Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Poses Difficult Questions for Japan

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered many debates within Japan regarding the direction of its security policy. For example, in the context of Tokyo revising its three key national security documents (the National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines, and Medium Term Defense Program), it reignited the debate on whether Japan should acquire preemptive strike capabilities. Furthermore, as the international community witnesses Russia’s attempt to coerce Ukraine into submission by threatening the use of nuclear weapons, some Japanese political leaders and pundits have begun to openly argue that Japan may have to consider “nuclear sharing” with the United States.

More than anything, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked discussion about what lessons Japan should draw when it looks at the rising tension between China and Taiwan. For instance, Japan’s former prime minister, Abe Shinzo, attracted a great deal of attention when he called on the U.S. to end its decades-old policy of strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis Taiwan in his opinion piece for Project Syndicate on April 12. “Given the change in circumstances since the policy of strategic ambiguity was adopted… The time has come for the US to make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion,” Abe argued.

The sentiment Abe expressed in his opinion piece is consistent with a growing belief among Japanese political leaders that a threat to Taiwan will quickly escalate to threaten Japan’s national security, given Taiwan’s proximity to Japan’s Southwest Islands chain and the surrounding East China Sea area, where Japan faces increasing pressure from China. Therefore, Japan should consider a Taiwan contingency as its own national security crisis and prepare itself accordingly. However, if Tokyo is indeed serious about making sure that it is ready not only to defend the disputed Senkaku Islands – claimed by China as the Diaoyu – but also to effectively support Taiwan’s effort to defend itself from coercive action by China, there are other “lessons learned” that Japan needs to take away from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.

First and foremost, an unambiguous demonstration of the political will to defend territorial integrity is absolutely critical. Indeed, the resilience of the Ukrainian people in the face of Russia’s invasion, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision to stay and fight rather than flee the country, has inspired the international community to rally around Ukraine. In his opinion piece, Abe reflected on his past meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, suggesting that he would always tell Xi “not to misjudge Japan’s intention to defend the Senkaku Islands.” And yet, in an opinion poll taken by the Japanese government in 2018, when asked what they would do if Japan was invaded by a foreign country, less than 6 percent of respondents said they would join the fight. Even though the majority – approximately 60 percent – said they would “support the JSDF in some other ways,” that is a far cry from showing public resolve to defend the homeland. In other words, there is a fundamental question of whether Japanese people would show a strong will to defend their territory in the face of any potential attempt by China to establish control over East China Sea.

Furthermore, despite what Abe and those who share his perspective think about the insufficiency of U.S. policy, Japan also has a challenge to overcome, especially in how quickly it can mobilize the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Due to the restrictive legal framework that authorizes JSDF operations, it can only engage in combat in defending Japan’s territory. Therefore, in case of a Taiwan contingency, the role the JSDF can play will be restricted to providing rear-area support for U.S. operations – unless and until the situation escalates to a point where Japanese territory is under threat. Given that a Taiwan contingency would be expected to escalate very quickly, the Japanese government will need to ensure that its decision-making process, including the one that involves explicit authorization by the Diet, can keep up with a situation that will likely evolve in the matters of hours.

Finally, the JSDF has a long way to go to be capable of sustaining high-tempo operations for a long period of time. The after-action assessment following the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake pointed to the lack of resiliency and inadequacy in logistic capabilities, but little has been done to rectify the problem. If anything, with rising tension in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, the JSDF is expected to modernize its forces to incorporate operations in emerging domains such as cyber and space, which takes resources away from the sustainment of the force. Although the recommendation put forward by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party for Japan to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of its GDP is a step in the right direction, even that level of increase may not be sufficient to resource what the JSDF needs to be fully capable and ready.

This all comes back to a simple set of questions: Is Japan fully committed to defend its territory? And is Japan ready to do what it takes to meet that goal? Rather than being caught up with a conceptual debate on issues such as strike capabilities and nuclear-sharing, Japanese political leaders should engage the public in the discussion of these fundamental questions.