A Democracy Summit Might Not Be Popular in the Indo-Pacific

A commitment to democracy has been a guiding force of the United States’ foreign policy since the country’s inception, and few would question the sincerity of President Joe Biden’s personal belief in democratic principles. But as the administration prepares for a virtual Summit for Democracy that will bring together leaders from across the globe, the White House has remained hesitant about releasing the list of participating nations, let alone the actual individuals who will be attending. The administration’s reluctance to tout who exactly will be attending the Summit for Democracy (scheduled for December 9-10) speaks volumes about the inherently divisive nature of how democracy is viewed today, even among like-minded countries that share interests but not necessarily values with the United States.

Across the Indo-Pacific, many governments are hesitant to have values drive foreign policy decisions. In fact, focusing on values all too often ends up driving a wedge between countries, rather than bringing them together. What unites the world’s most populous and diverse region is not values, but rather shared interests, ranging from how to position themselves in the face of persisting tensions between China and the United States, to ensuring continued economic growth.

That said, there are growing concerns about governance as well, which have become particularly acute over the past two years since the pandemic’s outbreak. Border closures, disruptions to supply chains, forced shutdowns curtailing economic activity, and massive public spending to offset those shocks have led to a reassessment about the role of government, and the expectation of citizens from their government.

During the early months of the spread of COVID-19, Asian nations kept the pandemic at bay far more effectively than the United States or European countries. The cost of containment was imposing more stringent or even draconian measures to prevent the spread of the virus, and the U.S. media in particular concluded that such steps reflected a broader, systemic difference in governance between authoritarian rule and democracies.

In Northeast Asia, however, the debate about how to tackle COVID-19’s spread focused on the differences between collective interests and protecting society at large, versus putting the interests of individuals first and promoting self-interest over that of the community. The Asian debate was less about democracy versus authoritarianism, and more about individualism against collectivism. More often than not, support to promote the collective interest prevailed, which was reflected in public policy decisions.

Now that COVID-19 appears to be more under control, especially with the wider availability of vaccines, at least among wealthier nations, the immediate focus in advanced economies is recovering from the fallout of the pandemic, from reopening borders to enhancing economic resiliency to restoring fiscal sustainability to make up for the massive spending incurred to fight COVID-19. Looking ahead in the longer term, though, one of the biggest questions will be how to restore confidence in government and what effective governance looks like.

The past two years have demonstrated that even the world’s wealthiest as well as the most technologically advanced country has been hard pressed to make full use of its assets to protect its citizens. Assuming that another global health crisis or other unexpected disruption occurs in the future, there is greater urgency for countries to learn from the COVID-19 experience by being prepared for crises, in order to ensure that such disruptions will not lead to an even deeper income or social divide.

The world is now looking for the United States to use its convening power to reflect upon those challenges ahead. A starting point would be to reflect on the lessons learned, and to identify weaknesses as much as strengths in dealing with the unexpected, starting with the U.S. itself. The fact that China has been unwilling to investigate the origins of the coronavirus, for instance, is alarming to countries around the world, whatever their political structure may be. The solution to enticing China to share information and be more transparent about the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan will not be to espouse the virtues of democracy to Beijing. Rather, it is to highlight that building trust with China’s own citizens and the world at large will lead to greater stability.

Bear in mind that when it comes to U.S. relations in the Indo-Pacific, what binds the two sides are shared economic and security interests rather than democratic values. In the case of Vietnam, for instance, its commitment to the TPP and subsequent CPTPP trade deal has been seen as a huge win for proponents of the international liberal order. In fact, there is a deep irony that Hanoi has signed off on both the CPTPP and RCEP, and as a result the communist state is far more integrated into the open regional trade architecture than the United States.

Washington’s push to promote democracy seems premature too without reflecting on the causes and consequences of the January 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol. Such lack of introspection can be off-putting at best and deeply offensive at worst in many parts of the Indo-Pacific, from Thailand to Indonesia and the Philippines and beyond.

If the end goal of the democracy summit is to reaffirm the strength and allure of democracies, Washington must be more upfront about its fragilities and acknowledge its own mistakes, especially within the United States. But if the objective is to promote values as a means to enhance its outreach to the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia in particular, focusing on good governance rather than democracy as an end in itself would be far more effective as a unifying force.