From Abe to Kishida: Japan at the Shangri-La Dialogue

When then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo gave the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2014, it was his moment to shine as the first Japanese prime minister to do so. In 2022, Kishida Fumio became the second Japanese prime minister to address the representatives of some 40 countries as the keynote speaker at the dialogue. While Abe’s 2014 speech took place in the context of ongoing negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and efforts to update the bilateral defense guidelines of the Japan-U.S. alliance, Kishida gave his 2022 speech amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and increasing China-U.S. tensions. Comparing their two speeches gives insight into how Japan’s view of regional security has changed in the last decade.

At the headline level, the two leaders chose different slogans. Abe’s was “proactive contribution to peace,” while Kishida’s was “realism diplomacy for a new era.” However, despite the difference in semantics at the headline level, the two speeches share two common underlying themes: a commitment to upholding the rule of law and a recognition that Japan must contribute to global security in order to enhance its own security.

These themes are present throughout both speeches, but to give a taste of each, notable phrases from Abe’s speech include: “Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law. And the rule of law for all of us. Peace and prosperity in Asia, forevermore,” and “We are in an era in which it is no longer possible for any one nation to secure its own peace only by itself.” Notable phrases from Kishida’s speech on these themes include: “At the root of all of these problems is a situation in which confidence in the universal rules that govern international relations is being shaken. This is the essential and most serious underlying problem,” and “No country or region in the world can shrug [Russia’s aggression against Ukraine] off as ‘someone else’s problem.’ It is a situation that shakes the very foundations of the international order, which every country and individual gathered here today should regard as their own affair.”

There is also more continuity from the Abe era to the Kishida era than the change in headline slogans would suggest. Though Abe did not use the phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in his 2014 SLD speech, this is a key phrase that he came up with during his time in office and has caught on internationally, most significantly, within the United States. In fact, it is so widespread and ingrained in the discourse that Kishida used the phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” 10 times in his SLD speech, and its derivatives “free and open international order” or “free and open maritime order” a total of five times. Other points of continuity between the two speeches include an emphasis on cooperation with the United States, Australia, India, and ASEAN states.

Although thematically similar, the tone of the two speeches is very different. While Abe said that he found it “extremely regrettable” that the region was spending “a large and relatively disproportionate amount” on “military expansion and arms trading,” and expressed concerns about weapons of mass destruction and attempts to change the status quo through force or coercion, he concluded his observations of the region by saying, “nowhere do we find a need to be pessimistic.” Even though his degree of optimism is an over-exaggeration, and likely a rhetorical device rather than Abe’s genuine feelings, it does stand in stark contrast to Kishida’s speech.

In his opening, Kishida declared, “With the very foundation of the international order being shaken by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the international community now stands at a historic crossroads.” He then listed the many regions where faith in international law was demonstrably waning: Ukraine, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula. One of the most memorable phrases from Kishida’s speech was: “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” The darker tone of Kishida’s speech is a justifiable reflection of a tenser international environment.

Another point of departure between the two speeches is the breadth and depth of their respective ambitions. Concrete goals from Abe’s speech included: establishing an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN; beginning to operate a maritime and air communication mechanism between Japan and China; enhancing the East Asia Summit; creating a framework to publicly disclose military budgets; providing assets and training to ASEAN states including the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia; and reconstructing the legal basis of collective self-defense and international cooperation. His most notable accomplishment was indeed reinterpreting the right to collective self-defense and capacity-building in Southeast Asia.

Concrete goals from Kishida’s speech included: joint capacity-building efforts with the Quad countries; expanding Official Development Assistance; laying out a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Plan for Peace” by next spring; strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of at least 20 countries; additional assistance to the provision of maritime security; training more than 1,500 personnel in the fields of rule of law and governance over the next three years; setting out a new National Security Strategy by the end of the year; substantially increasing Japan’s defense budget in order to enhance defense capabilities within the next five years; holding discussions on counterstrike capabilities; concluding negotiations with Singapore, as well with other ASEAN states, for a defense equipment and technology transfer agreement; concluding a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the United Kingdom as well as with other like-minded European and Asian states; participating in joint exercises with countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific; promoting international transparency regarding nuclear capabilities; a China-U.S. bilateral dialogue on nuclear disarmament and arms control; bringing back discussions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); establishing the “International Group of Eminent Persons for a world without nuclear weapons” and holding a first meeting this year; working toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea; strengthening the functions of the U.N. and reforming the U.N. Security Council; and supporting more than 100 supply chain resilience projects over the next five years.

How many of these goals and how effectively Kishida accomplishes them will be something to watch closely in the coming years, as well as whether the sheer number of goals makes them easier or harder to accomplish.

It is interesting to note that Kishida used his limited airtime to hammer out such concrete goals when Abe devoted a significant portion of his speech to an extended riff on the “new Japanese” as a peace-loving but dynamic and proactive people. While Kishida’s speech reads throughout like a to-do list for the Japanese government, Abe’s speech ends on a more visionary note: perhaps, what could be called a to-be list for the Japanese people.

This difference could be merely due to the changed context: More difficult circumstances in 2022 may generate a greater sense of urgency than in 2014. It could also be because of the differences in leadership. Given Abe’s reputation for hawkishness, he may have needed to go out of his way to reassure neighbors (and former victims of Japanese imperialism) that Japan would still be a peace-loving nation in a way that Kishida, with his pacifist reputation, did not need to worry about. It ultimately also could simply be a difference in personality, ideology, or leadership style between the two men. A comparison between the two speeches reveals changes over time in Japan’s geostrategic circumstances, as well as differences in between Abe and Kishida as individuals.