The Australian Republic Movement Tries Again

Since its defeat at the 1999 referendum proposing Australia become a republic, the Australian Republic Movement has been a bit hapless.The movement has struggled to regain the public traction it had in the 1990s, and has failed to find prominent figures to drive their campaign. Yet the movement’s biggest problem – the one that obstructed a referendum victory two decades ago – remains persistent: through what kind of model would an Australian head of state take office?

The model that was presented to the Australian public in 1999 was a minimal change model. It saw that the only realistic way Australia could transition to a republic was through an adaptation of the exiting system, rather than developing a whole new political system. In this model the monarchy of the United Kingdom and the office that carries out the functional duties of the head of state in Australia, the governor-general, would be replaced by a single figure – a president.

For this to be workable, an Australian president would have to be apolitical like the governor-general. The role would be mostly ceremonial, simply involving signing legislation into law, swearing in ministers and judges, and issuing writs for elections. The position would hold “reserve powers” like the ability to dismiss a government, but these could only be used in times of national crisis.

The model that was presented to the public in 1999 was one where a president would be appointed by a two-thirds majority vote of both houses of Parliament. This broadened the process to give the public’s representatives greater say, as at present the prime minister simply recommends a governor-general to the British monarch. Yet it also made sure that the office was beholden to the Parliament.

What disrupted the republican referendum in 1999 was that many people misunderstood the nature of the proposed role. Hearing the word “president,” the perception was that of an American president, and so a demand for the office to be elected by the public was created. Ultimately this misplaced perception proved decisive, as those who favored a “direct election” sided with the monarchists to defeat the referendum.

Over the past two decades the Australian Republic Movement has been grappling with this problem: How to create a model that protects the apolitical nature of the proposed position, while giving those who wish to elect the role their desired participation? In January 2022, the organization believed they had found a solution, proposing a new model that sought to find a compromise.

In this new proposed model, state and territory governments would each nominate a candidate and the federal government would nominate three, for a total of 11 candidates. These 11 candidates would then be put to a public vote.

This new model is not really concerned with the apolitical powers of the office; it is instead concerned with who might win a direct election. Believing the type of person who would serve to be the real problem, this is what the new model proposes to fix. Having candidates selected by the country’s Parliament is seen as an insurance policy to make sure someone credible holds the office. What the winner does with the office has not been considered, or indeed, how a campaign for an apolitical position would be conducted.

Political campaigns automatically create politicians. In a field of 11, the incentives for candidates to find ways to differentiate themselves would be strong. To win, each candidate would have to find something more substantial than just claiming they had the best hand-writing to sign legislation or the best technique for cutting ribbons. Campaigning itself would create a constitutional dilemma, with candidates primed to make claims that are outside the parameters of the office.

This constitutional dilemma would then be compounded by the winner taking office. Given that the prime minister is not directly elected by the public, with the holder of the position merely being one of the 151 members of the House of Representatives, a president elected by a nationwide vote could feel entirely justified that they would hold a greater public mandate than the prime minister. Were the new president to be of a vastly different political persuasion to the government of the day, this would add additional tension between the two roles.

For Australia to have its own head of state and for it to retain its parliamentary political system, the only constitutionally safe model for a republic was the one proposed in 1999. It proposed minimal changes, kept the role of the president bound to the current role of the governor-general, and made this position beholden to the Parliament, which is in turn beholden to the people.

The Australian Republic Movement should have spent the past two decades educating the public about this reality, explaining how republicans fought within themselves in 1999 to lose the referendum, and sought ways to prevent this from occurring again. Instead they have created a potentially dangerous new model that will only confuse the public further.