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Why Has Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Action Plan Failed to Curb the TTP?
Associated Press, Arshad Butt
South Asia

Why Has Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Action Plan Failed to Curb the TTP?

Islamabad’s deals with the TTP and reliance on pro-Pakistan groups like the Afghan Taliban to rein it in have not worked.

By Umair Jamal

Pakistan’s National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism and extremism in the country is failing to disrupt the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) resurgence, as evidenced by a new wave of attacks.

In 2015, Pakistan had managed to eliminate the TTP from its strongholds in the tribal areas. But six years later, the TTP is back to creating mayhem in Pakistan. Why has Islamabad’s NAP against terrorism failed to sustain the gains made?

There are several reasons for Pakistan’s failure to adequately respond to emerging (and re-emerging) security challenges.

A major reason is Pakistan’s strategy of using extremist groups close to the Pakistani state, like the Afghan Taliban, to put pressure on groups like the TTP. But involving friendly militant groups to rein in other groups doesn’t seem to be working.

So far, the Afghan Taliban – now in power in Kabul – have refused to unambiguously say that they are ready to expel TTP militants or put pressure on them to negotiate with Pakistani security agencies. In fact, over the last few weeks, the Taliban have added to Pakistan’s security woes by releasing hundreds of TTP fighters from Afghan jails in total disregard of Pakistan’s concerns.

On Pakistan’s part, it is unwise to expect the Taliban to expel or eliminate TTP fighters from Afghanistan, given the close tribal and ideological links between them. The Taliban may not even be in a position to force out TTP fighters from Afghanistan.

Another reason for the failure of the NAP to counter terrorism is Islamabad’s expectation to find a resolution via dialogue. The Pakistani state has reached agreements with militant groups, including the TTP, in the past. However, none of these deals led to an actual end of the conflict.

Once again, Pakistan’s security agencies are reaching out to the TTP for a peace agreement.

Recently, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan is willing to offer a pardon to members of the TTP if they promise not to engage in terrorist activities and submit to the Pakistani Constitution.

The reemergence of this conciliatory approach toward militant groups shows that the NAP has not taken into account the fact that negotiations with militant groups in the past have only strengthened the latter and their narratives, and weakened the writ of the state.

It appears that Pakistan is looking to further deepen its links with extremist groups like the Taliban in an effort to find a solution to its counterterrorism crisis – an approach that Islamabad should have given up on a long time ago.

In the last few weeks, the Pakistani government and security agencies have gone all out to welcome to power Taliban leaders who are pro-Pakistan. It has sought to sideline leaders who would be averse to Islamabad’s intervention in Afghan affairs. Arguably, Pakistan’s aim is to install in Kabul leaders that would accede to Pakistan’s demands vis-à-vis its security concerns related to the TTP.

It is unlikely that this strategy will work, however. Islamabad is already frustrated as TTP attacks are growing and fatalities rising. In recent weeks, the TTP has carried out sniper and IED attacks, suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, bomb blasts, and ambushes to overturn the gains Pakistan seemed to have made in the tribal areas.

In August, the TTP claimed 32 attacks, the highest number in recent years. However, in just a two-week period in September, it carried out 22 attacks against the Pakistani security forces.

Among other things, this shows that the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has given a boost to the TTP’s fortunes in Pakistan, severely undermining peace and stability in the region.

Additionally, the NAP has also failed to sharpen Pakistani diplomacy to manage the likely international ramifications of the TTP’s resurgence. For instance, Pakistan’s efforts to bring international cricket back to the country have already suffered a major setback, with the New Zealand cricket team backing out of a tour of Pakistan over security concerns minutes before the first match was scheduled to start in Rawalpindi.

It is significant that the New Zealand government cited a security threat that the government of Pakistan was not aware off. This shows that either the Pakistani security agencies didn’t have information on a possible threat, which puts into question their ability to secure such trips, or they didn’t want to inform the visitors in an attempt to ensure that the series would go ahead regardless. In either case, Pakistan’s reputation has suffered another blow.

Importantly, the NAP does not provide strategies to offer supporters of the TTP and other groups a counter-narrative that would wean them off extremist ideologies. Pakistan may have fenced its border with Afghanistan, but the country has not been successful in ending TTP’s support base in the tribal areas. This failure has roots in the minimal efforts made to isolate narratives that shape an enabling environment for extremism in Pakistan.

When Pakistan launched the NAP in 2015, the country’s leadership promised to reform thousands of religious seminaries across the country, including in tribal districts along the Afghan border. However, so far, not a single seminary has been reformed. The state has virtually forgotten its commitment to reform seminaries.

A recent study, titled “Strengthening Governance in Pakistan: Assessing the National Action Plan to Counter Terrorism and Extremism,” called for the restructuring of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism regime and introduction of radical reforms in multiple sectors to increase the effectiveness of its counterterrorism policies. “NAP should be reviewed afresh in the light of its past performance as well as according emerging challenges, forms and dynamics of extremism, terrorism and violence,” the report from Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies urged.

In September, the TTP’s leadership responded to Pakistan’s offer of amnesty by saying that it is Pakistan’s security forces that should ask for amnesty. The group went on to say that it would forgive Pakistani authorities if they promised to implement Shariah in the country.

“We are proud of our struggle …and believe in meaningful dialogue if it ensures implementation of Shariah in Pakistan,” the TTP said.

The TTP has sent out a clear message to Pakistan’s right-wing forces: Its struggle is justified.

This is essentially what the Pakistani state needs to counter in its messaging. Unless the NAP breaks the support base for the TTP’s narrative, it will be impossible to defeat the group. The TTP is just one group among many that are willing to take up arms for the cause of implementing Shariah in Pakistan. Even if Pakistan’s security forces are successful in pushing out the TTP again, it will be a matter of time before they return with another name or in a different shape.

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The Authors

Umair Jamal is a correspondent for The Diplomat, based in Lahore, Pakistan.

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