Unresolved Problems in South Korea’s Immigration Policy Paradigm

South Korea’s Ministry of Justice has proposed a more efficient and meritocratic immigration policy as a solution to the country’s demographic cliff. Suggested measures include a new immigration agency and a region-specific visa for qualified workers who are willing to be employed in industries chosen by the local governments of depopulated regions.

Despite being framed as an advancement in the country’s immigration system, the proposals highlight several problems with South Korea’s overall approach. First, Seoul’s immigration policies are still determined according to the country’s political and economic expediency. The attempt at a meritocratic paradigm also fails to address the blind spots responsible for the social and economic exclusion of involuntary migrants.

South Korea’s immigration policy values migrants based on their ability to help address the country’s economic and social needs and problems. Both the 1991 Industrial Trainee System and the 2004 Employment Permit System embodied this utilitarian approach. Revised labor laws and the financial crisis of 1997 aggravated the inequality in growth and working conditions between South Korea’s large conglomerates and small-to-medium sized firms (SMEs). In response, domestic workers began to avoid of SMEs, and the Korean government sought to fill the labor shortage by granting short-term visas to non-professional foreign workers.

Under this national interest paradigm, set out in the Immigration Control Act (ICA) and justified by the principle of national sovereignty, migrants are by default perceived as an object of exclusion and control. Their integration into South Korea’s society is thus an “exception” that is granted depending on how useful they are to advancing the country’s national interests.

While border control is a sovereign right, the disproportionate focus on the economic utility of migrants has led to the under-institutionalization of mechanisms to protect the social and economic rights of involuntary migrants. 

In 2013, South Korea became the first country in Asia to implement a Refugee Act as a special law in its domestic legal framework. This legislation signaled an acknowledgement that there are limits to the national interest paradigm of the ICA – notably, that it would not contribute to international refugee protection. In practice, however, the Refugee Act was rarely given precedence. Although Article 3 of the Refugee Act sets forth the principle of non-refoulement, many refugees in South Korea have been subject to detention – a precursor step of forced repatriation – for exceeding the length of stay permitted by the ICA. In 2021, the resettlement of Afghans who supported ROK forces was granted under “special contributor” status, with their residence in South Korea being justified by the principle of mutual benefit rather than humanitarian support. 

Due to the ambiguous hierarchy of policy goals, South Korea’s refugee policies have been heavily influenced by the whims of public sentiment. The country’s geographical location has insulated it from experiencing major refugee inflows, prolonging a conceptual confusion between refugees and economic migrants among both policymakers and the public. In a 2019 poll, over 72 percent of South Korean survey respondents chose poverty as the basis for refugee status recognition, rather than the fear of political persecution as defined by international law. In 2021, 49 percent of survey respondents who opposed refugee acceptance expressed concerns about “fake refugees” who pretend to require protection but actually seek economic opportunities.

Politicians and legislators reinforced such misconceptions by responding with ad hoc discriminatory policies. Following the hostile public reception of Yemeni asylum seekers in 2018, the National Assembly immediately poured out bills to revise the Refugee Act to prioritize national security over human rights and to shut out “fake refugees.” In 2019, the Ministry of Justice banned refugees from obtaining jobs in the construction sector on the grounds of protecting domestic workers, inflaming public concerns that refugees intensify job competition.

Given the increasing number of refugees seeking asylum in high-income countries and the diversifying causes of involuntary migration, South Korea will have to establish a principled approach to the acceptance and integration of those whose arrival is not rationally motivated by socioeconomic pull factors.

In the 2021 survey cited above, 66 percent of respondents who agreed with accepting refugees believed that refugees contribute to South Korea’s economy by seeking employment in fields that Korean nationals avoid entering. Such public preconceptions, as well as structural issues with the Korean economy stemming from the oversupply of highly educated workers, make it highly likely that South Korea will continue to tacitly restrict the “economic utility” of involuntary migrants to a limited number of low-skill industries. A glass ceiling and socioeconomic hierarchy provide fertile ground for social instability in the long run.

From the 2004 Employment Permit System to the new immigration agency, developments in South Korea’s immigration policies have been consistently underpinned by the discourse of becoming a seonjinguk (advanced nation). It thus remains a significant irony that restricting non-nationals’ economic rights on the grounds of protecting domestic jobs – a policy long favored by Seoul – is an exception to the principle of non-discrimination guaranteed only to developing countries under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 

Whether for the long-term stability of its society or for its international reputation, South Korea needs to reconsider the implications of continuing an immigration policy paradigm that focuses disproportionately on the narrow economic utility that migrants bring to the country’s national interests.