Impatience Grows Over Biden’s Rebalance 2.0 Strategy

Nine months into the Biden presidency, the honeymoon between the United States and like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific may be drawing to a close.

There are positives: Washington’s return to engaging with the region in a more predictable and measured manner continues to be welcome. So too are the White House’s overtures to make clear that the United States places strategic importance on the Indo-Pacific, from prioritizing in-person meetings with leaders from East Asia, to key cabinet members traveling across East, South, and Southeast Asia. The administration’s diplomatic overtures have been in line with the verbal commitment to working together with allies and building up relations.

But there is frustration with the growing discrepancy between the rhetoric of cooperation that Washington is espousing and the actual policies it is pursuing, which in turn is shaking confidence in longer-term U.S. commitment to its position as a Pacific power.

This is not to say there has been a lack of notable progress in U.S. engagement in the region. From East Asia’s perspective, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan been seen as a positive development, given that it would allow the White House to focus on addressing the more pressing issue of grappling with the China threat. Granted, concerns have been raised about the implications of Afghanistan for the reliability of U.S. commitment and presence more broadly, but expectations that President Joe Biden will give more attention to the Indo-Pacific to further the U.S. rebalance to Asia strategy as had been outlined under the Obama administration have broadly outweighed the negative implications.

The White House’s focus on Taiwan, and its ability to rally U.S. allies to publicly share their collective commitment to maintain stability in cross-strait relations, has also garnered considerable support. While the escalation of Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in recent months has been particularly alarming, a stronger united front in defense of Taiwan among like-minded countries has only been possible through U.S. leadership.

Nevertheless, there are growing concerns about Washington matching its words to its deeds. Even though the recent partnership announced between the United States, Australia, and the U.K. to share technical capabilities to build nuclear submarines in Australia has been greeted affirmatively to varying degrees by U.S. partners in the region, the way the trilateral pact was announced alarmed not just France, but other long-standing U.S. partners too. Although France has seemingly repaired relations with the AUKUS members since, the lack of transparency and communication regarding Australia’s cancelation of its contract to purchase French diesel-powered submarines has led to questioning about a re-emergence of an Anglo-centric hierarchy of amongst allies. These concerns cannot be shaken.

To be sure, U.S. efforts not only to further its military commitment in the Indo-Pacific but also to rally allies across the region and in Europe have been in line with its endeavors to take a multilateral approach to regional security. Developing a wide range of networks that enhance existing relations in addition to building new ties has also been clearly defined as an effort to preserve the rule of law and ensure stability amid the growing threat of China. That ability to define and unite against a common threat militarily would not be possible without the United States.

Yet the fact remains that when it comes to economic leadership, Washington is lacking. The Biden administration has been unable to match its military commitments with economic engagement. As a result, the United States is increasingly becoming an outlier in the emerging regional economic architecture.

Hopes that Biden would move quickly to make up for lost opportunities to strengthen the economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific are effectively dashed for now, given the domestic political considerations that make it difficult for the United States to rejoin the revamped Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement anytime soon. But not only has the Biden administration lagged behind in making headway on multilateral trade efforts, it has done little to boost bilateral trade either. The Whie House has consciously decided to more or less continue to adhere to the trade policies adopted under former President Donald Trump, most notably by preserving the tariffs that had been imposed on China, even as those tariffs have come to hurt U.S. manufacturers that rely on Chinese imports.

But the most significant development on the trade front since Biden assumed office has been the double whammy of the U.K. formally requesting to join the CPTPP, and China as well as Taiwan also publicly declaring their interest in joining the trade pact. Moreover, South Korea is expected to announce its interest to join the deal too, even as the United States remains outside of the group with no prospect of having the political will to rejoin any time soon.

The lack of U.S. appetite to join the multilateral trade deal could have been offset by other factors, if Washington could articulate how it would fit into the region’s economic roadmap. Such an explanation, however, has been sorely lacking even as other countries in the region and beyond are eager to embrace the world’s most ambitious, high-standard trade deal.

For the countries of the Indo-Pacific, the challenge of balancing their relations with the region’s indisputable economic hegemon, which also is one of the biggest security threats, still looms large. Even though there are clear downsides and risks in adopting the CPTPP, it is a deal that clearly outlines rules of fair trade, which are not imbued with political ideology and thus are palatable to a wide range of countries at various stages of economic development as well as economic models. So far, the Biden administration has not proposed any plan that could even come close to providing a roadmap that would facilitate economic engagement in the region.

The more interest there is from other countries to join the CPTPP, while the United States remains outside of the framework, the less credibility Washington will have as a fully committed power of the Indo-Pacific. For the Biden administration to have an effective Indo-Pacific strategy, it can no longer ignore the need to develop an economic roadmap that can match its military presence. The window to develop and promote such a plan, however, may close sooner than Washington would like it to.