Japan’s Constitution at 75

2022 marks the 75th anniversary of Japan’s remarkable constitution. It is Japan’s second, preceded by the Meiji Constitution of 1889 that heralded a similar overhaul of Japan’s social and political institutions. Both documents reflected a conscious effort to transform Japan to keep pace with global dynamics. The Meiji Constitution signaled an embrace of modernity by Japanese elites as the industrializing nations of Europe and the United States began to set their sights on Asia’s resources. Under the leadership of the emperor, Japan would compete rather than capitulate to Western imperialism.

The 1947 Constitution was a harbinger of a different Japan.

After being defeated in World War II, Japan was occupied by Supreme Commander of Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur. The aim of the new constitution was deliberate: to democratize and demilitarize Japan. Once promulgated, the Japanese people once more faced social reforms at home. No more would the emperor be head of state. No more would aristocrats claim political and economic privilege. And no more would Japan’s modern military hold sway over the state and the fate of the nation. These were MacArthur’s aims, but these goals were also embraced by many in Japan.

In the years since, Japan emerged once more as a formidable global power. The new constitution’s Article 9 included a promise: “The Japanese people forever renounce war… as a means of settling international disputes.” Legislators interpreted their constitution to allow for self-defense, and a new force was armed and deployed on Japanese territory for that purpose. By the 1980s, it was Japan’s economic power that propelled it to world prominence, ranking second in the world behind only the economy of the United States. Its global influence earned it the status of a “civilian power” and “economic superpower,” and contrary to many a realist’s expectations, the Japanese people had no desire to translate this affluence into military might. Instead, Tokyo increased its financial contributions to the Japan-U.S. alliance, continued to work on repairing its relations with its neighbors, and focused on contributing to multilateralism in Asia and globally. Japan’s constitution and the post-war identity that emerged from it was the foundation of Japan’s post-war success.

Seventy-five years later, Japan faces a different world. A new power has arisen in Asia to surpass Japan in the scale of its economic power. Unlike Japan, China has not hesitated to acquire military power, including nuclear weapons, nor has it eschewed the use of that power to assert its interests. A smaller, rogue state also challenges Japan’s security: North Korea. The Kim regime’s decision to acquire a nuclear and missile arsenal in the mid-1990s created a threat that did not exist for much of the Cold War. By 2017, North Korea had demonstrated that its ballistic missiles could easily reach Japanese waters and overfly its airspace, suggesting that a weapon of mass destruction could be delivered within minutes to Japanese soil.

Yet despite these shifts in the regional security balance, the 1947 Constitution continues to frame Japan’s strategic intentions. Within the premise of self-defense, however, the Japanese government will be taking significant steps to improve its readiness should a crisis erupt. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Japan will need to consider what it has long sought to avoid: a major power conflict in Asia.

The domestic debate over Japan’s Constitution has evolved. Even those who advocate for its revision, including former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, seek amendment rather than abandonment of the document that so many Japanese embrace. Its core premise of limiting Japan’s military power to the task of self-defense remains, although some conservatives still chafe over the lack of recognition given to the uniformed services. What is emerging as the focal point for potential amendment are issues of governance reform. A particular concern for successive cabinets has been the need to define and adapt the state’s relationship with its citizens in the case of a national emergency.

Japan’s Evolving Debate

Two generations of Japanese have grown up with the 1947 Constitution, and the cleavages that once defined public debate over its meaning have receded. In the early post-war years, Japan’s constitution was referred to in irritation as “MacArthur’s constitution” or in a more welcome manner as the “peace constitution.” The right saw the document as imposed by the Americans, with the traditional foundations of Japanese society stripped from governance. The left, including the Japan Communist Party and Japan Socialist Party, saw in the new document a liberated Japan that could discard its imperialist past. Some on the right wanted revisions to highlight the traditional role of the monarchy, honor those who served in uniform, and allow Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) to be a proper military. The left refused to countenance revision.

Japanese politics have moved on from this old dichotomy as younger Japanese have come to the fore. Much has changed since the 1947 Constitution gave Japanese citizens far greater voice in their governance as power was dispersed. Women have gained economic autonomy and the right to vote. Land was separated from ownership of the few, and the corporate wealth of the prewar zaibatsu was divided and disbursed. Throughout the post-war period, embracing the popular sovereignty embedded in the constitution, Japan’s voters turned out to vote in record numbers.

Similarly, Japanese citizens turned to the courts to challenge the state. In a landmark civic protest in 1957 that ended up in the courts, Japanese citizens prevented their government from forcibly expropriating land to extend a runway on a U.S. military base in Sunagawa village, claiming it violated the spirit of Article 9 but more importantly was an instance of state overreach. They won their case.

