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Imran Khan’s Campaign Sullies Image of Pakistan’s Military
Associated Press, Anjum Naveed
South Asia

Imran Khan’s Campaign Sullies Image of Pakistan’s Military

Policymakers say that the military today is as unpopular as it was in 1971, when East Pakistan broke away.

By Umair Jamal

Over the past several months, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leaders and supporters have openly accused the military leadership of orchestrating the April vote of no-confidence against the PTI chief, former Prime Minister Imran Khan, in parliament. The ongoing politicking over Khan’s removal as prime minister has damaged the military’s reputation to a considerable extent.

The institution’s absolute control over politics has been shaken and its popularity has plunged. Many in Islamabad’s policymaking circles say that the last time the military was this unpopular in Pakistan was in 1971, when East Pakistan broke away to emerge as independent Bangladesh.

In July, the PTI criticized an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lahore sector commander for allegedly manipulating the recently held by-elections in Punjab. Awhile back, anyone questioning the military’s role this way would have simply vanished. But this time, Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa issued directions immediately asking his officers to stay away from politics, with some in the security establishment explaining that the commander in question was not even present in the city where polls were being held.

One can also gauge the military’s troubles from the institution’s attempts to appease politicians to win back some sort of support. For instance, the military leadership is bending over backwards to reassure the current coalition government over the ongoing talks with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

A few weeks ago, in an unprecedented move, Bajwa, ISI head Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum, and Corps Commander Peshawar Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed gave a detailed briefing to lawmakers over the ongoing talks with the TTP. The military leadership faced tough questions from politicians, including queries related to the army’s mandate to hold talks in the first place. In the end, the security establishment was forced to concede that a parliamentary committee would oversee the entire negotiation process and decisions will be made after parliament’s approval.

In another instance, the civilian government was able to reduce the military development program budget by 20 percent without much pushback from the army. A few years ago, any civilian government trying to cut the military budget would have been sent home.   

“The military as an institution is on its back foot. People are openly accusing officers, commanders, generals, and the ISI of intervention without any fear,” one government official told The Diplomat on condition of anonymity.

“This was unimaginable even about six months ago,” he added.

The issue has been made worse by pressure from military families on the army leadership over the issue of Khan’s removal as the premier. In fact, the last few months have seen a lot of activism from military families in support of Khan. However, that doesn’t mean that the activism reflects a genuine movement against the current military leadership.

One can argue that the military families protesting against the decision to remove Khan from power had vested interests tied to the PTI-led government. A part of these vested interests were engaged with the PTI regime as part of the military’s decision in 2018 to bring Khan to power. Back then, these families were brought together as part of the military policy to produce support for Khan’s party. With Khan gone as the prime minister of Pakistan, these families feel let down by their own institution.

A second area of criticism from military families comes from those who genuinely consider Khan a better political choice compared with the existing lot of politicians and political parties in the country.

Many of these families have been dealt with quietly by the military. Some were directly confronted through family networks while others, who refused to follow the institution’s decision, were punished by losing perks and privileges such as residential plots, pensions, and free healthcare.

The military leadership is surely aware of the criticism of its decision to remove Khan from power. But this not the first time that the military leadership has been criticized from within. While families of many retired officers may disagree with the leadership of the military, it doesn’t mean there will be a revolt. As the saying goes in Pakistan’s military circles, no chief retires without a baggage of blunders. This is precisely what has happened with Bajwa’s tenure.

While criticism from military families has persisted, it has also lost steam. Nevertheless, the criticism has had reputational costs for Bajwa and the institution, as it made public the internal politics of the military.

A key question remains: Is such criticism enough to bring back Imran Khan as the prime minister of Pakistan?

In the eyes of many within the military, Khan not only failed to deliver as prime minister, but he also was the reason for the increased politicization of the institution as he tried to win the loyalties of generals. None of this, however, means that Khan cannot make a deal with the institution again.

At this stage, no one knows what the priorities of the next army chief will be and with whom he will make deals. It is unclear if the current ruling set-up will work for the military establishment into the future. Political instability persists, paired with an economy under enormous pressure. The way Khan’s camp has targeted the military and won recent elections in Punjab, it is very likely that the army leadership will have to reach out to him to strike some sort of deal.

The current ruling coalition collaborated with the military to sideline Khan and his political party. But no one can be sure how long the ruling coalition will remain in the military’s good books. When (and it is surely only a matter of time) they fall out of favor with the military, the PTI (and Khan) will still be waiting.

To some extent, the ongoing attacks on the army chief and politicization of the military leadership is linked to the next army chief’s appointment in November 2022. Many within the military leadership believe that Bajwa aims to seek another extension in November.

Some in the military are not necessarily averse to the PTI’s propaganda campaign against Bajwa, as that may push him into retirement, allowing someone else to take over the top post. Others argue that in order to restore the army's reputation, Bajwa needs to hang up his boots. In the immediate term at least, this would enable the military to reverse some the reputational damage it has suffered, as Bajwa is a core focus of the critiques.

Whatever happens, the development will hardly end the military’s choking control over the country’s economy and politics. What makes it worse is that no politician, including Khan, is frankly questioning the influence of the institution or its domination of politics. This essentially shows that the ongoing targeting of the military by politicians is only for political gains rather than a movement to strengthen civilian’ control and democracy in the country.

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The Authors

Umair Jamal is a correspondent for The Diplomat, based in Lahore, Pakistan.

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