Michael Kugelman

2022 has been a hard year for much of South Asia. Sri Lanka has been wracked by continuous protests since late March, with Sri Lankans demanding a change in government amid a wrenching economic crisis. In Pakistan, a no-confidence vote against then-Prime Minister Imran Khan turned particularly ugly after Khan accused his opponents of conspiring against him with the United States. And Afghanistan continues to see its economy dissolve away under Taliban rule, even as the Taliban focus their attention on restricting the behavior of women in the name of public morality.

To get a more holistic view of the changes afoot in the region, The Diplomat interviewed Michael Kugelman, the deputy director of the Asia Program and senior associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

It’s been an eventful spring for South Asia: a change in government in Pakistan, protests demanding regime change in Sri Lanka, and a slow-moving economic disaster unfolding in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. How much of a factor was the COVID-19 pandemic – and the resulting economic turmoil – in the political developments we’re seeing across the region right now?

I wouldn’t overstate the pandemic’s impact on political developments in South Asia. Several countries in the region have had political crises rooted in factors unrelated to the pandemic. Others have had severe economic stress not tied to the pandemic. And still others had terrible pandemic surges that didn’t result in political turbulence.

Pakistan and Sri Lanka have experienced the most political tumult, and in both cases it’s been driven by economic stress. Anti-government protests in Sri Lanka are fueled by public anger at soaring inflation. In Pakistan, the previous government was ousted in a no-confidence vote that cited economic misgovernance. But this economic stress isn’t entirely attributable to the pandemic. In Sri Lanka, two decades of economic mismanagement – from a heavy dependence on foreign loans to drastic tax cuts – had produced many years of economic fragility. The pandemic’s impact on Sri Lanka’s economy was indeed devastating – the tourism industry’s contribution to GDP fell from nearly 6 percent in 2018 to less than 1 percent in 2020. But it was the many years of bad economic decisions that made Sri Lanka’s economy so vulnerable to pandemic-induced shocks.

Pakistan, meanwhile, weathered the pandemic relatively well. You didn’t have the overwhelmed hospitals or soaring death tolls you had in India or Nepal. And the Pakistani economy did show signs of strengthening in recent months. It’s true that supply chain shortages wrought by the more recent pandemic wave have contributed to rising prices in Pakistan (and elsewhere in the region) this year, but it was the surge on global oil prices triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine that prompted the biggest spikes in Pakistan’s inflation.

Additionally, while the opposition’s no-confidence vote that ousted Khan was officially motivated by the issue of economic misgovernance, it was really driven by political factors more than anything else. Khan lost the support of the Army chief last November, and once that happened the opposition sensed an opportunity to pounce on Khan’s political vulnerability. That’s when it first decided to put together the no-confidence vote.

Afghanistan, meanwhile, can attribute its collapsing economy, one that has been chronically weak and dependent on foreign aid, to everything but the pandemic – Western sanctions, drought, the Taliban’s utter lack of economic governance experience, and so on. But this hasn’t caused any major political threats to the Taliban, which haven’t faced any viable political opposition since the group’s takeover last August. That said, there are some rumblings of a new resistance. There have been recent reports of fighting against the Taliban in the Panjshir region, and indications that several new armed opposition groups have formed, though they’re not potent at the moment. The Taliban could in due course face more challenges to its political control, but these would flow from non-pandemic related factors – an ever-worsening economy, surges in terrorist attacks, and its broader inability to gain domestic legitimacy.

India and Nepal were arguably the South Asian states hit hardest by the pandemic, but there haven’t been serious political tensions in either country as in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Nepal did have a change in prime minister in the summer of 2021 at a moment when Nepal was going through a terrible pandemic surge, but that leadership transition was more tied to internal political issues. And in more recent months, political stability has returned to Nepal. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s poor handling of a catastrophic pandemic surge one year ago didn’t hurt him politically, and his party scored resounding victories in several state elections earlier this year.

How do you expect Pakistan’s foreign policy to develop under the new government – especially with Imran Khan openly blaming the United States for his ouster?

I’d offer three cautionary notes when thinking about what to expect from the Sharif government’s foreign policy. First, this will be a short term government. It will be in power for, at the most, another 15 months, with elections scheduled for the summer of 2023. But some officials have suggested elections could come even sooner. So this means the government will have limited time to craft and execute foreign policy plans.

