North Korea: A Decade Under Kim Jong Un

27-year-old Kim Jong Un’s ascendance to power a decade ago generated much speculation and skepticism about the future of North Korea. He had made his official debut only 15 months before, and little was known about him besides his education overseas and what could be gleaned from his public appearances with Kim Jong Il from the time of his first public appearance to his father’s death. The young successor’s seeming inexperience and fragile support base in the country’s leadership circles were widely viewed as compelling enough reasons why a country that was already battling economic hardship at home and diplomatic isolation abroad was doomed to collapse. Projections were rife among North Korea watchers, including in South Korean intelligence, about a collective leadership system where a small group of advisers would support Kim Jong Un while the young leader grew into his formidable new role.

Ten years later, not only has North Korea survived under the stewardship of Kim Jong Un, but Kim also has emerged as a bold, confident leader who has managed to rise to the same ranks as his forefathers, despite myriad vicissitudes. There was no collective leadership system, at least not in the sense that many North Korea experts meant in the wake of Kim Jong Il’s death. There are persistent questions about the stability of the Pyongyang regime, and for good reason: The North Korean leader himself has openly and repeatedly acknowledged the country’s economic difficulties. North Korea’s frequent high-level personnel shuffles in the party in the first half of 2021 only fueled outside observers’ concern about the goings-on in the top leadership echelons. Despite prolonged international sanctions and the near-two-year self-imposed national lockdown to prevent an outbreak of COVID-19 – a combination that some feared may bring North Korea’s crippled economy to a crisis – the country keeps soldiering on. And in all likelihood, Kim Jong Un’s North Korea will muddle through, which makes it a force to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not.

In that vein, there are questions worth examining as we mark the first decade of Kim Jong Un’s leadership. How did Kim rise from an enigmatic young successor to the North’s most powerful man? What are the defining traits of his leadership? Perhaps most importantly, what does our experience with Kim Jong Un tell us about how he may steer his country in the coming years?

From “Young General” to “Suryong”

North Korea started laying the groundwork for third-generation hereditary leadership years prior to Kim’s public debut at the Third Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Conference in September 2010. After a period of dormancy, the succession campaign picked up speed following Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2008, and by January 2009, the third son had been designated the successor. Kim Jong Un has solidified his power in phases from the time he was designated as the successor. It is uncertain how long Kim was groomed to be the country’s next leader, but the “young general” – the title Kim Jong Un was known by when he was the successor-designate – had already started giving military inspections before his debut and was even involved in the North’s April 2009 rocket launch, according to state media.

A key concern for Kim Jong Il at the time of the young leader’s public debut – and probably for the successor himself, too – was for Kim Jong Un to strengthen his power within the military for a smooth succession and post-succession regime stability. Kim Jong Un received one major party title at the Third Party Conference – vice chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission (CMC), the party’s top military guidance organ – positioning him well for seizing control of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Following Kim Jong Il’s death, Kim Jong Un took all of his father’s titles in the military, party, and state – in that order – in four months, taking the KPA supreme commander title just 13 days after his father died.

Kim confronted two formidable challenges when he took the helm of the country. First, he was dealing with a WPK that remained the most powerful institution in name but in many ways had become dysfunctional under Kim Jong Il’s songun policy, which prioritized the military. Accordingly – and this was his other challenge – Kim was left with a KPA that had become too big and powerful. Hence, from the very beginning of his leadership, Kim set out to revitalize the WPK and normalize the KPA.

The process of rebuilding the party’s functions actually began in the last year of Kim Jong Il’s rule. Although the elder Kim preferred to rely on the military, he clearly viewed the WPK as crucial for his son’s succession. The Third WPK Conference in 2010 – the first such meeting held in 44 years – was the starting point for reviving near-defunct party meetings and formalizing a collective decision-making process in the party under Kim Jong Un (this is still different from collective leadership). From the very start of Kim’s rule, he mobilized the full range of party meetings, from party congresses to party plenums and Politburo meetings, to cement his leadership, institutionalize the party, and reassert the WPK’s authority. For example, Kim rose to the top post of the party at the Fourth WPK Conference in April 2012. The removal in 2012 of CMC Vice Chairman and KPA General Staff (GS) Chief Ri Yong Ho, who was widely viewed as Kim Jong Un’s confidant, and the high-profile purge of Kim’s uncle Jang Song Thaek in 2013 were made out to be party decisions made at Politburo meetings, rather than Kim’s decision.

