Is There Room for the US in Central Asia?

On September 14, 2022, the House Foriegn Affairs subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation met in a room in the Rayburn House Office Building across the street from the U.S. Capitol to hear testimony from key U.S. officials who deal with Central Asia. In opening the hearing – titled “Strengthening U.S. Engagement in Central Asia” – Rep. Ami Bera, of California, noted that it was “the first Foreign Affairs Committee hearing focused on this region since July 2018, which featured nongovernment witnesses.”

Bera trotted out the usual platitudes about how “central” Central Asia is, highlighting the region’s location between Afghanistan, China, Iran, and Russia. He noted U.S. engagement over the last three decades, including “more than $9 billion in direct assistance” and private sector investments of “over $31 billion.” He also highlighted China’s growing interest, particularly since the 2013 launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, in the region.

Bera then said that recent developments – the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, unrest in Kazakhstan in January, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – “have foisted Central Asian countries into the global spotlight.”

“But,” he continued, “it behooves us to have a sustained comprehensive approach toward this dynamic region based on its own merits.”

And just as Bera had prefaced the notion of paying attention to Central Asia “based on its own merits” with a discussion of its geopolitical position (and China in particular), the subcommittee’s ranking member, Rep. Steve Chabot of Ohio, followed by focusing on the region’s geopolitical position, and, of course, China.

“This region often gets less attention than it deserves. Yet, the fact that Central Asia does not sit squarely within Europe or the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific but instead at the border of all three is one of the things that makes it so important. 

Since ancient times, for example, this crossroads has linked East and West. Today, as the world becomes increasingly connected, its deserts and steppes will undoubtedly become busier than they've ever been before. 

As the United States engages in great power competition with the People's Republic of China and its partners in despotism – Iran and Russia – Central Asia is poised to be of critical importance in the years ahead.”

In noting that Iran was, at that very moment, in the process of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Chabot made a callback to the days of the George W. Bush administration: “Iran is set to become a member of the [the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], bringing together the world's new axis of, if not evil, true malevolence.”

Chabot, a Republican, pivoted into a counterterrorism discussion and fired a few broadsides at the Biden administration for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. He then tipped his cards and noted that he co-chairs the Kazakhstan Caucus and stated, without apparent irony, “I hope that the reforms that that country is undertaking now will bring it closer to the West.” Chabot had nice things to say about Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, too, the latter being “the most welcoming partner when it comes to counterterrorism in the region.”

Chabot’s remarks, more so than Bera’s, highlight a core tension in U.S. engagement with Central Asia: In order to engage with the states of Central Asia the United States has to effectively turn a blind eye to the very reasons the region is so closely aligned with “malevolent” actors – even more than simple geopolitics, it’s autocratic synergy at work.

There’s a degree of hypocrisy inherent in all foreign policy, as states balance their values with the practicalities of operating in the world as it is, not as we wish it would be. But Central Asia falls into a unique trap of having little independent value to the United States but having great geopolitical value. Washington’s relations with Central Asia are triangulated against Russia and China, most seriously, and occasionally Iran by Republicans who simply looked at a map.

For the last 20 years, Central Asia’s relations with the United States were tied, despite occasional protestations to the contrary, to Afghanistan and the war. At present, it’s Central Asia’s ties to Russia – and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – that motivate Washington’s ongoing outreach to the region. As Bera and Chabot’s remarks suggest, China is the anticipated rationale for U.S. engagement with Central Asia in the near future. 

The core tension noted above has only intensified over the last 20 years. Potential democracies in Central Asia have ossified into autocracies instead, bringing the region closer – politically and stylistically – to U.S. “enemies” like Russia and China.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are finally on their second generation of leaders, both of which – Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Shavkat Mirziyoyev – have promised democratic progress while at the same time consolidating power and setting the stage for lifetime rule. In Tajikistan, there’s a looming dynastic transition from father to son, a la North Korea, looming; in Turkmenistan, a dynastic transition happened earlier this year when Serdar Berdimuhamedov succeeded his father, Gurbanguly, as president. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has perfected a new style of revolving-door “democracy” in which a string of politicians take power and, after some time, are churned out of office – usually via protests, but at least once by voters.

All of this, however, has occurred at the same time as two other trends: Not only has the region’s geopolitical importance to the United States increased, but Washington has something to offer the region it actually wants.

During the congressional hearing noted above, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu, previously U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, highlighted the United States’ top priorities as supporting the “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Central Asian states.” This mantra ought to be familiar; it was laid out in the last revamp of the U.S. strategy toward Central Asia released in February 2020. It also, notably, does not necessitate “democracy.”

That strategy – released by the Trump administration just before it settled a deal with the Taliban to withdraw from Afghanistan – remains the framework for U.S. policy toward the region. Lu’s predecessor, Alice Wells, told The Diplomat in February 2020, fresh off a trip to the region, that “They want our diplomatic engagement, they very much value – this is the mantra – sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity because some of their other major neighbors don’t offer that.”

That part of the strategy was remarkably prescient. 

Lu, in his remarks, mentioned democracy and human rights last: “Finally, we are supporting human rights and democracy. We are clear eyed about serious human rights concerns in the region. Four of the five Central Asian countries have seen violent unrest in the past two years and repression of individuals for their religion, gender, political activities, or sexual orientation is widespread.”

He did not dwell on it long, however, returning within a few sentences to what remain the United States’ core concerns when it comes to Central Asia: “We are increasing our engagement in the region to demonstrate that we are a reliable partner and an alternative to Russia and to [China].”

The price of being an alternative to Russia and China as a partner for Central Asia is ignoring the elephant of dwindling democracy in the room and hoping no one gets crushed.