The Ukraine Conundrum for Japan

On February 23, in response to Russia moving its military “peacekeepers” into eastern Ukraine, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced that the Japanese government was imposing a series of sanctions against Russia and the areas of Ukraine that Russian government had recognized as “independent” republics. His decision followed responses by the U.S. and its European allies, including German Chancellor Olaf Sholtz’s announcement essentially shutting down Nord Stream 2 on February 21 and U.S. President Joe Biden’s announcement of “the first tranche” of economic sanctions against Moscow on February 22. Kishida also indicated that his government will be willing to impose additional sanctions should Russia continue to escalate tensions.

Moscow did so in horrific fashion on February 24, when it mounted a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In response, Japan’s government announced tighter sanctions, including a ban of exports of semiconductors and other technology goods. Japan also joined the U.S. and EU in limiting transactions with Russia’s central bank and cutting many Russian banks off from the SWIFT network.

“Japan needs to show its resolve not to allow any change to the status quo by force,” Kishida said in announcing new sanctions on February 25, according to Kyodo News. “The attack is totally unacceptable from the standpoint of our national security. It is an extremely serious situation with ramifications for the international order, not just in Europe but Asia and beyond.”

Kishida’s decision to move in lockstep with the G-7 differentiates himself from Japan’s past approach toward Russia. When similar situations happened in the past, Japan chose to tread carefully, delaying any response. For instance, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Japan lagged behind the rest of the G-7 in its decision to impose economic sanctions against Russia. When Tokyo finally came out with the list of sanctions, its scope was largely limited, and Tokyo also demonstrated a willingness to keep the door open for economic and cultural exchanges.

Even as Russia-U.S. tensions continued over Russia’s military intervention in Syria following the annexation of Crimea, Japan’s prime minister at the time, Abe Shinzo, invited Putin to his hometown for a summit meeting in December 2016. This move surprised many, including observers in the U.S., especially because Abe otherwise touted value-based diplomacy. The outreach was interpreted by many as an indication of Abe’s strong desire to conclude a peace treaty with Russia and resolve a territorial dispute over four Russian-held islands – one of the last unresolved World War II legacies for Japan – so as to ensure Abe a lasting diplomatic legacy.

A couple of factors drove Japan’s decisionmaking this time around. First and foremost, Japan recognizes that, as Russia continues to escalate tensions, Japan has to choose between two paths to move forward.  Simply put, the choice is between standing up for Japan’s foreign policy principles by joining collective actions with the U.S. and European partners against Russia’s behavior or staying away from taking any punitive measure against Russia so that Tokyo can save room for diplomatic engagement with Russia. The latter path would be necessary if Japan still hopes to negotiate the settlement of its territorial dispute with Russia and conclude a peace treaty.

Tokyo is also aware that how the international community reacts to Russia’s actions is being watched closely by China. In other words, an indecisive response from the United States and the rest of the international community may embolden Beijing to resort to its own use of force to change the status quo in East Asia. In this context, Japan realizes that it may not be able to count on the international community’s support against China’s aggressive behavior in East China Sea when Tokyo hesitates to stand firmly in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity against Russia.

In addition, Kishida government is trying not to repeat the mistake that its predecessor made in Afghanistan last summer. When the Afghan government fell in August 2021, the Japanese government’s slow response to evacuate Japanese citizens, which essentially ended up being too little, too late, attracted strong criticism. This time, the Japanese government began to urge Japanese citizens in Ukraine to exit the country as early as February 11. It has also arranged a chartered flight to evacuate Japanese citizens out of Ukraine if necessary. While the Japanese government had more time to prepare this time due to the pace of escalation – the situation in Ukraine developed over several weeks as opposed to the case in Afghanistan, where the Taliban’s rapid advance happened in just a few days – it is still apparent that Kishida and his government are determined not to be caught off guard like last summer.

The Japanese government’s specific moves to respond to the immediate challenges aside, the current Russia-Ukraine crisis presents a daunting foreign policy challenge for Japan. First and foremost, it has forced Japan to choose sides between the U.S. and its Western allies on one side and Russia on the other. In the past, Japan has always tried to tread carefully, standing close enough with its Western allies and partners while always exploring ways to leave enough diplomatic maneuvering room to maintain some level of engagement with Moscow. However, the current situation, with Russia refusing to de-escalate, has eroded any room for maneuver.

Tokyo had only two options: stand up for its foreign policy principles by joining in collective action with like-minded countries against Russia’s behavior, or stay away from taking any punitive measures for fear of alienating Russia (and thereby destroying any hopes for resolving their territorial dispute). Abe, known to be a staunch promoter of Japan’s value-based diplomacy, chose the latter option when Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014.

But today, Japan is keenly aware that how the international community reacts to Russia’s actions, which blatantly disregard the existing territorial sovereignty of Ukraine, is being watched closely by China, which also continues to expand the area it controls in the East and South China Seas. In other words, an indecisive response from the U.S. and the rest of the international community will only embolden Beijing to resort to force to change the status quo in these regions. Furthermore, Japan realizes that it cannot be a fair-weather friend for Ukraine and expect the international community to support Japan’s claims against China.

Most importantly, the Kishida government’s response to the current evolving situation in Ukraine is also a reflection of Japan’s perception of its own national security today – the security environment that surrounds Japan is deteriorating and it is unlikely that it will improve in the near future. It will be interesting to see how these experiences will inform Kishida’s government as it revises its key national security documents, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines, and Mid-Term Defense Program, over the next several months.