At the Eighth Party Congress held at the outset of 2021, Kim Jong Un’s party title changed from “chairman” to “general secretary,” a symbolic development in that he finally claimed the title that was held by his forefathers. The Eighth Party Congress also revised the party charter, further institutionalizing the WPK and Kim’s party leadership. The new party charter delegated responsibilities among top party cadres to ensure smooth operation of the party and replaced Kim’s name with the “party head [suban]” or “party center [tang jungang],” terms that accentuate the position of the party leader as opposed to Kim Jong Un the individual. These steps were clearly taken to further consolidate Kim’s rule and centered on the party in the lead-up to the decennial of his leadership.

In another move to boost Kim Jong Un’s status in time for the 10th anniversary of his leadership, North Korean state media have called him suryong – translated as “leader,” a title that had been reserved for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il – at least since late 2020, shortly after the celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the party and in the lead-up to the Eighth Party Congress. Prior to that, state media made indirect references to Kim Jong Un as suryong, for example when he was grouped with his forefathers.

Just as Kim concentrated on empowering the WPK, he spent much of his energy reining in the military. Kim’s early years in office were marked by a clean-up operation that keyed in on ministers of the People’s Armed Forces, who represent the military, and chiefs of the KPA GS, who command military operations. The removal of KPA GS Chief Ri Yong Ho in July 2012 was just a start.

The fall in the KPA General Political Department (GPD) director’s ranking in the WPK Politburo, a barometer of one’s standing in the regime hierarchy, reflects the military’s waning power in the regime. Jo Myong Rok, Kim Jong Il’s last KPA GPD director, and Choe Ryong Hae and Hwang Pyong So, the first two KPA GPD directors under Kim Jong Un, were all members of the Politburo Presidium, making them the most powerful military officials after the Kim leader. Those who came after Hwang, however, did not make it to the Presidium. In fact, the current KPA GPD director, Kwon Yong Jin, is listed toward the bottom of the Politburo’s full members.

Growing Pain: Hanoi Summit and the Aftermath

The collapse of the second North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi in spring 2019 appears to have been beyond humbling for the leader – it had a major impact on Kim Jong Un’s psyche and his visions for the country. The two salient post-Hanoi developments were the North’s handling of constitutional revisions, and the tightening of the noose across all realms.

North Korea carried out unprecedented back-to-back constitutional revisions in April and August 2019, which restored to Kim a key role played by his grandfather on the state side, and some more. The first revision stipulated that Kim Jong Un, as the “president [wiwonjang]” of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), the highest-level decision-making body of the state, “represents the State.” This provision mirrored Kim Il Sung’s constitutional role of “representing the national sovereignty of the DPRK” as the country’s “president [jusok].” Through this revision, Kim Jong Un officially became the head of state, a role that had been assumed by the president of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium since the constitutional revision of 1998 under Kim Jong Il. The second revision in August gave the SAC president the right to appoint or recall North Korean diplomatic representatives, which exceeded even Kim Il Sung’s powers as DPRK president.

Between the first and second constitutional revisions, Pyongyang unleashed an extraordinary media leadership campaign that centered on an unusual spate of authoritative party daily articles stressing Kim’s leadership, including his summit diplomacy. This campaign culminated in North Korea’s first-ever commemoration of the anniversary of Kim Jong Un’s election as SAC president. This was a highly unnatural move, as it was the third anniversary, a minor anniversary year that does not usually garner special attention in North Korea.

Pyongyang’s unusual handling of the constitutional revisions and the great lengths it went to between those two revisions to indoctrinate the people in Kim’s greatness and elevate the SAC and the SAC president tells us something about the regime’s anticipation of a successful Hanoi summit and how it had planned to use the summit to further elevate Kim’s constitutional status. It also shows how, when the summit did not work out, North Korea attempted to justify the revisions – and perhaps address Kim Jong Un’s vulnerabilities about his own leadership – through an intensified leadership campaign in the intervening months.

