Is Pakistan’s Imran Khan Taking on the Military?

In October, there was a commotion in Pakistan over the appointment of the new director-general of the country’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Prime Minister Imran Khan, who is known to have a good working relationship with Pakistan’s military, initially refused to approve the military’s recommended appointee for the post, only acquiescing 20 days later.

On October 6, Inter-Services Public Relations, the military’s media wing, announced the appointment of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Anjum as the new ISI director-general. It said that Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed, who currently serves as the director-general, would take over as the Peshawar Corps Commander. But for nearly three weeks, Khan refused to issue a notification to approve the appointment, which is a constitutional requirement.

In fact, on October 12, the government said that the “authority to appoint the ISI director-general lies with the prime minister” and that the “legal procedure would be followed for the purpose.” In a way, the government openly rejected the military’s notification.

The confrontation between Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership over the appointment of the ISI director-general created a sense of political instability in Pakistan, with many even voicing concerns about an impending military coup. For now, the immediate conflict has been resolved, but the tense atmosphere in Islamabad is likely to linger in the coming weeks as key players in the civilian and military leadership jockey for power.

What are the positions of the main actors involved in the October crisis, and what could it mean for Pakistan’s politics in the coming months?

Khan was reluctant to replace the ISI chief. He saw Hameed’s position as the ISI director as important for his government’s survival and reelection. “PM Khan wants Faiz [Hameed] to take over as the military chief next year, and doesn’t want to give another extension to General Bajwa,” a senior government official, who requested anonymity, told The Diplomat. Arguably, Khan and Hameed share a common interest in protecting each other.

Both have a very bad relationship with the opposition parties, particularly the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and its leader and former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. Sharif has openly accused Hameed of orchestrating his party’s loss in the last election, and forcing the judiciary and other accountability institutions into taking up fake cases against the PML-N leadership on Khan’s orders.

For his part, Hameed has been positioning himself to take over as the army chief once General Qamar Javed Bajwa retires in November 2022. Hameed’s strangling of the opposition parties and media demonstrates a readiness to work with Khan to secure the top post.

The Pakistani military’s current chief, Bajwa, is likely to push for yet another extension come November 2022. He is, however, unlikely to get it as he has already lost some amount of support from the military’s high command after his first extension last year.

Khan is not expected to give Bajwa a second extension, as he sees Hameed as the man who will secure his political future. Seemingly, Khan doesn’t see Bajwa in the same light anymore, which would explain why the prime minister locked horns with him in an attempt to retain his favorite candidate as the ISI director-general – a post that is crucial when it comes to the military’s ability to control domestic politics.

That said, Bajwa remains powerful as long as he wears the uniform. Eventually, after an in-person meeting with Khan on October 26, Bajwa got his pick approved as the new ISI director. Anjum will take up the post on November 20.

Within the military’s high command, the Corps Commanders are not happy with the ongoing politicization of postings and the ISI’s stretched role under Hameed in domestic politics at Khan’s behest. The military high command, beyond Bajwa and Hameed, perhaps see the institution’s excessive affinity with Khan as a negative development and want to pull back.

Last year’s drama over Bajwa’s extension left many in the military’s top ranks frustrated as they believed he should have retired as expected and allowed the next in line to take over.

Certainly, the mood in the military’s top command is very tense as the power struggle between a handful of individuals is posing a threat to the institution’s prestige, standing, and stability.

The military’s high command, particularly the senior-most lieutenant generals, may be keen to block another extension for Bajwa but are not likely to support Hameed’s bid for the army chief post either, as he has already become too controversial.

One implication of this controversy is that it has exposed the prime minister’s bias in favor of Hameed, which would be problematic at the time of the next succession in the Army, when he would be one of the contenders. Moreover, the controversy has further accentuated the position of the section within the military’s top command that wants the institution to step back from supporting the current government.

The military may not have a clear option in the political realm to replace Khan, but the ISI chief fracas has the potential to force the military leadership into thinking that they should start working on options within the opposition parties.

Potentially, Bajwa could strike a deal with the leadership of PML-N and other smaller groups under which Hameed is retired next year. In return, this could offer Bajwa the support of the opposition for another extension. Bajwa could also consider getting the current Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government to push for Khan’s ouster in an attempt to install someone else as the prime minister to win support for his extension.

If Bajwa pushes for a breakaway group within the PTI, many could be ready to take over the post of prime minister. The opposition could bring a vote of no-confidence against Khan after reaching an agreement with Bajwa. This would culminate in Khan losing the top job. Someone else could replace him as a compromise candidate to form a consensus government.

At the moment, Khan doesn’t have too many options. His government is highly unpopular due to rising inflation. Opposition parties are not likely to step in to save his government or criticize a possible military intervention to remove him from power as long as the situation leads to fresh elections.

In fact, the opposition, particularly the PML-N, will do everything it can in the next 12 months to ensure that Hameed doesn’t come back as the military chief, and that the apparent schism between Khan and the military’s leadership is exploited to the fullest.

We should expect more anti-government protests from the opposition in the coming weeks and months.

Things could get worse in the coming weeks and months for both civil-military ties and Pakistan’s political stability.