Paul Staniland

Why do some governments crush tiny militant outfits while tolerating much more powerful armed groups? In a new book, Paul Staniland, an associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago, aims to explore the spectrum of relations between governments and armed actors, a range that runs from alliances to total war, cooperation to conflict, with much fluid grey space in between

“Ordering Violence: Explaining Armed Group-State Relations from Conflict to Cooperation” offers a series of cases studies drawn from South and Southeast Asia, which illustrate Staniland’s argument that ideology – or rather the perception by states of the ideological threats posed by armed groups – is a major driver of state responses and interactions between the two.

Across South and Southeast Asia, armed groups have long interacted with governments. What drives relations between states and armed groups in this region?

In my book “Ordering Violence,” I show that there is a huge spectrum of relations between non-state armed groups and governments, ranging from tight alliance to intense warfare to live-and-let-live deals in between. Rather than pitched fights to the death, there is a lot of gray space and variation.

I argue that one factor that helps to account for these differences are governments' nationalist ideologies and the way these shape governments' threat perceptions. Armed groups can be seen as deeply threatening, but also as friendly or tolerable even if unsavory, which shapes the level of coercion or cooperation that governments aim toward armed actors. This doesn't mean that other factors – from external state backing to the strength of the armed group itself – are irrelevant, but we can learn a lot about these “armed politics” by exploring the historical sources of government threat perceptions.

In the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and Hefazat-e-Islam in Bangladesh, we see political actors in South Asia embracing violence to achieve their goals. Has this been effective? What does it say about the political systems in which they operate?

In Pakistan, Bangladesh, and many other countries, political parties, local notables, and insurgents can mix violence with “normal” or “mainstream” politics. These actors are most effective in blending coercion with “normal” politics when their political demands are potentially compatible with the standard areas of contestation in politics and/or when they are on the side of the state. They face some repression, especially if violence is perceived to have become disruptive, but not the same kind of intense, sustained crackdowns that groups face when seen to be “beyond the pale.”

The Pakistani government in early November announced a ceasefire with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). The Taliban government in Kabul has said it is mediating talks between the two. Does this mark a departure from previous relations between the TTP and the Pakistani state?

This newest round of attempted rapprochement resembles two earlier periods of state-TTP relations in Pakistan. First, prior to 2009 there were a number of attempts to establish ceasefires with various armed factions on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, including armed actors that would become central to the TTP. Again in 2013, under Nawaz Sharif's government, we saw efforts to build some kind of modus vivendi with the TTP. From 2014, there was a fairly intense crackdown that contained the TTP, but did not eliminate it.

It remains to be seen how this newest round of outreach will go: From the outside, and I suspect from the inside as well, it's hard to know how much real leverage the Afghan Taliban have or are willing to use, what the TTP will settle for (and how cohesive it is), and how far the Pakistani state will be willing to go. But this is not inconsistent with the broader record of government-TTP relations, which have oscillated in quite dramatic ways over time.

How significant is the institutionalization of various nationalist ideologies in this region – for example, Hindutva in India and Sinhalese Buddist ideology in Sri Lanka?

The institutionalization and “stickiness” of nationalist and religious ideologies is a major focus of my book. They are obviously not the only thing that shapes politics, by a long shot, but there is no real way to make sense of how governments are thinking about and responding to both armed and unarmed political actors without taking these ideologies seriously. They form the “deep structure” of political life in many countries: Political entrepreneurs can try out new strategies and engage in intricate electoral and coalition politics, but there are certain perceived enemies, political demands, and symbols that have resonance that cannot be easily ignored or wished away.

This is a grim part of the problem in Myanmar – the military has a very narrow, repressive, and exclusionary view of the “right” kind of nationalism and appropriate governance institutions, one that limits meaningful democratization and culminated in a bloody seizure of power.

Moving to Myanmar: How has the February 2021 coup affected relations between the state and armed groups?

The coup has dramatically exacerbated a set of preexisting conflicts, while adding another layer of insurgency to the country’s already-complex landscape of violence. We have seen escalated conflicts with an array of ethnic insurgent groups that now have even less reason to trust the military, which had been a key factor in stalling the prior peace process. There is now widespread insurgency even in Bamar-majority areas aligned with the National Unity Government. It remains to be seen how cohesive and institutionalized these forces can become, but they have clearly put real stress on Myanmar's security apparatus.

At this point, it is enormously difficult to imagine a realistic negotiated settlement in the near future; obviously the future is unpredictable, but it seems plausible that we should expect a long period of continued fighting, economic collapse, and humanitarian crisis.

And closing with the Philippines: Does the Bangasamoro peace agreement in the Philippines offer a workable model for other governments in Southeast or South Asia seeking to end violence by established armed groups?

The Bangsamoro model does provide some aspects of a template. There are not many fully successful or cleanly successful peace deals, and the southern Philippines is certainly no exception, so I wouldn’t hold it up as an ideal model. That said, there are elements that can be adapted, including offers of autonomy and willingness to sustain negotiation over long periods of time. The problems we see in the case also suggest dangers to watch for in other conflicts, including insurgent (and pro-government) political/organizational fragmentation and the need to ensure that reforms are actually implemented and services delivered.