Kim’s 2018 summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore was, needless to say, a huge diplomatic success for North Korea. He signed a joint statement with the U.S. president in a historic first North Korea-U.S. summit. Overnight he went from an international pariah to a normal leader rubbing shoulders with the president of the world’s most powerful nation. His successful international debut, coupled with his personal rapport with Trump, surely gave Kim Jong Un the confidence that he could broker a deal with Trump in Hanoi that would result in the lifting of key sanctions. In all likelihood, the North Korean leadership calculated that another successful summit with Trump and ensuing economic benefits should be more than enough to elevate Kim Jong Un’s constitutional status, an important move for a country keen to become a “normal” state in the eyes of the world. Accordingly, North Korea probably planned for conducting one constitutional change in April 2019, when Kim’s diplomatic accomplishment would still be fresh in the people’s minds.

When Kim returned home empty-handed from Hanoi, Pyongyang appears to have adjusted its timeline for revising the constitution, opting to phase out the revisions instead. This was probably out of concern about how the domestic public, and perhaps even the top echelons of the North Korean leadership, might perceive Kim’s broadened constitutional powers, particularly given that these changes were reminiscent of or even exceeded those of Kim Il Sung.

The collapse of the Hanoi summit changed North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy calculus, prompting Pyongyang to shift to a harder line that reflected resilience and principle over flexibility and a society that was becoming increasingly closed.

Kim Jong Un set the tone in his speech at a party plenum one month after the Hanoi meeting, setting as a priority national agenda item “self-reliance,” a term that North Korea tends to emphasize when it is in the midst of, or is headed into, diplomatic isolation. It reflected Kim’s thinking that North Korea was in for a long-term confrontation with the United States. And in the North Korean leadership’s mind, a longer-term standoff with the U.S. meant prolonged hardships that made stronger crackdowns inevitable for maintaining social order. The speech was soon followed by an uptick in North Korean rhetoric, from low level to high, on self-reliance, ideological unity, “anti-socialist” elements, and discipline. On the foreign policy front, North Korea did not altogether close the door to diplomacy with the U.S. but indicated that the price for negotiations has gone up. On the surface, the anti-COVID national lockdown necessitated – but perhaps it may be more accurate to say the lockdown offered a good opportunity for – an intensified self-reliance campaign and stronger social control. And the “DPRK law on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture” adopted in December 2020 should be viewed within the broader context of post-Hanoi developments and North Korea’s increased domestic control during the COVID lockdown.

Kim Jong Un’s Leadership Brand

In the early years of his rule, Kim’s public persona was built on his grandfather Kim Il Sung rather than his father Kim Jong Il, who was more reclusive and, more importantly, was less popular than the DPRK’s founding father. Kim Il Sung frequently gave speeches. He regularly convened party meetings and made key decisions in formalized collective settings. He enjoyed mingling with the people and came across as being personable. He also made public appearances with his second wife, Kim Song Ae.

Like his grandfather, Kim Jong Un speaks in public. His first public speech at the Kim Il Sung Square in April 2012 was unmistakably designed to strike a resemblance with the beloved founding father of the DPRK. Kim is often seen interacting with the people and soldiers, though his on-site guidance visits have dropped sharply since 2020. He makes public appearances with his wife Ri Sol Ju, who is known as a fashion icon among North Korean women.

As time went by and Kim Jong Un started to feel more confident in his role, he started to go beyond his grandfather’s recipe and create his own leadership brand. Of course Kim has maintained the tradition of brutally removing political foes or potential threats to the regime: he executed his uncle Jang Song Thaek and had his half-brother Kim Jong Nam assassinated. Kim Jong Un continued the weapons programs started in his grandfather’s time, but that was not all. He took the country’s nuclear and missile capabilities to new heights, declaring in November 2017 that the country had “completed the state nuclear force.” Of his multiple leadership traits, the two that stand out the most in terms of their uniqueness in the history of North Korean leadership and their impact on policy are pragmatism and transparency.

