Natasha Kuhrt

Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the ongoing war, has had far-reaching economic and political consequences. In Asia, Russia’s relationships with China and India have been challenged by the invasion; ties with Beijing, however, have also been augmented through a shared anti-American position. In Central Asia, the war in Ukraine has been met with measured neutrality even as Russia’s ability to provide security in the region has been diminished and China has pursued regional transport projects that circumvent Russia. 

A decade ago, Russia – much like the United States – iterated a “pivot to Asia.” Russia’s effort to diversify relations across Asia have not necessarily met with much success.

To discuss these aspects of Russia’s relations in Asia and more, The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz spoke with Dr. Natasha Kuhrt, a senior lecturer in international peace and security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

There’s been a lot of discussion of how China views Russia, but how does Russia view China? Is Moscow happy with the level of support it has gotten from Beijing?

At the official level, the narrative in Russia is that relations are better than ever. Public opinion polls show ordinary Russians also feel similarly – a poll cited by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) in an August 2022 report noted that over 91 percent of Russian respondents and 98 percent of Chinese respondents feel that bilateral relations will grow even deeper; 72.6 percent of Russians and 87 percent of Chinese believe that the two countries should work to strengthen comprehensive strategic cooperation. 

In the economic sphere, at first glance trade looks to have increased, but this is mainly due to the rise in prices of oil and gas. China has taken full advantage of cheap Russian oil. There has also been discussion of Russia moving to the Chinese yuan as a reserve currency. However, there has been intense debate within the Russian government regarding the wisdom of such a move. A particular issue is the fact that the yuan is not fully convertible and the rate is controlled by Beijing, raising concerns that Russia could become a victim of Chinese manipulation.

While President Putin has expressed his gratitude to China for its support, other commentary hints at a more selfish Chinese attitude. For example, Andrei Kortunov, director of RIAC, suggests that “it would be hardly fair to define Beijing’s foreign policy as ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-Russian,’ since they have always been and will primarily be ‘pro-Chinese.’”

Indeed, the war in Ukraine has brought Chinese investment to a standstill, although it should be noted that China has always been a reluctant investor in Russia. 

Russia needs Chinese technology – in particular the technology that it previously obtained from the West. China now supplies around a third of Russia’s semiconductors, but increasingly the reliability of this technology is in doubt – around 40 percent of semiconductors imported by Russia since March 2022 from China were defective, as opposed to around 2 percent of imports before the war.

The 20th CCP Congress in October was viewed in Russia as highlighting a welcome continuity in Chinese domestic and foreign policy and the symbolism of authoritarian regime solidarity. Growing Chinese nationalist rhetoric, which could potentially seem dangerous to Russia, is actually welcomed by Russia as it goes hand in hand with increased anti-hegemonism (code for anti-Americanism) and thus Russian and Chinese agendas appear to be increasingly converging.

What about the states of Central Asia? How would you assess the state of the post-Soviet order? Is Russia losing influence and status in Central Asia as a result of the invasion of Ukraine?

Central Asian states may fear that Russia’s ability to provide security in the region will be compromised, given Russian focus on the war in Ukraine and the poor performance of the Russian military, as well as Russian narratives that show contempt for Ukraine’s right to sovereign statehood.

Kazakhstan refused to recognize the Donetsk People's Republic or Luhansk People's Republic, no doubt concerned regarding Kazakhstan’s own ethnic Russian population and its long border with Russia.

The lack of Russian reaction to the Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes in September is instructive. Russia failed to intervene in the Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict, despite the fact that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan host Russian bases and that both are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and despite the Kyrgyz president calling on Russia to mediate. The Kyrgyz-Tajik issue was not even discussed at the SCO summit in September 2022. As with the Kazakh unrest in early 2022, Russia portrayed the cross-border violence as the work of external forces, i.e. the West.

Some Central Asian states appeared to be taking advantage of perceived Russian weakness; for example ,Tajikistan got Russia to recognize the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) as a terrorist organization, a full seven years after Dushanbe labeled it as such.

At the SCO summit, Beijing signed agreements for two new railway projects with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, with potential plans for a southern link to Turkmenistan that continues on to Iran and then to Turkey. This would shorten the route to Europe for China by around eight days. Given Beijing’s previous dependence on Russia’s rail network for Central Asian projects this would be highly significant and would reduce Russian leverage.

The September 2022 SCO summit was hosted by Uzbekistan. The Uzbek president appeared to portray the SCO somewhat differently than Russia and China, noting the importance of preserving the non-aligned status of the SCO (which is different from the Chinese, and particularly Russian, emphasis on anti-Western norms). Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev suggested that “such a dialogue, free from geopolitical rivalry, ideological contradictions and disputes, is extremely in demand,” and he drew attention to practical projects such as trade and investment, and connectivity projects. 

Mirziyoyev’s emphasis on practical projects would seem closer to India’s approach to the SCO. India joined the organization in 2017, and has also shied away from Russia’s emphasis on the ideological dimension of the SCO.

Another Asian country whose relations with Russia have been much debated is India. How does Russia view India’s deepening relations with the United States, in particular its involvement with the Quad? 

