A Tale of Two Constitutional Referendums

When a constitutional commission was formed in Uzbekistan in late May 2022, the process was expected to move quickly – with a new constitution likely to be adopted before the summer ended. That is, in general, how constitutional referendums in Central Asia tend to go. In neighboring Kazakhstan, a constitutional referendum proposed in March was held and approved in June.

But an early draft of proposed constitutional changes in Uzbekistan included provisions that would have stripped the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan of its sovereignty and right to secede from Uzbekistan. The amendments triggered large protests in early July, which Uzbek authorities seemingly did not anticipate. The protests were quashed, harshly. According to official information, 18 people were killed and more than 200 injured. Internet access to the region was cut and prominent journalists and local leaders detained.

Mirziyoyev, however, immediately rescinded the proposed changes to Karakalpakstan’s status. In fact, Tashkent appears to have pumped the brakes on the entire constitutional referendum.

Why did these two constitutional referendum efforts take such divergent paths? To state the obvious: They occurred in distinct political contexts and at vastly different moments in political time.

Kazakhstan: A Time Ripe for Change

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered a State of the Nation address in March 2022, only two months after dramatic scenes of violence played out across Kazakhstan. Tokayev characterized the violence witnessed in January thusly:

In recent years, Kazakhstan has embarked on a path of radical modernization and transformation. Far-reaching transformations have begun in various spheres. Some influential persons did not like this. They hoped to continue their years-long illegal activity. Moreover, they were eager to gain power.

The conspirators formed an underground group of professional mercenaries, armed bandits and traitors from among the officials. Internal and external enemies of our state joined together to seize power. They directed peaceful protests in a destructive direction and used the people for their criminal purposes.

This is the core of the Kazakh state’s narrative regarding the events of “Bloody January.” Most serious analysts doubt the “external” element in the state’s narrative, given a lack of evidence to support it, while finding a grain of truth in the notion that “some influential persons” did not like the direction Tokayev was taking Kazakhstan. In Tokayev’s version, his radical reforms sparked a backlash; a more honest appraisal instead may blame the power Tokayev has assumed since taking over the presidency in 2019.

The slow transition from the Nazarbayev era to the Tokayev era reached its inevitable tipping point in January. Everything that has happened since supports that conclusion, particularly the de-Nazarbayevification of the Kazakh state. This has taken many forms, from the resignation of Nazarbayev family figures from top government and business posts to the arrest and conviction of others – for example, Nazarbayev’s nephew, the businessman Kairat Satybaldy, was sentenced in late September to six years on charges he embezzled from state-owned companies. Other changes required constitutional tinkering as Nazarbayev had seeded his legacy into the Kazakh Constitution itself.

Tokayev spent the bulk of his March speech laying out proposed amendments to the constitution, further efforts to achieve a “new” and “just” Kazakhstan. Among the proposed changes was a ban on close relatives of the president from serving in government posts, a clear swipe at the rampant nepotism of the Nazarbayev era. One amendment Tokayev didn’t explain in his speech that nevertheless ended up in the referendum was the the elimination of “Elbasy” – a title meaning “leader of the nation” which Nazarbayev gave himself and imbued with special privileges – from the text of the constitution. In deleting “Elbasy” from the constitution, Tokayev also revoked the immunity from prosecution for the former president and his family that had come with the title (though such protection for ex-presidents remains in place via other legislation).

In short, much of what Tokayev proposed with the referendum was, in fact, desired by the Kazakh public. The referendum had its critics, of course, who complained of a lack of direct consultation with the public, the rushed process, and the cosmetic nature of many of the suggested changes. On this last point, we can point to earlier “reforms” regarding protests laws as an example of a desired legal change yielding very little change in practical terms to date. But there were no complaints regarding the diminishment of Nazarbayev’s mark on the Kazakh state and only small protests of the vote.

Uzbekistan: Poor Planning, Bad Timing, Terrible Optics

In his second inaugural address in November 2021, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said that during the campaign “representatives of the electorate” suggested constitutional reform as the next step in Mirziyoyev’s efforts to realize a “New Uzbekistan.”

