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Will the Fall of Afghanistan Distract the US From Southeast Asia?
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Will the Fall of Afghanistan Distract the US From Southeast Asia?

Kamala Harris’ trip to the region was supposed to showcase U.S. commitment, but the fall of Kabul derailed that messaging.

By Shihoko Goto

Kamala Harris’ first visit to Singapore and Vietnam as vice president in late August was highly anticipated. Not only was it her second overseas trip since assuming office, but it also was her first to Southeast Asia as second-in-command. Harris followed in the footsteps of senior Biden officials, including Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. The message Harris was meant to be delivering was clear: Namely that the White House was now taking the first tenet of diplomacy seriously, and that investment in cultivating personal relationships by showing up actually mattered.

Yet the rapid demise of the U.S.-backed Afghan military and the Taliban’s seemingly effortless return despite two decades of Washington’s involvement in Afghanistan changed the very nature of Harris’ visit to the Southeast Asian region. The U.S. vice president had to begin her much-anticipated policy speech on the Indo-Pacific with a lengthy aside on the situation in Afghanistan before making an awkward segue back to her presence in Singapore.

“[O]ur partnerships in Singapore, in Southeast Asia, and throughout the Indo-Pacific are a top priority for the United States,” she proclaimed, adding, “I am here to reaffirm our commitment” to the U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific.

Despite the soaring rhetoric, Harris was not able to assuage the concerns of the ASEAN nations in what should have been a confidence-building tour of the region. That is to be expected; after all, there is a deep divide among Biden-supporting Democrats themselves about what went wrong in Afghanistan, what steps the White House might have taken to avert such a spectacular downfall of U.S.-trained forces, and how to deal with the Taliban moving forward, not to mention the challenge of accommodating the influx of displaced Afghans seeking refuge overseas, including in the United States.

For a wealthy nation like Singapore, Harris’ first stop, the immediate concern about Afghanistan stems from concerns about the spillover effect of an unstable government and the prospect of a higher threat of terrorism across the region – points Harris notably did not address in her public remarks. For ASEAN nations at large, the question of how and whether China or Russia might seek to fill the vacuum left behind by the United States looms large. Granted, some analysts may argue that neither Beijing nor Moscow would be eager to immerse themselves in the Afghan quagmire as they assess the heavy price Washington has paid for its commitment over the years with seemingly very little result.

The challenge for the United States moving forward, though, is to restore its credibility on the global stage, and win back shaken confidence in its words and actions. Washington’s rapid retreat and the chaos surrounding Afghanistan has led to the questioning of U.S. reliability as an ally and as a guarantor of security. That in itself may not necessarily push Southeast Asian nations to be more inclined to side with China. Yet Beijing’s efforts to undermine Washington have undoubtedly gotten a lift with the latest developments in Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. retreat has led to questions about its troops and overall presence in other parts of the region amid growing domestic concerns about the cost as well as risks of supporting military efforts.

Nonetheless, when it comes to U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, however, the fundamentals remain unchanged. If anything, the situation in Afghanistan has made clear that the United States cannot reach its objectives of regional security and stability without the firm commitment of its partners. As the Biden administration seeks to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific, it is now more apparent than ever that Washington needs its allies. The question, however, is how Washington will be able to acknowledge and reassure its partners, including its hitherto staunchest allies across the Indo-Pacific, that U.S. commitment to the region is unwavering.

Singapore is usually regarded as Washington’s staunchest Southeast Asian ally, and yet it is also has strong ties to China as well. The fact that Harris chose the prosperous nation-state as one of her two stops in Southeast Asia is not only a public manifestation of the White House’s understanding of the critical role that Singapore plays in the region, but also a public recognition that Washington must do more to ensure that Singapore does not align more strongly with China moving forward.

To be sure, having the vice president make a personal visit to Singapore as well as Vietnam indicated that the United States is sensitive to regional concerns about U.S. commitment and is willing to invest in rebuilding the trust. Nonetheless, simply showing up is only the first step and certainly not enough. The Biden administration has made a concerted effort to put Harris in the limelight, not least by insisting on calling the White House the Biden-Harris administration at every public occasion it can. By having the vice president visit the region, the administration is signaling that the focus on Southeast Asia will transcend Biden’s presidency. The hope is that will not be too little too late, as confidence in the United States continues to falter.

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The Authors

Shihoko Goto is the deputy director for geoeconomics and the senior Northeast Asia associate at the Wilson Center's Asia Program.

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