In Central Asia, Russia’s Losses Are Turkey’s Opportunities

On May 10, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev touched down in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, for a two-day state visit at the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was Tokayev’s first trip to Turkey since taking office in 2019 and could not have come at a better time for both states as they navigate around the economic and political repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s blunder in Ukraine may prove to be a golden opportunity for Turkey in Central Asia. Although the states of Central Asia have all largely maintained a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine, given their close economic and political ties with Russia, Kazakhstan has been the most clear in supporting Ukrainian sovereignty. Nur-Sultan has communicated to Europe its intentions to uphold (though not join in) sanctions against Russia and opened its doors to business looking to relocate out of Russia.

Trade, transport, and shared Turkic heritage were at the center of discussions in Ankara, alongside defense cooperation. In each area, Russia’s losses looks to be Turkey’s gains.

According to RFE/RL, Tokayev said after his visit that the most important matter for the two states was developing the potential of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Also known as the Middle Corridor, the route charts a path from the factories of China across Kazakhstan by rail to the shores of the Caspian Sea and onward into the Caucasus and eventually on to Europe via Turkey. Most notably, the route bypasses Russia, through which much of Central Asia’s trade must necessarily pass.

During the visit, Tokayev and Erdogan signed a joint statement on expanding their strategic partnership along with 14 other bilateral agreements, including a defense cooperation agreement. In addition, a particularly notable deal was a memorandum signed between state-owned Kazakhstan Engineering and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) to facilitate the joint production of Anka unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Kazakhstan has been a Turkish defense industry customer, purchasing three Anka drones last year and under the new agreement will host a manufacturing facility. Much of Kazakhstan’s defense materiel – from T-72 tanks to S-200 and -300 surface to air missile batteries – is Soviet or Russian equipment, meaning Kazakhstan is beholden (much like India is) to Moscow for access to parts and expertise. Turkey’s growing defense industry represents a much needed diversification for Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan’s shared Soviet history with Russia has grounded bilateral relations for 30 years, but Turkey likes to highlight its much more ancient claim to brotherhood with Kazakhstan. This has become even more poignant as many of the statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine – including dismissing its statehood as fiction – have been said about Kazakhstan, too.

In April, for example, after Kazakhstan confirmed it would not hold a large military parade to mark Victory Day on May 9, Russian commentator Tigran Keosayan went on an anti-Kazakhstan screed, calling Kazakhs “ungrateful” and worse, ending with a dark warning: “Look at Ukraine carefully, think seriously.” The implied threat was met sternly by Kazakh officials. But rather than just reject the comments, Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov acknowledged that “Perhaps his statement reflects the views of a certain part of the Russian public and the political establishment.”

Enter Turkey, a much less insulting brotherly nation.

The war in Ukraine “has once again showed the importance of the solidarity and cooperation among the Turkic states both at the bilateral level and within the Organization of Turkic States,” Erdogan said during his joint press conference with Tokayev last month.

“With my treasured brother [Tokayev], we have reaffirmed our determination to maintain our solidarity at various platforms including the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Economic Cooperation Organization besides the Organization of Turkic States.”

The Organization of Turkic States, until 2019 known as the Turkic Council, has long represented Turkey’s effort to claim deep connection with the states of Central Asia. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan are members of the organization, which aims to hold its new strategic cooperation council meeting in Kazakhstan in October. The organization also neatly maps onto much of the Middle Corridor route.

Whether Turkey can truly capitalize on Russia’s losses in Central Asia is yet to be seen and is not without its own challenges. In April, Bruce Pannier noted in an article for Eurasianet that Turkey’s ties with Central Asia are very much wrapped up in Erdogan, personally. Perhaps more critically, Turkey’s tense relationship with China – particularly over the treatment of Uyghurs (also a Turkic people) – could put Central Asia awkwardly in the middle. At the same time, Pannier wrote, “they must… see the benefits of close ties to a strong Turkey, at the very least to balance demands from Russia, China, or the West.”

As the war in Ukraine persists, it’ll be worth watching how Turkey chooses to engage with the states of Central Asia.