Despite North Korea’s heavy ideological rhetoric, Kim from early on has valued results and action over ideology and words. His pragmatism has affected public communications and the economic and cultural sectors the most. North Korea has endeavored to modernize state propaganda since the outset of Kim Jong Un’s rule, starting with state television. This was encapsulated in Kim Jong Un’s letter to a national meeting of propaganda workers in March 2019, where he called for “fresh” propaganda methods and creating content that can resonate with the people. Kim’s speech at a military parade marking the WPK’s 75th founding anniversary largely omitted ideological themes or praise of the Kim family’s leadership and focused on the people instead, an unusual move at a major political event.

Kim Jong Un has built on reforms that his father had started but failed to push forward to the end. He rolled out “economic management methods of our style,” a reference to reform measures across the agricultural, industrial, and financial sectors. The overarching theme of Kim’s economic reform is to give each work unit greater latitude across the entire process of planning, production, and management of resources and profits. The “socialist enterprise responsibility management system [SERMS],” the crux of Kim’s reforms, was codified in the constitution in April 2019.

Innovation is a recurring theme in Kim Jong Un’s era, and Kim at the outset of his rule surprised the world by attending a Moranbong Band performance that showcased Disney characters and female performers in Western clothing. Not only was the show itself extremely unusual for embracing Western culture in such an overt manner, it was even more meaningful that the country’s top leader attended and expressed endorsement of this performance.

Kim Jong Un took a different path from his forefathers by openly acknowledging shortcomings, apologizing for them, and tackling problems head-on, rather than concealing them or painting a mirage. A group of officials took turns apologizing to the victims of a building collapse in Pyongyang in 2014, which was considered highly unusual at the time. Kim Jong Un’s criticism of officials during on-site inspections or public acknowledgment of problems or failures is no longer a rare sight. For example, Kim apologized to the people in his October 2020 military parade speech, and in his opening speech at the Eighth Party Congress he admitted that “almost all sectors fell a long way short” of meeting the goals under a five-year national economic development strategy.

Looking Ahead

Having reviewed Kim Jong Un’s history and leadership style, we come to the question of what we might expect from Kim in the future.

A foremost concern is how Kim will steer the economy and deal with his economic reform measures. He appears to be using the national lockdown to take “self-reliance” as far as he can and use this period to reduce imports from China, find indigenous sources of production, increase recycling, and advance science and technology to support domestic production efforts. He also seems to be using this insulated environment, when party and state control can best be maximized, to address the more fundamental problems of the economy, to include “readjusting and developing” the economy, developing local economies, and removing “departmentalism” and “the practice of regarding one’s unit as being special.”

North Korea over the past year has emphasized the party’s guidance over the cabinet on economic issues, which has given rise to analyses that North Korea may be slowing down or rolling back on reform. This is a relevant point to raise, as the cabinet has traditionally represented reform and the party has been associated with conservatism. It must be noted, however, that North Korean state media continues to draw the line between the cabinet and the party: the economy is under the cabinet’s “unified command,” while the party’s role is to provide guidance to the cabinet. A review of North Korean state media shows that the country’s economic reforms remain in place. They continue to mention SERMS and the “field responsibility system,” a reference to reform in the farming sector. Formulations that appear to suggest reinforced central control are not by themselves antitheses of reform. For now, Pyongyang appears to want to implement reform in a way that it can manage.

Kim appears set to keep pushing ahead with his reform measures. If he remains committed to reform, its success will by and large hinge on whether North Korea improves diplomatic relations with the United States. Pyongyang understands all too well that it needs a favorable external environment, namely improved ties with Washington, to fundamentally improve the economy. That said, Kim’s experience of failure in Hanoi likely means he will return to talks only if he is absolutely sure that he will get something tangible in return.

North Korea’s increased rhetoric on “communism” and “ideology-first principle” point to a country that is becoming more conservative as it hunkers down for continued hardship. When there is a right diplomatic momentum and North Korea views it as a ticket to a better future, the North may relax its draconian control mechanisms, including, hopefully, the infamous “law on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture.” After all, Kim remains committed to creativity and innovation, and he even once championed Disney characters on stage. Hopefully he hasn’t lost that streak in him.