Russia’s “flexible strategic partnership” with China, which some describe as an alliance, implies a concomitant downgrading of Russia’s partnership with India. Moreover, India’s growing closeness to Western security structures within the Indo-Pacific, and in particular the Quad, designed largely to contain China, is difficult for Russia. India has tended to value Russia for its role in managing China (for example by attempting to mediate in Sino-Indian border clashes in 2020). While the Ukraine war suggests that India may not wish to condemn Russia – it has not joined the Western sanctions and continues to buys cheap Russian oil – nor will it wish to be seen to side openly with an aggressive actor. 

Russia and India may need to reevaluate their relations, as Russia may become less valuable to India as a partner given India’s need for greater security relations with the United States. Russia has traditionally valued its relations with India as a way of balancing China, selling the more advanced weaponry to India ahead of China. However, Indian purchases of Russian arms peaked in around 2013 and India now seeks to diversify its arms trade. Moreover, India is being deprioritized in favor of China.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has drawn Russian ire, with Russia criticizing it as “artificial,” “divisive,” and “destructive,” seeming to echo China’s narrative. Further, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has accused the West of drawing India into “anti-China games” in order to reinstate a unipolar world, which would exclude Beijing and Moscow. The Russian foreign minister has also contrasted institutions such as the G-20, the BRICS and the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral, noting that they are built on “different values” to the Indo-Pacific concept.

Russia has taken a markedly more proactive role in the Indo-Pacific region, conducting regular joint bomber patrols with China, for example, thus veering from a studied neutrality on Indo-Pacific issues to supporting China’s view of the region. As India’s security partnership with the U.S. grows, Russia’s positioning will become more of a dilemma for India.

India’s policy of “non-alignment 2.0” is being severely tested by the war in Ukraine, as the G-20 summit in November 2022 showed. The G-20 Declaration condemning the Russian invasion was strongly worded, but it is unclear to what extent India was fully behind it. Nevertheless, India may now seek to distance itself from Russia.

One of the only countries to consistently side with Russia in forums like the United Nations is North Korea. What can be said about the Russian relationship with North Korea at present?

The DPRK reacted slowly to the invasion, taking a similar line to China, blaming NATO expansion as a threat to Russian security and also pointing to U.S. hegemonism. 

North Korea unsurprisingly voted against U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion and rejected the suspension of Russia from U.N. Human Rights Council.

Along with China, Russia has opposed statements by the U.S. and U.N. condemning North Korean missile launches. 

The greater support shown to the DPRK is not entirely new, but hitherto Russia had tried to pursue a policy of equidistance between the two Koreas. This seems to be changing.

In particular, as with the increasing emphasis on the new U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy widely seen as seeking to contain China, South Korea is increasing cooperation with the United States.

Russia and China have also criticized the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which the U.S. installed in South Korea.

Although Russia, as one of the five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) parties, is pledged to non-proliferation, it does not necessarily see the DPRK as a direct threat and insists sanctions are not the solution.

Russia's increasing dependence on China will only exacerbate Moscow’s support for the regime in Pyongyang. At the same time Russia and China have not unconditionally supported Pyongyang in its aggressive policies, wary of jeopardizing the already fragile stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia

In economic, terms Russia has pursued a “niche” diplomacy toward the DPRK for some years. The shared border (albeit only 17 kilometers) in Russia's Far East has seen North Korean workers play a key role in supplying labor to Russia's logging industry, although this was jeopardized by the U.N. sanctions. Russia has also attempted to push for joint infrastructure projects between Russia, North and South Korea in terms of railways and gas pipelines, although due to sanctions little has been achieved.

While economic cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Far East remains low in comparison to trade with China, and has been suspended since 2018 due to sanctions (UNSC 2397 prohibits Russia from importing food and agricultural products from the DPRK), official trade figures do not reflect the real volume of trade because much of it is indirect, going through Chinese intermediaries who take the goods across the border to the DPRK, thus evading sanctions.

Overall the current climate is beneficial for the DPRK, as tensions have only increased between the U.S. on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, which may give Pyongyang more opportunity to flex its military muscles and will obviously be to the detriment of any efforts at denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

A decade ago, Russia – much like the United States – stated an ambition to “pivot” toward Asia. In light of the invasion of Ukraine and ensuing fallout, what can be said of the Russian pivot to Asia as of 2022?

Russia’s track record in terms of its pivot to the Asia-Pacific is less than stellar. It had failed to diversify relations long before the Ukraine war, pursuing an increasingly Sinocentric policy since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea.

Still, even after 2014 there were some potential bright spots in relations with the countries of the region – Japan continued to seek better relations in a bid to resolve the territorial impasse, and Vietnam and Indonesia continued to buy Russian weaponry, seeing Russia as a potential hedge against Chinese assertiveness. India showed its discomfort with U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific that appeared to position it as part of the U.S. strategy to contain Chinese aggression, viewing Russia as helping to balance China. However, the Ukraine war and the new partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, as well as Russia’s more decisive support for Chinese positions there, including joint bomber patrols and encouragement of intimidating Chinese military behavior, means that these relationships are in jeopardy.