Cross-Strait Relations in 2023

2022 was a difficult year for cross-strait relations. Admittedly, the situation has been generally tense since China decided to stonewall Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen upon her inauguration in May 2016.

Tsai, part of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), would not fully endorse the “1992 Consensus,” a vague agreement between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) that there is only one China. As a result, China cut off cross-strait dialogue platforms with Tsai’s government, resumed efforts to poach Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and – most worryingly – upped its military presence in the Taiwan Strait.

Things came to a head in August 2022, when U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, becoming the first person of her rank to do so since 1997. China had issued dire warnings against her trip beforehand and reacted fiercely afterward. The military drills that followed, running from August 4 to 15, involved China launching missiles into areas of the ocean on all sides of Taiwan – including a reported five missiles that flew over Taiwan itself. Meanwhile, China deployed a record number of naval vessels and aircraft in the Taiwan Strait, repeatedly crossing the median line between the island of Taiwan and the Chinese coast.

Some of these incursions persisted through the end of 2022, causing researchers Adrian Ang U-Jin and Olli Pekka Suorsa to argue, “Since the beginning of August 2022, the PLA has established a ‘new normal’ in the Taiwan Strait, with the previously acknowledged median line erased entirely.”

Amid these developments, some analysts – and some top U.S. defense officials – suggested repeatedly that China could invade Taiwan within the next five years, further escalating the sense of crisis.

We could see recent history repeat itself in 2023. New U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (a Republican) has declared his intention to pay a visit to Taiwan, not wanting to be outdone by his Democratic predecessor. If he makes such a trip, it would start the provocation cycle all over again – and Beijing’s reaction could be even stronger. China absolutely does not want such visits to become a tradition, and Beijing would be incredibly frustrated to see its previous response wasn’t enough to deter a repeat performance. The pressure to up the ante would be huge.

Any cross-strait tensions will take place against the backdrop of Taiwan’s looming presidential election, set for early 2024. The race is wide open, as incumbent President Tsai is prevented by term limits from running again. Taiwan’s presidential elections typically have a strong focus on cross-strait policies, so we’ll see more discussion and debate of Taipei’s approach to Beijing during the party primaries and the ensuing election campaign.

It’s still early, and we don’t know for sure who will even run. That said, so far, the current frontrunners for the candidates are William Lai of the DPP and Hou You-yi of the KMT.

Lai – previously Tsai’s premier, now her vice president – actually challenged her as the DPP’s presidential candidate in 2020, saying he thought he could better protect Taiwan from China’s aggression. Indeed, Lai has been more assertive on Taiwan’s status than Tsai, once saying that he “advocates Taiwan independence.” Lai has since moderated that to match Tsai’s position that Taiwan is already de facto independent and doesn’t need to take any additional steps to achieve independence. But he’s still closer to a pro-independence candidate than Tsai, and her election was enough to give Beijing fits.

Hou, the mayor of New Taipei since 2018, is more of a wild card. While he’s affiliated with the KMT, he was a member of the DPP for over 10 years before switching back to the KMT in 2013. Hou was even personal friends with previous President Chen Shui-bian, the first Taiwanese president from the DPP, known for his pro-independence rhetoric. Having never held national office, Hou hasn’t been pressed much on his cross-strait positions – yet. If he does throw his hat in the ring, that’s sure to change.

Hou’s party, the KMT, is typically seen as “pro-China”; the last KMT president, Ma Ying-jeou made outreach to Beijing the central platform of his administration. Recent KMT candidates have only furthered that perception, to the party’s detriment. Hung Hsiu-chu, who advocated for ending purchases of U.S. arms and moving toward “one China, same interpretations,” proved so unpopular that she was replaced as the KMT’s presidential candidate just three months before the 2016 election. The KMT’s 2020 candidate, Han Kuo-yu, was seen as Beijing’s choice – to the extent of allegedly benefiting from China’s disinformation campaigns. He lost in a landslide, with Tsai winning by nearly 20 points.

Given the KMT’s drubbings in the past two presidential elections, the positioning of its candidate – whether Hou, party chair Eric Chu, or someone else – on cross-strait issues is key. Since Hung Hsiu-chu was forced out as party chair, the KMT’s top leaders have all acknowledged the need to shake the party’s “pro-China” image. Whether the party picks a candidate with a more moderate stance or another “deep Blue” out of touch with the public on China issues could seal the KMT’s presidential hopes.

For Beijing, however, a long-term move away from the 1992 Consensus by the KMT would be disastrous. China has long seen the KMT, which originated on the mainland, as its preferred interlocutor. If that party also begins to distance itself from Beijing – as Taiwan’s voters has repeatedly demonstrated they prefer – China won’t have many options for engaging peacefully with Taiwan.

To avoid that scenario, China’s leaders may be tempted to “talk tough” on Taiwan in the lead-up to the election, but that would be unwise. Xi Jinping gave a forceful speech in 2019 that stressed China was determined to achieve unification under the “one country, two systems” framework. With Taiwanese already deeply alarmed by China’s crackdown on Hong Kong – the poster child for “one country, two systems” – Xi’s speech gave a huge boost to Tsai’s popularity ahead of the 2020 election.

Xi’s approach to cross-strait relations looks even less palatable to Taiwanese now than it did then, with Hong Kong’s “two systems” forcefully subsumed under Beijing’s quest for control. A new white paper on Taiwan issued by China’s State Council in August 2022 sparked further alarm by removing previous assurances that Taiwan could keep its way of life intact after unification. Xi Jinping also emphasized in his work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 that the “wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” adding more fuel to the burning speculation that China has a timeline in mind for a potential invasion.

Any further moves by CCP leaders on cross-strait relations in 2023 will reverberate through Taiwan’s presidential campaign. And that, in turn, will set the scene for cross-strait relations not only in 2023, but through 2028.