More than a decade later, citizen activism against Japanese corporate pollution defended their interests in the courts. The constitution was also invoked to champion citizen rights in the face of environmental damage to villages. Families won out over the corporations that had led the rebuilding of the Japanese economy, giving Japan today some of the strictest environmental pollution standards in the world.

Today, the debate over the constitution revolves around a different set of issues. Citizens now claim their right to equality under the law in new ways. Japanese voters have gone to the courts to challenge Japan’s electoral districts, pointing out the inequities of a continued rural advantages. More recently, Japan’s LGBTQ activists have appealed to the courts for equality in the right to form civil unions.

Meanwhile, Japan’s political parties have slowly come together to consider the practicalities of a revision process. Where once the politics that shaped the constitutional debate seemed to be an all-or-nothing proposition, today political leaders have laid the groundwork for amendment of the document. According to Article 96, revision of the constitution would require approval of two-thirds of the lower and upper houses of the Diet, and then the proposed changes would need to be presented to the Japanese people for their approval in a national referendum. By the turn of the 21st century, a cross-party effort in the Diet to outline what revision might look like created the impetus for a new law determining how this national referendum would be organized. The procedures to be followed in a national referendum were outlined in law in 2007. Last year, during the midst of a global pandemic, the Suga Yoshihide cabinet updated the law to allow for voting to take place during a national emergency.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has argued for constitutional revision since its formation in 1955, but today others have joined the debate. After Japanese political reforms in 1990s, new parties came to the fore that had constitutional revision in their sights. Some wanted greater local autonomy (Ishin no kai); others wanted to consider greater state support for education (Komeito). Even the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the liberal party that successfully challenged the LDP at the polls in 2009, began to discuss the idea of a national referendum. The DPJ and others suggested that environmental protections might be an appropriate topic for constitutional amendment. Privacy rights also could be considered a constitutional issue.

Others also weighed in. Media published their own views and draft constitutions to encourage debate. The Yomiuri Shimbun began this under the leadership of its head, Tsuneo Watanabe. The Sankei Shimbun followed suit. Both conservative media outlets favored the LDP and echoed many of the same rationales for change. Japan’s business community also felt the need to join the conversation. The Keidanren and the Keizai Doyukai both published commentary on the growing debate over Japan’s constitution. Public opinion polls also suggested greater popular appetite for deliberating the pros and cons of revising the 1947 Constitution but not a clear majority in favor of revision.

Abe, Article 9, and Japan’s Defense

Former Prime Minister Abe repeatedly called for revising the constitution during his time in office. In his first stint as prime minister in 2006-7, Abe called for a study of the “right of collective self-defense,” a term that referred to the JSDF’s ability to use force on behalf of other nations. Experts were gathered, and the situations in which Japan’s forces might be engaged in operations to defend Japan alongside the U.S. military were considered. Abe left office abruptly in 2007 and the issue was shelved. When Abe returned to office in 2012, he had a long list of security reforms in mind.

With a two-thirds majority in the Lower House, Abe had the legislative foundation to move forward with a series of changes. In 2014, the Abe cabinet changed the government interpretation of Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense and the following year, it drafted a docket of laws to incorporate the change. Diet deliberation was protracted, but the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito, had the numbers in the Lower House to pass the bills.

Article 9 has not prevented Japan’s investment in military power, nor has it been interpreted to restrict Japan’s ability to join regional coalitions in peacetime. The JSDF is one of Asia’s premier militaries, with technologically advanced weaponry and a navy capable of projecting power across the Indo-Pacific. Like U.S. allies in Europe, Japan spends $50 billion each year to defend itself.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has adapted its military goals to cope with a variety of new demands. The United States has expected more from its allies, including Japan, in terms of burden-sharing for global security challenges. Moreover, Japan’s own region has become more fraught as the military capabilities of North Korea and China transformed the military balance there. Even U.S. attitudes toward its longstanding alliances seem to be undergoing a shift. The Trump presidency revealed deep doubts about the U.S. policy of offering defense assistance to its wealthy trade partners. And now the Russian invasion of Ukraine raises the possibility that major powers will no longer be deterred by U.S.-led alliances.

It is the increasingly fraught relationships of the Indo-Pacific that shape Japanese perceptions of its own strategy. In the region, Japan’s commitment to Article 9 carries historical weight. Embedding its JSDF within a multinational coalition is yet one more way that Japanese policymakers have sought to defend the rule of law and the regional status quo that has supported Japan’s post-war gains. With the United States, Australia, and India, Japan now sees the regional balance of power assured by a network of nations willing to defend open seas and the rule of law.

This year, Japan is expected to make considerable changes to its defense planning. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait concern Tokyo about the alliance’s readiness to stand up to China. Nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula has instigated military build-ups in both North and South Korea. Russia, chagrined at Tokyo’s stance on Ukraine, has upped its military activities in and around Japan.

