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Biden’s First Trip to Japan
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Biden’s First Trip to Japan

The U.S. president’s first visit to Japan since taking office notched several key wins – for Biden and his Japanese counterpart.

By Yuki Tatsumi

From May 20-24, U.S. President Joe Biden made his first Asia trip since taking office in January 2021, visiting South Korea and Japan. Taking place as U.S. strategic competition with China intensifies and provocations from North Korea are on the rise, the trip was deemed by many to be crucial for Biden’s effort to strengthen cooperation with its two critical allies in Indo-Pacific region – not only to counter China but also to bolster the Biden administration’s wider foreign policy agenda. 

Even though the comment Biden made during his joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio on the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan stole headlines, the U.S. president’s trip to Tokyo yielded many results that can have a tangible impact on his administration’s effort to reclaim the U.S. position as the world’s rule-maker.

Following the Biden-Kishida summit meeting, the U.S. and Japan released not only a joint leader’s statement on “Strengthening the Free and Open International Order” but also fact sheets on two additional bilateral initiatives – the Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership (CoRe) and the Climate Partnership. Both initiatives, agreed upon between Biden and Kishida’s predecessor, Suga Yoshihide, illustrate the two countries’ efforts to set the stage for the U.S. to re-engage in global affairs after four years of withdrawing from international commitments during the Trump presidency.

For example, the CoRe initiative is designed to position the two countries to jointly lead efforts to shape the rules of the road in areas such as competitiveness and innovation, global health and health security, as well as clean energy and climate change. In particular, the cooperation on competitiveness and innovation includes partnering on the digital economy, Open Radio Access Networks (RANs), cybersecurity/critical infrastructure resilience, new technologies (such as “quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and climate change technology”), space exploration, and supply chain resilience. All of these areas require a certain code of conduct anchored in a rule-based international order for all countries to benefit from. Japan and the United States are clearly seeking to help write those rules.

The U.S. and Japan also used the occasion as an opportunity for strategic messaging vis-à-vis China. For instance, Kishida chose to host a dinner for Biden at an exclusive inn located in Happo-en. Well known today for its gardens, Happo-en also happens to be the location where KMT founder Sun Yat-sen – a crucial leader in the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in China – stayed while in exile.

More directly, Biden and Kishida also called China out in their joint statement, urging Beijing to stand up against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and join the international community’s effort to uphold an rule-based international order. In this context, the agreement among the Quad leaders – Biden and Kishida as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese – to cooperate on maritime domain awareness at the end of the Quad Leaders’ Summit on May 24 was particularly notable. The embrace of MDA cooperation means it got buy-in from India, often the outlier when it comes to its positioning vis-à-vis China.

Both leaders succeeded in pushing important agenda items. On Biden’s part, he was able to successfully get Japan's support for his new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) initiative. During the Obama administration, Japan's similar support was essential for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. While the details need to be hashed out, particularly in regards to how to ensure IPEF will have synergy with the TPP’s successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Japan’s support for IPEF means a great deal.

Biden and Kishida also agreed to cooperate on supply chain resiliency for critical materials such as semiconductors and rare earth minerals, another area that the Biden administration considers important for the U.S. economy.

Finally, Biden also secured Japan’s commitment to a “substantial increase” in defense spending, which is consistent with the administration’s goal for a more equitable and reciprocal alliance.

On the other hand, Kishida also succeeded in winning Biden’s support for issues that are important for Japan – as well as for Kishida personally.  On Japan’s pressing security concerns, Kishida was able to reconfirm the Biden administration’s support for the defense of Japan in the event of an attempt by China to occupy the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing also claims.

Kishida was also able to secure Biden’s support for reform at the United Nations, including Japan’s permanent membership in a post-reform Security Council – one of Japan’s major post-World War II foreign policy goals.

Furthermore, as the two governments stood firm against North Korea’s increasingly provocative behavior, Biden met with the families of Japanese citizens abducted by Pyongyang in the late 1970s and early ‘80s. The meeting ran longer than was planned, reassuring the families of U.S. support for the resolution of the issue.

In addition, Kishida was able to announce with Biden that Japan will host next year’s G-7 summit in his hometown, Hiroshima. The Japanese prime minister expressed his desire to leverage the occasion to renew the push for nuclear disarmament – personally very important for Kishida.

After ending Biden’s first Asia visit with a “win-win” summit, the U.S. and Japan have successfully positioned their alliance as the key vehicle to achieve their shared vision of the free and open Indo-Pacific. Now that the agenda-setting is done, both leaders have to tackle the much more complicated task of leading their respective governments to execute these visions.

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The Authors

Yuki Tatsumi is a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program and director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center.

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