If Taiwan Tensions Rise, What Happens to the Philippines?

The Philippines is playing it cool. After U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in early August – and China reacted with military drills that dialed up Taiwan Strait tensions to their highest level in decades – President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said Pelosi “did not raise the intensity” of the security situation in the Philippines’ own backyard.

The situation was already volatile, Marcos explained to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and it only underscored the importance of a Philippines-U.S. relationship that survived the rollercoaster reign of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, who embraced ties with Beijing and threatened to cancel a key U.S. security pact before backtracking.

While he may downplay it, Marcos faces a far more complex security equation than Duterte ever did. If China were to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, the nearby Philippines may have to assist U.S. troops or take in refugees. If Beijing stops short of invading but continues increasing its economic and diplomatic pressure on the island by canceling trade routes and imposing blockades, Manila will likely have to do what it’s avoided for years now: pick a side.

Marcos, who took office just two months ago, has cautiously tried to strike a balance. During his campaign, he said China was the country’s “strongest partner” in its post-pandemic recovery, and he has called their relationship “very important” and “advantageous to both countries.” But Marcos has also taken a tougher stance than Duterte on China’s frequent incursions into Philippine-claimed waters in the disputed South China Sea, vowing not to “abandon even a square inch” of Philippine territory and ending talks on joint oil and gas exploration in those waters with China.

Marcos has also tried to get on the same page as the United States, despite concerns that ties would be complicated thanks to bad familial blood left over from his father, former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. The elder Marcos sought exile in Hawaii after his dictatorship was toppled, and in 2011, a U.S. court issued a contempt order instructing the younger Marcos to pay human rights victims around $353 million of the money his family pilfered from the Philippine government as they fled. But U.S. President Joe Biden has invited Marcos to Washington, D.C., despite the contempt order, indicating that the Philippine president is immune. The order wasn’t an issue when Blinken visited Manila just days after Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan – a clear sign from the United States that it intends to rely on Marcos as a security partner.

The Marcos administration was probably happy to continue the balancing act, retaining warm ties with Washington and Beijing while ratcheting up the tough talk on China just enough to please Filipino voters, who overwhelmingly favor closer ties with the U.S. and distrust China. But if tensions continue to rise on the Taiwan Strait, that won’t be possible.

In the event of a Chinese invasion, the Philippines would immediately face a humanitarian crisis. The Department of National Defense has already warned that a military clash in Taiwan would likely lead to an outpouring of refugees – and aside from China, Taiwan’s closest neighbors are Japan and the Philippines. The country would also have to evacuate the 150,000 to 200,000 overseas Filipino workers who work as domestic helpers, factory workers, and fishermen in Taiwan.

The Philippines may also be compelled to host U.S. troops in its military bases, which Washington would see as crucial to stage a potential defense of Taiwan or help secure other countries in the “first island chain.” Filipinos have mixed feelings about U.S. military bases. The government ordered the United States to leave its strategic naval base at Subic Bay in 1991, and while U.S. troops regularly visit the Philippines to train with the Philippine army, permanently hosting U.S. soldiers could be seen as a step too far – even if China invades Taiwan.

Of course, Marcos might be hesitant to become a full-throated U.S. ally in the event of a China-U.S. conflict, thanks to the Philippines’ own economic interests. Will the Philippines be more secure if Marcos firmly stands alongside Washington, or will he be better served to remain strategically neutral, even in a worst-case conflict scenario? Marcos would certainly prefer to play both sides, but that approach has risks: By not committing to the U.S. or to China, it’s possible that the Philippines could one day simply be seen as unreliable and not worth the trouble by either.