A decade-long review of these deteriorating security dynamics has reached two conclusions. First, Japan ought to have its own capability to retaliate should it be threatened with aggression. This conventional strike capability could take many forms, but the rationale is clear: integrating Japan’s own ability to respond with that of the United States will enhance deterrence. Second, Japan should significantly increase its defense spending to keep pace with regional changes. In 2021, the LDP included a desire to match the NATO goal of 2 percent of GDP. In the latter half of this year, a new national security strategy and a ten-year defense plan, including a procurement commitment, will likely incorporate these changes.

Amendment to Reform Governance

Japanese citizens have been deeply skeptical of changing Article 9. The government interpretation of Article 9 has limited the purpose of Japan’s Self Defense Force to just that – self-defense. Japanese of all ages took to the streets in 2015 to protest what they called “Abe’s war bills,” a direct reflection of the worry many had about just how far their government wanted to go to change the post-war premise that Japan would not go to war. Interestingly, public support for constitutional revision dipped during Abe’s time in office, suggesting that his security reforms may have sufficiently addressed growing public concern about Japan’s defenses.

Today, the focal point of conversation among and between Japan’s political parties on the constitution is less about Article 9 and more about reforming the way the nation is governed. A much-overlooked area of post-war politics has been the deliberate effort by those who wrote the constitution to bolster legislative oversight of the state. Imagining a national emergency has been difficult for those responsible for a response. For example, the JSDF has been tasked with the defense of Japan since its formation in 1954, but it was not until 2004 that the Diet passed laws that provided for the balance of authority between civilians and the SDF during an “emergency” (yuji).

The LDP continues to advocate for several amendments to the constitution, but even among conservative legislators, opinion can vary. In March 2018, the LDP’s Constitutional Reform Promotion headquarters put forward four priorities for amending the constitution. First, the LDP wanted to add language to Article 9 to declare that the JSDF was constitutional, putting an end to post-war controversy about the nation’s uniformed forces. Second, the party wanted to address the Japanese court rulings on upper house electoral districts, ensuring equity in the representation of Japanese citizens. Third, the LDP supported access to free education, a point emphasized by its coalition partner, Komeito. And, finally, the LDP argued for ensuring emergency powers for the cabinet, a reform that many other political parties supported in principle but were wary of in practice.

Japan has faced considerable crises, however, that have prompted greater thinking about how to prepare for them. In 1995, the Kobe earthquake revealed the dissonance between municipal leaders and the central government when it came to using the JSDF to help in disaster relief. Only in 2011 after the Great East Japan earthquake, and after the laws mentioned above were passed, did the Japanese public see the value in having their post-war military be able to act as first responders. It was one of Japan’s opposition parties, the DPJ, that had to confront that national crisis. Similarly, as noted above, the COVID-19 pandemic raised new questions for the Suga cabinet about how to manage Japan’s elections during an unprecedented emergency.

Allowing the state to act in the absence of Diet approval during an emergency is one of the issues that continues to be high on the LDP’s agenda. With a new prime minister in office, the secretary general of the party, Motegi Toshimitsu, has put this at the top of his list for amending the constitution, but first the LDP must successfully compete in this summer’s upper house election. Only then will it be possible to see if the LDP has an opportunity to marshal a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament to support the cause of constitutional amendment.

While the LDP can find political parties who support their cause, the Japanese public remains hesitant. Japan’s conservatives are hoping that a new generation of Japanese will be more open to amending the historic document, but in the wake of a global pandemic and in the face of growing concern over Japan’s economic and security, the task of tackling constitutional revision seems less pressing than managing the day-to-day in Japan.

Conclusion

Outside of Japan, the constitutional revision issue is often entangled with Japan’s approach to its military. For 75 years, successive Japanese leaders have sought to reassure their neighbors based on the self-restraint embedded in Article 9: “The Japanese people forever renounce war… as a means of settling international disputes.” This internalized norm has penetrated Japanese military doctrine and serves as a statement of intention: Japan will never again threaten its neighbors with war.

Like many across the globe, however, Japanese are watching the world change rapidly and in ways that are raising new questions about the predictability of their future. The Kishida Fumio cabinet has acted quickly to align itself with others in the G-7 in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Worry about how the war in Europe will shape the global order abounds in Japan, and experts have raised considerable alarm bells about how to best manage an increasingly volatile world.

Has the time come for Japanese to also take a closer look at revising their constitution?

The impetus may very well have little to do with Article 9. Instead, the focus on how to improve Japanese governance may be where a popular consensus forms on amending Japan’s unique constitution. Expect Japanese citizens, however, to jealously guard their rights and to check any attempt at unnecessarily expanding state control over society.