What the US Midterms Mean for Japan

In the 2022 midterm elections, U.S. voters by and large rejected conspiracy theorists and election deniers. Though the campaign season was nerve-wracking to follow for everyone who cared about the United States’ future as a liberal democracy, and the stage is set for protracted legislative battles over the next two years, the results were encouraging.

It was also encouraging for the United States’ democratic allies, such as Japan. Japan’s leaders have invested a lot of capital in disseminating the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as an organizing principle for security in the Indo-Pacific. While it is unlikely that U.S. President Joe Biden would abandon this catch phrase, regardless of the midterm results, or that any potential Republican president in the future will drop the phrase, “free” does not have quite the same ring when it is being upheld by an illiberal state.

Semantics aside, even before the election results were in, most analysts did not expect a radical change in U.S. foreign policy even if voters had delivered Biden a fully divided government. The gap between Republicans and Democrats is not as wide in the foreign policy realm as it is in the domestic policy realm. Furthermore, the executive branch has greater autonomy over foreign policy than it does over domestic policy.

However, there are still variations in foreign policy depending on which party holds Congress – for example, how strongly the United States would stand with the Ukrainians or against China. Congress still controls the purse and must agree to any funding for government policy, including military assistance to Taiwan and Ukraine. Looking at the people NHK chose to interview, and what questions they asked, the Japanese media were clearly interested in the impact that the election might have on the United States’ Ukraine policy.

Another cause of relief for U.S. allies, including Japan, is the electoral defeat of many isolationist Republicans. Separate from more concrete debates over the U.S. approach to China, Russia, Ukraine, and Iran, there is also a growing segment of the Republican Party that, abstractly, prefers an isolationist approach to foreign policy. Although they are unlikely to be a true political force in the short term, the fact that they did not fare well in this election cycle is also encouraging for U.S. allies.

One area of stark foreign policy difference, and an area where Congress would play an important role, is international cooperation to combat climate change. Japan – and many other rich democracies – are relieved that Biden’s Democratic Party has maintained a hold on power, at least enough that the United States will not backslide on this important and time-sensitive issue.

Japan is also looking forward to continuing close cooperation with the United States on traditional security issues, including strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan’s defense capabilities to deal with China and North Korea.

Given Japan’s dependence on the alliance, one could reasonably expect the Japanese public to care about who is leading the United States. However, according to a survey conducted by the Sydney-based United States Studies Center before the midterms, 43 percent of all Japanese respondents answered that if Biden won a second term in 2024 it would be neither good nor bad for Japan, and an additional 20 percent answered that they did not know. Only 14 percent believed a second Biden term would be bad or very bad for Japan, and 23 percent that it would be good or very good for Japan.

While Japanese respondents might be unsure of a Biden second term, they have stronger opinions about the impact of Donald Trump winning a second term in 2024 for Japan: 41 percent answered that Trump winning another term would be bad or very bad for Japan; 15 percent answered that it would be good or very good for Japan; 26 percent answered that it would be neither good nor bad; and 18 percent answered that they did not know.

In conclusion, although Japanese leaders and the Japanese public remain understandably wary of Trump’s return in 2024, this November’s election in the United States was mostly good news for Japan. While the Democrats will control the Senate and the Republicans will control the House, Biden will remain comfortably in charge of U.S. foreign policy. This will mean greater stability and predictability for U.S. policy in Asia, though Biden’s presence in Asia may not have been as strong as others would have liked. It also likely means a continued emphasis on Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

The first negotiations for IPEF will be held in Brisbane, Australia on December 10-15 by the 14 participating countries. The IPEF will focus on four pillars: (1) supply chains, (2) clean energy, decarbonization and infrastructure, (3) tax and anti-corruption, and (4) trade. But given that lowered tariffs and increased market access are not on the table, why are so many states interested in joining? The hope for the IPEF is that it will create mechanisms to defend against economic coercion by China. Whether Biden’s midterm reprieve can translate into meaningful deliverables in international cooperation over climate change and regional economic cooperation remains to be seen.