospect of other countries forcing it from power. But the world should be doing much more to support the people of Myanmar through this crisis – including the terrible wave of COVID-19 sweeping the country, the broader humanitarian needs, and the grave socioeconomic and human rights consequences.

Many observers state that China has a crucial role to play in any resolution of Myanmar’s crisis. How do you interpret China’s recent move toward recognition of the junta as Myanmar’s legitimate government? In general, what has underpinned Beijing’s response to the coup?

Beijing had invested heavily in its relationship with the Aung San Suu Kyi administration. It felt that she and her government were less anti-China than the Thein Sein administration, and that this would allow China to further its strategic interests in the country. The coup undermined all this and brought huge instability and risks to Chinese investments. But however unhappy China has been with the coup, it fairly quickly came to the conclusion that the military was not going to be ousted, and that it would have to learn to live with them in power. The alternative – backing resistance forces that have a strongly anti-China disposition – was never an option. China is not enthusiastic in its support of the regime, but it realizes that it will have to learn to live with the military in power, and is making tactical decisions accordingly.

With Myanmar facing a COVID-19 wave and a resurgence of conflict, the outside world finds itself impaled on the horns of a dilemma: the imperative to provide humanitarian support without inadvertently legitimizing the coup government. How should foreign governments go about engaging with Myanmar on these issues?

It is not clear that the dilemma is as stark as suggested. No Western countries, and few anywhere, regard the junta as in any sense legitimate, and they will limit their interactions with it. The question of how and when to engage with Naypyidaw arises not only with respect to humanitarian aid. All countries that have diplomatic ties with Myanmar will have to engage to some degree if they want to keep those embassies open and have diplomats accredited and functioning in the country. It is not clear to me that the delivery of humanitarian assistance accords any significant legitimacy to the regime – to the contrary, the need for outside support to those in need is a symptom of the governance failures and lack of legitimacy of the regime.

As with any humanitarian context globally, discussions and approvals are needed of all de facto authorities, including armed groups, the junta, and communities themselves, in order to deliver aid independently and effectively. It is more difficult with support for social services such as health and education, which is extremely difficult to do at scale without going through national systems. But Western and multilateral donors are unlikely to give any significant support to these systems at this stage, given that they have been rendered largely dysfunctional by the civil disobedience movement and are subject to boycotts by much of the population.