Second, foreign policy will not be a top priority. The Sharif government is facing a surging balance of payments crisis that will occupy an outsize share of policy space. And in fact this economic crisis will be a driver of its foreign policy, with a focus on diplomacy meant to secure new financial assistance, whether from allies like Saudi Arabia and China or international financial institutions like the IMF. It will also face relenting pressure from Imran Khan, now back in the opposition. He is promising street protests and marches until the government is no longer in power. So for Islamabad, the top priorities will be domestic.

And third, Pakistan’s military has the final, and in some cases, major, say in Pakistani foreign policy moves – and especially when it comes to key countries like Afghanistan, India, and the U.S. So a change in civilian administration won’t necessarily lead to major foreign policy shifts, given the influence of the military, a constant key factor in foreign policy.

All this said, I anticipate some changes but a lot of continuity in foreign policy between Khan and Sharif. The main change will involve rhetoric. Sharif is a more subdued figure than Khan. You won’t hear the angry and strident messaging about Pakistan’s Indian and U.S. rivals that we’d come to expect from Khan during his final months in power. Similarly, we shouldn’t expect the activist foreign policy that Khan sought to wage. He positioned himself as a leader of the Islamic as well as the developing world and sought to take the lead to combat global Islamophobia and to call for debt forgiveness. These aren’t issues that Sharif will take up. That said, Sharif, like all Pakistani leaders, will continue to advocate on behalf of the Kashmir issue.

I anticipate some modest changes in policy toward the U.S. and India. Imran Khan had good relations with Washington during the latter part of the Trump administration. But much about the Biden administration had aggrieved him – Biden’s unwillingness to call him, Pakistan’s not being invited to a White House climate summit, and of course most recently the negative comments about Khan made by a senior U.S. official. In the end, Khan had no interest in working with Washington. The arrival of Sharif will create a healthier, less toxic environment for bilateral relations and create more space for exploring potential new pathways for cooperation, including on the security fronts, which Khan was simply not interested in.

On India, we may see a greater willingness on Sharif’s part to explore reopening some trade with India, much of which has been suspended for several years. His government has so far indicated no desire to do so, but he recently announced the appointment of an official to serve in the Pakistani high commission in New Delhi as Pakistan’s trade minister – a post that had been vacant for five years. Sharif’s party counts on a lot of support from the Pakistani business community, which has expressed support for cross-border trade. So Sharif’s government may enable India-Pakistan ties to see some small forward movement in a relationship that has otherwise been mired in deep tensions. But we should keep expectations low; there are powerful interests, both political and economic, in Pakistan that oppose trade with India. And New Delhi may not want to pursue stepped-up engagement with a lame duck administration in Islamabad.

I anticipate a lot of continuity on policy in Afghanistan. Sharif, like Khan and really any prime minister in Pakistan, doesn’t want the country next door to collapse, because of the problematic implications this could have for Pakistan – from heightened refugee flows to cross-border terrorism. Sharif, like Khan, will try to prop up the Taliban regime and call on the world to provide more financial assistance. Like Khan, he will also focus on the the threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban, which is based in Afghanistan and has stepped up attacks in Pakistan over the last year. Khan’s government had pursued talks with the Pakistani Taliban, mediated by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Sharif will favor such an approach as well, though he would also likely be more supportive than would Khan of Pakistani military operations in Afghanistan that target Pakistani Taliban bases there. Khan has always opposed foreign military operations of any type in Afghanistan.

Additionally, though there may be space for dialogue with the U.S. in the Sharif era, Sharif, like Khan, won’t want to push forward too much. For Sharif, there is a political risk in trying to move quickly to improve relations with the U.S., as this would strengthen the narrative of Khan and his supporters that Sharif and his allies colluded with Washington to oust Khan. Additionally, there are geopolitical constraints to deeper U.S.-Pakistan relations that are in place no matter who is the Pakistani prime minister – Pakistan’s close alliance with China at a moment of intensifying U.S.-China competition, for example, as well as deepening U.S.-India relations and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which has long been the lens through which the U.S. views its relations with Pakistan.

Similarly, how do you view the geopolitical implications of the protests in Sri Lanka? The Rajapaksa regime has fostered close ties with China, but also been open about desiring a warm relationship with India.

Sri Lanka reflects a geopolitical reality common to just about every country in South Asia aside from Afghanistan and Pakistan: It is caught up in a growing strategic tug of war between India and China, and it wants no part of it. It wants to balance relations with both New Delhi and Beijing, and doesn’t want to align itself with one over the other.