As the President, who is assuming the post for a new term, by deeply realizing the entire responsibility for today and the tomorrow of our Homeland, I want to assure: we shall ever firmly and decisively continue the democratic reforms, which we have started together with our people, and shall never turn back from this path!

Together we shall certainly build a New Uzbekistan!

That Mirziyoyev used his second inauguration – which should, technically, be his last given the current two-term limit in the Uzbek Constitution – to propose a referendum piqued the attention of many analysts. Miriyoyev’s predecessor, Islam Karimov, was notorious for tinkering with the constitution to buy himself more time in office.

In May 2022 a commission was formed in the Uzbek parliament to craft the referendum. In late June, when the draft of proposed amendments was put out for public review, one of the changes aimed to extend the presidential term from five to seven years. Sodiq Safoyev, deputy speaker of the Uzbek Senate, made it clear that if the proposed constitution were approved, it would reset the clock on Mirziyoyev’s presidential terms. In essence, Mirziyoyev aimed to pull a Karimov and buy himself a new term with a new constitution.

But it was another proposal that ultimately derailed the referendum: For some reason, included in the proposed amendments was the revocation of Karakalpakstan’s sovereignty and its legal right to seek secession from Uzbekistan. Tashkent clearly did not anticipate the backlash that swiftly came in the form of massive protests in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakstan, in the first week of July. As security forces suppressed the protests, Mirziyoyev immediately walked the offending set of proposals back.

The public consultation process, which began with the late June posting of the draft proposals, was supposed to last 10 days but was extended until August 1 in the wake of the Karakalpakstan protests. An OSCE needs assessment published in early August noted that the Uzbek Constitutional Commission had claimed that 117,000 proposals had been submitted by citizens, public institutions and other interested parties. In early October, Mirziyoyev said that the commission had received 150,000 proposals from the public.

“Can you imagine?! This is proof that our people are not indifferent to tomorrow,” Mirziyoyev said during an October 7 visit to the Sirdaryo Region. His remarks were the first major comments regarding the referendum since the close of the public comment period on August 1.

The Uzbek president foreshadowed further stalling: “The committee is currently working on proposals. In order to create a perfect, truly people's Constitution, which will become an expression of the aspirations of the people, I suggest not to rush.”

There’s no sense of when the commission will finalize the final draft text and send it to the parliament for approval. Only then will a date be set for the referendum. Mirziyoyev’s suggestion “not to rush” will invariably be heeded.

Two Referendums Diverged in the Woods of 2022

On the surface, the constitutional referendums in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have similar aims. As stated by the respective authorities, both referendums are efforts to cement further modernization of political systems and consolidate gains in democracy. The more cynical may see efforts to establish “new” versions of both countries as merely a changing of masks: From Nazarbayev to Tokayev, from Karimov to Mirziyoyev.

Where the two referendums diverged can be chalked up to timing and circumstances.

In the wake of Kazakhstan’s “Bloody January” the moment was ripe for any change that would diminish Nazarbayev’s legacy. By virtue of being still among the living and with a vast network of family relations that have gotten rich over the last 30 years, Nazarbayev is an easy target for Tokayev’s government. Kazakhstan’s sins can be laid at Nazarbayev’s feet and the Nazarbayevs can be punished, even if only symbolically.

At the same time Tokayev, cleverly, held off on tinkering with the presidential term length and limits until after the referendum – and passed those changes without a countrywide vote. Kazakhstan is now headed for a snap presidential election on November 20 in which Tokayev will certainly be elected to a new seven-year term. Technically, he’ll only be eligible for one seven-year term, but seven years is plenty of time to tinker with the rule book again.

In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, no such convenient crisis or living foe exists. Karimov, to put it bluntly, is very dead yet seemingly will never be gone. Karimov’s legacy is embedded deeply in Uzbekistan’s political ecosystem and Miziyoyev is a direct product of it. Tokayev, of course, was a Nazarbayev acolyte but has effectively separated himself. Mirziyoyev never has and it may be too late to do so.

We’ll have to wait and see what Uzbekistan’s Constitutional Commission puts forward as the final draft to face a referendum, whenever that happens. With the Karakalpakstan changes scrapped, there remain others that could spark dissent, especially if Mirziyoyev persists with pursuing alterations to his term in office. It could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back or an opportunity to truly listen to what the people want.