Ironically, however, seen against the backdrop of Sri Lanka’s terrible economic crisis, with the country desperate for financial assistance to replenish its foreign reserves and to ease a broader liquidity crisis, Colombo actually benefits from India-China rivalry. Beijing and New Delhi are seemingly falling over each other in efforts to bring economic relief to Sri Lanka, and by extension to scale up their influence there. It was telling, earlier this year, how quickly New Delhi moved to announce a new shipment of fertilizer to Sri Lanka after Colombo got into a spat with Beijing about spoiled fertilizer products sent by China. More recently, India agreed to a new line of credit agreement with Sri Lanka, whereas Beijing has signaled it’s considering its own new relief package.

Both New Delhi and Beijing will be careful not to inject themselves into the political crisis in Sri Lanka, and instead they’ll focus on the economic engagement front. And that’s fine with Colombo. This is a win-win for everyone because it helps India and China scale up influence, and it offers Sri Lanka much-needed economic relief. Additionally, for all the talk of how the Rajapaksas are close to China, the scale of Sri Lanka’s economic needs suggests that the Rajapaksas – or whoever happens to be leading Sri Lanka if President Rajapaksa steps down – will welcome economic engagement from both New Delhi and Beijing.

What do you make of the Taliban’s foreign policy strategy thus far? China has been engaging with the Taliban in an official capacity recently – where else are the Taliban’s diplomatic energies going?

Soon after the Taliban seized power, they said they welcome friendly relations with every country other than Israel. Such a claim is of course about public relations, as it’s meant to project the Taliban as a responsible international actor very different from the global pariah of the 1990. But it’s also meant to push the Taliban toward their goal of securing much-needed foreign assistance. The idea here is that by developing good relations with other countries, the Taliban stand a better chance of reaching accords on financial assistance. But of course it’s not that easy, especially given that the Taliban’s retrogressive social policies have alienated the very international community the group seeks to cultivate.

The Taliban don’t appear to have a formal foreign policy, though we have seen them host meetings with a wide array of interlocutors, from their regional neighbors to countries in the West, including the U.S. They will naturally privilege relations with those countries that they believe can best help them advance their interests, and that means those countries most willing to provide financial support. So they have engaged heavily with capital-rich China, as well as with Western countries that play an outsize role in the international donor community. Due to border trade and security considerations, relations with the region and especially bordering states will be a priority as well. The Taliban benefit from the fact that while no country has recognized the Taliban regime, most are still perfectly comfortable engaging on high levels with the Taliban diplomatically, albeit on unofficial terms.

Do you think the Taliban are getting closer to winning official recognition as the government of Afghanistan from any of their partners? How about on the international stage, for example in the United Nations?

It’s becoming increasingly clear that the Taliban have blown a golden opportunity to gain international recognition. Their troop withdrawal agreement with the U.S. brought them a level of legitimacy they hadn’t had before, and this led to regular high-level diplomatic engagements with countries around the world. Many countries didn’t like how they seized power last summer, but quite a few nations, both in the West and in Afghanistan’s neighborhood, have signalled that if the Taliban demonstrate a willingness to curb terror groups and to show a degree of inclusivity and respect for human rights, recognition could be a possibility.

Instead, the Taliban have showed little indication of curbing terrorism in Afghanistan. Their relationship with al-Qaida remains intact. They have, to be sure, gone after the Islamic State, which unlike nearly every other Islamist terror group in the country is a Taliban rival. But they’ve struggled to degrade the Islamic State threat, as they don’t know how to operate the air power used by NATO forces to manage the threat in the past. They’ve used scorched-earth ground operations that have alienated communities and made the Islamic State stronger. The Islamic State has also benefited from the humanitarian and economic crisis, which raises the likelihood of radicalization and new recruits for Islamic State.

More significantly, the Taliban have imposed the most retrogressive social policies, the same ones in place from the 1990s – restrictions on women’s movement, on what they wear in public, and on education for older girls. This is a reflection of the power of the most hardline elements of the Taliban, who hold the most senior positions and call the shots. And they don’t care about appeasing the international community. The more moderate elements of the Taliban, those that have operated from the Taliban political office in Doha and engaged directly with the international community and know of the importance of moderating the Taliban’s ideology in order to gain international support and most importantly financial aid, have been marginalized.

As a result, the Taliban aren’t about to be recognized by any country anytime soon. The regional players, including the Taliban’s Pakistani ally, aren’t prepared to bestow recognition because of concerns about security, especially terrorism, emanating from Afghanistan. Western countries are concerned about rights and inclusivity, and see only regression, not progression, on these fronts. The Taliban may not be global pariahs as they were in the 1990s, given that now, unlike then, the world is willing to engage. But the simple truth is that formal recognition isn’t in the cards.